• My augmentation to foundationalism

    From olcott@21:1/5 to All on Sun Oct 17 09:23:01 2021
    XPost: sci.logic, comp.theory

    The epistemological foundation is the notion of truth itself is anchored
    in philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/

    Here is my addition to this field: Knowledge is a fully justified true
    belief such that the truth of the belief is a necessary consequence of
    its justification.

    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

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  • From olcott@21:1/5 to Jim Burns on Sun Oct 17 12:55:15 2021
    XPost: sci.logic, comp.theory

    On 10/17/2021 12:44 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 10:23 AM, olcott wrote:

    Here is my addition to this field:
    Knowledge is a fully justified true belief

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
    |
    | Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier,
    | Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases")
    | challenge the long-held justified true belief (JTB)
    | account of knowledge.

    | In a 1966 scenario known as "The sheep in the field", Roderick
    | Chisholm asks us to imagine that someone, X, is standing outside
    | a field looking at something that looks like a sheep (although
    | in fact, it is a dog disguised as a sheep). X believes there is
    | a sheep in the field, and in fact, X is right because there is a
    | sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field. Hence, X has a
    | justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field. But is
    | that belief knowledge?

    such that the truth of the belief is a necessary consequence of
    its justification.

    We have evidence (sometimes).
    The evidence justifies a belief (sometimes).
    The justified belief is also true (sometimes).

    We might not have evidence of some true circumstance.

    If we have evidence of it, it might not be enough or
    we might not understand the consequences of the evidence.

    ( A good example of this:
    ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sum_and_Product_Puzzle
    ( |
    ( | The Sum and Product Puzzle, also known as the Impossible
    ( | Puzzle because it seems to lack sufficient information
    ( | for a solution, is a logic puzzle.

    Anyway, for various reason, our beliefs might not reflect
    the evidence we have.

    We might think we have evidence for a certain belief,
    and we would be correct to believe it on that basis, but
    the evidence is not what it seems to be. Coincidentally,
    what we have been tricked into believing is actually true.
    Justified belief that is also true. Is it knowledge?


    We can correct for the Gettier problem (with my correction) by defining knowledge as:

    Knowledge is a fully justified true belief such that the truth of the
    belief is a necessary consequence of its justification.

    This is best applied to the analytic side of the philosophical analytic
    / synthetic distinction where an expression of language can be verified
    as true entirely on the basis of its meaning.


    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

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  • From Jim Burns@21:1/5 to olcott on Sun Oct 17 13:44:22 2021
    XPost: sci.logic, comp.theory

    On 10/17/2021 10:23 AM, olcott wrote:

    Here is my addition to this field:
    Knowledge is a fully justified true belief

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
    |
    | Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier,
    | Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases")
    | challenge the long-held justified true belief (JTB)
    | account of knowledge.

    | In a 1966 scenario known as "The sheep in the field", Roderick
    | Chisholm asks us to imagine that someone, X, is standing outside
    | a field looking at something that looks like a sheep (although
    | in fact, it is a dog disguised as a sheep). X believes there is
    | a sheep in the field, and in fact, X is right because there is a
    | sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field. Hence, X has a
    | justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field. But is
    | that belief knowledge?

    such that the truth of the belief is a necessary consequence of
    its justification.

    We have evidence (sometimes).
    The evidence justifies a belief (sometimes).
    The justified belief is also true (sometimes).

    We might not have evidence of some true circumstance.

    If we have evidence of it, it might not be enough or
    we might not understand the consequences of the evidence.

    ( A good example of this:
    ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sum_and_Product_Puzzle
    ( |
    ( | The Sum and Product Puzzle, also known as the Impossible
    ( | Puzzle because it seems to lack sufficient information
    ( | for a solution, is a logic puzzle.

    Anyway, for various reason, our beliefs might not reflect
    the evidence we have.

    We might think we have evidence for a certain belief,
    and we would be correct to believe it on that basis, but
    the evidence is not what it seems to be. Coincidentally,
    what we have been tricked into believing is actually true.
    Justified belief that is also true. Is it knowledge?

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  • From olcott@21:1/5 to Richard Damon on Mon Oct 18 09:55:58 2021
    XPost: comp.theory, sci.lang.semantics, sci.logic

    On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:

    On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:

    I will put it in simpler terms.
    The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete logical
    certainty that an expression of language is true is when its truth
    can be totally verified entirely on the basis of its meaning.

    This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.

    But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable (in some
    fields).


    Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are simply
    excluded from the body of knowledge.

    But may still be true.

    That does not matter they do not count as truth or as knowledge until
    after they have been proven true.

    Only Wittgenstein understood this: (see page 6 for full quote)

    https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel


    And it is also a fact that you might not know if
    something can be in the body of knowledge.

    That is very simple if it is true and no one knows it then it is not
    knowledge.


    Math is built on logical definitions that allow for statements to
    exist that we know must be either True of False, but that we are
    unable to actually 'prove' by analytical proof which it is.


    Any expression of language that cannot be proven true is necessarily
    untrue, yet possibly also not false. Some expressions of language are
    simply not bearers of truth values.

    WRONG. That statement was disproved a century ago.

    This is a misconception based on defining truth and knowledge in an
    incoherent way.

    There are statements
    which it is provable that they must be either True or False, but it is impossible to actually prove if they are True or False.


    That is the same kind of crap that has nitwits believing that there was election fraud when there was no evidence of election fraud.

    When a large group of people have a psychotic break from reality on the
    basis of Nazi style propaganda the one key thing that would point them
    to the actual truth is the idea that no statement is true until after it
    has been proven.

    One interesting problem with your position, is it turns out that if you
    won't accept that a statement is a Truth Bearer unless it is provable,
    then there exist statements that you can't tell if they ARE Truth
    Bearers or not, as you can't prove if they are provable. And this
    continues to infinity.

    Yes this is correct. When we really don't know it can be quite horrific
    in some cases for us to presume that we do know. With my system we have
    a finite set of expressions of language that are confirmed to be
    definitely true and an infinite set that are unconfirmed as true.

    There are some things that are known to be true the rest are unknown to
    be true with no emotional attachment to an opinion (belief) inbetween.

    There is also a weight of evidence to be applied when we have incomplete information. When there is no evidence that an expression of language is
    true it is still considered possible thus carries negligible weight.

    Whatever view objectively carries the most weight of evidence becomes
    the current working hypothesis.


    THis means that you really can't make a statement to be decided on until
    you prove that it IS decidable, and you can't really ask if it is
    decidable until your prove that its decidability is decidable, and so on.


    This whole overload of the term "decidable" is far too misleading. The
    actual case is that the reason that we cannot decide between yes and no
    is that the expression of langugae is simply not truth bearer.

    What time is it (yes or no)? I can't decide (make up my mind.)

    This severely limits the power of a system of logic that refuses to acknowledge the existance of truth values for statements that are not provable.


    Their truth values don't exist.
    "This sentence is not true."
    is indeed not true because it is not a truth bearer.

    You seem to be a century behind in the theories of knowledge, probably because you refuse to study some of what has been done because you don't 'believe' they can be right. You have basically condemned yourself to
    repeat the errors of the past, and don't have the excusses that they did
    back then.


    I simply have a deeper insight because I studied these things from first principles rather than even tentatively accept the preexisting framework
    of misconceptions.

    I have known since 1997 that if Gödel's 1931 incompleteness theorem and
    the halting problem are correct then the basic notion of truth itself
    must be broken. Tarski's Undefinability theorem (that directly applies
    to the notion of truth itself) confirms this.

    Yes, There ARE realms where you can use that sort of logic, but there
    are also realms where it does not work. You just don't understand where
    that line is and it bashes you in the head and makes you stupid.

    It works for the entire body of analytical knowledge: Expressions of
    language that can be verified as completely true entirely based on their meaning.

    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

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  • From Jim Burns@21:1/5 to olcott on Mon Oct 18 12:12:19 2021
    XPost: comp.theory, sci.lang.semantics, sci.logic

    On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:

    I will put it in simpler terms.
    The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
    logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
    when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
    of its meaning.
    This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.

    But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
    (in some fields).

    Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
    simply excluded from the body of knowledge.

    But may still be true.

    That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
    knowledge until after they have been proven true.

    A modest proposal:
    Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
    need not be about only reality).

    '4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
    It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
    |
    | Betty had four apples.
    | Then she gave two of them to Bill.
    | How many does she have now?

    I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
    "analytic symbol grab-bags".

    But what is reality?
    |
    | Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
    | doesn't go away.
    |
    ― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon

    It seems to me that welding truth to knowledge misses the
    point of truth, which is that, if we play our cards right,
    we can expand knowledge further into truth. You suggest that
    there is no "there" there to expand into.

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  • From olcott@21:1/5 to Jim Burns on Mon Oct 18 12:08:28 2021
    XPost: sci.lang.semantics, sci.logic

    On 10/18/2021 11:12 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:

    I will put it in simpler terms.
    The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
    logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
    when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
    of its meaning.
    This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.

    But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
    (in some fields).

    Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
    simply excluded from the body of knowledge.

    But may still be true.

    That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
    knowledge until after they have been proven true.

    A modest proposal:
    Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
    need not be about only reality).

    '4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
    It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
    |
    | Betty had four apples.
    | Then she gave two of them to Bill.
    | How many does she have now?

    I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
    "analytic symbol grab-bags".

    But what is reality?
    |
    | Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
    | doesn't go away.
    |

    Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in a vat thought
    experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

    The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable" decision
    problems that are actually only "undecidable" because they are simply
    not truth bearers.

    ― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon

    It seems to me that welding truth to knowledge misses the
    point of truth, which is that, if we play our cards right,
    we can expand knowledge further into truth. You suggest that
    there is no "there" there to expand into.


    As Wittgenstein agrees until an expression of language has been proven
    true it does not count as true. Haskell Curry has a similar position.

    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

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  • From olcott@21:1/5 to Jim Burns on Mon Oct 18 11:32:45 2021
    XPost: sci.lang.semantics, sci.logic

    On 10/18/2021 11:12 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:

    I will put it in simpler terms.
    The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
    logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
    when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
    of its meaning.
    This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.

    But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
    (in some fields).

    Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
    simply excluded from the body of knowledge.

    But may still be true.

    That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
    knowledge until after they have been proven true.

    A modest proposal:
    Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
    need not be about only reality).

    '4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
    It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
    |
    | Betty had four apples.
    | Then she gave two of them to Bill.
    | How many does she have now?

    I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
    "analytic symbol grab-bags".

    But what is reality?
    |
    | Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
    | doesn't go away.
    |

    Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in a vat thought
    experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

    The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable" decision
    problems that are actually only "undecidable" because they are simply
    not truth bearers.

    ― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon

    It seems to me that welding truth to knowledge misses the
    point of truth, which is that, if we play our cards right,
    we can expand knowledge further into truth. You suggest that
    there is no "there" there to expand into.


    As Wittgenstein agrees until an expression of language has been proven
    true it does not count as true. Haskell Curry has a similar position.

    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Jim Burns@21:1/5 to olcott on Mon Oct 18 13:58:05 2021
    XPost: sci.lang.semantics, sci.logic

    On 10/18/2021 12:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 11:12 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:

    I will put it in simpler terms.
    The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
    logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
    when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
    of its meaning.
    This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.

    But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
    (in some fields).

    Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
    simply excluded from the body of knowledge.

    But may still be true.

    That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
    knowledge until after they have been proven true.

    A modest proposal:
    Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
    need not be about only reality).

    '4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
    It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
    |
    | Betty had four apples.
    | Then she gave two of them to Bill.
    | How many does she have now?

    I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
    "analytic symbol grab-bags".

    But what is reality?
    |
    | Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
    | doesn't go away.
    |
    ― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon

    Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
    physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
    a vat thought experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

    | Synsepalum dulcificum is a plant in the Sapotaceae family known for
    | its berry that, when eaten, causes sour foods (such as lemons and
    | limes) subsequently consumed to taste sweet. This effect is due to
    | miraculin. Common names for this species and its berry include
    | miracle fruit, miracle berry, miraculous berry, sweet berry, and
    | in West Africa, where the species originates, agbayun, taami, asaa,
    | and ledidi.
    |
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synsepalum_dulcificum

    There is a reality of sugar being in the thing you're eating or a
    reality of sugar not being in it.

    There is a _sensation_ (sweetness) of sugar being in the thing
    you're eating or a reality of sugar not being in it.

    The reality and the sensation agree, for the most part. That's
    why we associate sweetness with sugar. They do not always agree.
    That's why they're not the same.

    The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
    decision problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
    they are simply not truth bearers.

    You haven't explained anything. When we look inside your
    definitions, we see that you're saying undecidable decision
    problems are not decidable decision problems.

    You seem to want to contradict Philip K Dick:
    You want to stop believing in undecidable decision problems,
    after which they should go away. I disagree that _reality_
    is like that.

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  • From olcott@21:1/5 to Jim Burns on Mon Oct 18 13:15:43 2021
    XPost: sci.lang.semantics, sci.logic

    On 10/18/2021 12:58 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 12:32 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 11:12 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
    On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:

    I will put it in simpler terms.
    The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
    logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
    when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
    of its meaning.
    This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.

    But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
    (in some fields).

    Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
    simply excluded from the body of knowledge.

    But may still be true.

    That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
    knowledge until after they have been proven true.

    A modest proposal:
    Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
    need not be about only reality).

    '4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
    It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
    |
    | Betty had four apples.
    | Then she gave two of them to Bill.
    | How many does she have now?

    I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
    "analytic symbol grab-bags".

    But what is reality?
    |
    | Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
    | doesn't go away.
    |
    ― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon

    Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
    physical  sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
    a vat thought  experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

    | Synsepalum dulcificum is a plant in the Sapotaceae family known for
    | its berry that, when eaten, causes sour foods (such as lemons and
    | limes) subsequently consumed to taste sweet. This effect is due to
    | miraculin. Common names for this species and its berry include
    | miracle fruit, miracle berry, miraculous berry, sweet berry, and
    | in West Africa, where the species originates, agbayun, taami, asaa,
    | and ledidi.
    |
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synsepalum_dulcificum

    There is a reality of sugar being in the thing you're eating or a
    reality of sugar not being in it.


    There is an empirical truth of sugar being contained in some foods.

    There is a _sensation_ (sweetness) of sugar being in the thing
    you're eating or a reality of sugar not being in it.


    It has been empirically validated that what appears to be the physical sensation of sweetness is associated with the presence of sugar.

    The reality and the sensation agree, for the most part. That's
    why we associate sweetness with sugar. They do not always agree.
    That's why they're not the same.

    The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
    decision  problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
    they are simply  not truth bearers.

    You haven't explained anything. When we look inside your
    definitions, we see that you're saying undecidable decision
    problems are not decidable decision problems.


    The only reason that we cannot "decide" whether or not an undecidable proposition is true or false is that this "undecidable proposition" is
    not a truth bearer, thus a semantically incorrect proposition.

    You seem to want to contradict Philip K Dick:
    You want to stop believing in undecidable decision problems,
    after which they should go away. I disagree that _reality_
    is like that.


    They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are accurately
    construed as semantically incorrect rather than undecidable.

    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Jim Burns@21:1/5 to olcott on Mon Oct 18 19:04:31 2021
    XPost: sci.lang.semantics, sci.logic

    On 10/18/2021 2:15 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 12:58 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 12:32 PM, olcott wrote:

    Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
    physical  sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
    a vat thought  experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

    | Synsepalum dulcificum is a plant in the Sapotaceae family known for
    | its berry that, when eaten, causes sour foods (such as lemons and
    | limes) subsequently consumed to taste sweet. This effect is due to
    | miraculin. Common names for this species and its berry include
    | miracle fruit, miracle berry, miraculous berry, sweet berry, and
    | in West Africa, where the species originates, agbayun, taami, asaa,
    | and ledidi.
    |
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synsepalum_dulcificum

    There is a reality of sugar being in the thing you're eating or a
    reality of sugar not being in it.

    There is an empirical truth of sugar being contained in
    some foods.

    There is a _sensation_ (sweetness) of sugar being in the thing
    you're eating or a reality of sugar not being in it.


    It has been empirically validated that what appears to be
    the physical sensation of sweetness is associated with
    the presence of sugar.

    Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
    physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
    a vat thought experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

    Reality and sensations are not the same.
    Consider what happens when one chews Synsepalum dulcificum.

    The reality and the sensation agree, for the most part. That's
    why we associate sweetness with sugar. They do not always agree.
    That's why they're not the same.

    The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
    decision  problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
    they are simply  not truth bearers.

    You haven't explained anything. When we look inside your
    definitions, we see that you're saying undecidable decision
    problems are not decidable decision problems.

    The only reason that we cannot "decide" whether or not
    an undecidable proposition is true or false is that this
    "undecidable proposition" is not a truth bearer,

    You previously defined "truth bearer" as "decidable proposition".
    Am I mistaken about that?

    The following is not useful:

    _truth bearer_ -- See "decidable proposition"
    _decidable proposition_ -- See "truth bearer"

    thus a semantically incorrect proposition.

    You seem to want to contradict Philip K Dick:
    You want to stop believing in undecidable decision problems,
    after which they should go away. I disagree that _reality_
    is like that.

    They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
    accurately construed as semantically incorrect rather than
    undecidable.

    Consider this fragment of set theory:
    I. If sets x and y have the same elements, then x = y.
    II. An empty set exists.
    III. If sets x and y exist, then set x ∪ {y} exists.

    Perhaps
    no domain of sets exists which satisfies I,II,III.

    On the other hand,
    *IF* there is a domain D of sets which satisfies I,II,III, *THEN*
    for each claim about the sets in D, there is a corresponding
    set in D.

    For each finite sequence of claims about the sets in D, there is
    a corresponding set in D.

    For each proof from I,II,III (proof == finite sequence of claims)
    _about_ D, there is a corresponding set _in_ D.

    There are a lot of details supporting my claims which I've
    left out, but they're fairly straightforward.

    None of that looks semantically incorrect to me.

    For here, it's a hop, skip, and a jump to claims which are true-but-not-provable from I,II,III about the sets in D.

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  • From Jim Burns@21:1/5 to olcott on Mon Oct 18 19:50:26 2021
    XPost: sci.lang.semantics, sci.logic

    On 10/18/2021 7:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 6:04 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 2:15 PM, olcott wrote:

    They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
    accurately  construed as semantically incorrect rather than
    undecidable.

    Consider this fragment of set theory:
    I. If sets x and y have the same elements, then x = y.
    II. An empty set exists.
    III. If sets x and y exist, then set x ∪ {y} exists.

    Perhaps
    no domain of sets exists which satisfies I,II,III.

    On the other hand,
    *IF* there is a domain D of sets which satisfies I,II,III, *THEN*
    for each claim about the sets in D, there is a corresponding
    set in D.

    For each finite sequence of claims about the sets in D, there is
    a corresponding set in D.

    For each proof from I,II,III (proof == finite sequence of claims)
    _about_ D, there is a corresponding set _in_ D.

    There are a lot of details supporting my claims which I've
    left out, but they're fairly straightforward.

    None of that looks semantically incorrect to me.

    Does any of that look semantically incorrect to you?

    For here, it's a hop, skip, and a jump to claims which are
    true-but-not-provable from I,II,III about the sets in D.

    The claim is not actually true but unprovable,
    the claim is true in F yet unprovable in F.

    "Unprovable in F" looks a lot like "not-provable from I,II,III"
    Are you agreeing or disagreeing with me?

    True and unprovable would be analogous to black and
    totally colorless.

    True without saying true _of what_ and provable without saying
    provable _from what_ would be more analogous to
    | 'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
    | Did gyre and gimble in the wabe.

    Luckily for me, I haven't done either of those things.
    See above for what's what.

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  • From olcott@21:1/5 to Jim Burns on Mon Oct 18 18:33:27 2021
    XPost: sci.lang.semantics, sci.logic

    On 10/18/2021 6:04 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 2:15 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 12:58 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 12:32 PM, olcott wrote:

    Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
    physical  sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
    a vat thought  experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

    | Synsepalum dulcificum is a plant in the Sapotaceae family known for
    | its berry that, when eaten, causes sour foods (such as lemons and
    | limes) subsequently consumed to taste sweet. This effect is due to
    | miraculin. Common names for this species and its berry include
    | miracle fruit, miracle berry, miraculous berry, sweet berry, and
    | in West Africa, where the species originates, agbayun, taami, asaa,
    | and ledidi.
    |
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synsepalum_dulcificum

    There is a reality of sugar being in the thing you're eating or a
    reality of sugar not being in it.

    There is an empirical truth of sugar being contained in
    some foods.

    There is a _sensation_ (sweetness) of sugar being in the thing
    you're eating or a reality of sugar not being in it.


    It has been empirically validated that what appears to be
    the physical  sensation of sweetness is associated with
    the presence of sugar.

    Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
    physical  sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
    a vat thought  experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/

    Reality and sensations are not the same.
    Consider what happens when one chews Synsepalum dulcificum.

    The reality and the sensation agree, for the most part. That's
    why we associate sweetness with sugar. They do not always agree.
    That's why they're not the same.

    The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
    decision  problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
    they are simply  not truth bearers.

    You haven't explained anything. When we look inside your
    definitions, we see that you're saying undecidable decision
    problems are not decidable decision problems.

    The only reason that we cannot "decide" whether or not
    an undecidable  proposition is true or false is that this
    "undecidable proposition" is  not a truth bearer,

    You previously defined "truth bearer" as "decidable proposition".
    Am I mistaken about that?

    The following is not useful:

    _truth bearer_  --  See "decidable proposition"
    _decidable proposition_  --  See "truth bearer"


    Mathematics is not incomplete on the basis that it cannot prove
    semantically incoherent expressions of language.

    thus a semantically incorrect proposition.

    You seem to want to contradict Philip K Dick:
    You want to stop believing in undecidable decision problems,
    after which they should go away. I disagree that _reality_
    is like that.

    They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
    accurately  construed as semantically incorrect rather than
    undecidable.

    Consider this fragment of set theory:
    I. If sets x and y have the same elements, then x = y.
    II. An empty set exists.
    III. If sets x and y exist, then set x ∪ {y} exists.

    Perhaps
    no domain of sets exists which satisfies I,II,III.

    On the other hand,
    *IF* there is a domain D of sets which satisfies I,II,III, *THEN*
    for each claim about the sets in D, there is a corresponding
    set in D.

    For each finite sequence of claims about the sets in D, there is
    a corresponding set in D.

    For each proof from I,II,III (proof == finite sequence of claims)
    _about_ D, there is a corresponding set _in_ D.

    There are a lot of details supporting my claims which I've
    left out, but they're fairly straightforward.

    None of that looks semantically incorrect to me.

    For here, it's a hop, skip, and a jump to claims which are true-but-not-provable from I,II,III about the sets in D.

    The claim is not actually true but unprovable, the claim is true in F
    yet unprovable in F. True and unprovable would be analogous to black and totally colorless.

    Here it is expressed by Tarski:
    https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

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  • From olcott@21:1/5 to Jim Burns on Tue Oct 19 09:14:23 2021
    XPost: sci.lang.semantics, sci.logic

    On 10/18/2021 6:50 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 7:33 PM, olcott wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 6:04 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
    On 10/18/2021 2:15 PM, olcott wrote:

    They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
    accurately  construed as semantically incorrect rather than
    undecidable.

    Consider this fragment of set theory:
    I. If sets x and y have the same elements, then x = y.
    II. An empty set exists.
    III. If sets x and y exist, then set x ∪ {y} exists.

    Perhaps
    no domain of sets exists which satisfies I,II,III.

    On the other hand,
    *IF* there is a domain D of sets which satisfies I,II,III, *THEN*
    for each claim about the sets in D, there is a corresponding
    set in D.

    For each finite sequence of claims about the sets in D, there is
    a corresponding set in D.

    For each proof from I,II,III (proof == finite sequence of claims)
    _about_ D, there is a corresponding set _in_ D.

    There are a lot of details supporting my claims which I've
    left out, but they're fairly straightforward.

    None of that looks semantically incorrect to me.

    Does any of that look semantically incorrect to you?

    For here, it's a hop, skip, and a jump to claims which are
    true-but-not-provable from I,II,III about the sets in D.

    The claim is not actually true but unprovable,
    the claim is true in F  yet unprovable in F.

    "Unprovable in F" looks a lot like "not-provable from I,II,III"
    Are you agreeing or disagreeing with me?

    True and unprovable would be analogous to black and
    totally colorless.

    True without saying true _of what_ and provable without saying
    provable _from what_ would be more analogous to
    | 'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
    | Did gyre and gimble in the wabe.

    Luckily for me, I haven't done either of those things.
    See above for what's what.


    True and unprovable is the same sort of crap where 1/3 if the USA
    electorate believe that Trump only lost the election because of election
    fraud that is unprovable because there is no evidence of election fraud.

    Unprovable means untrue. (yet not false). Wittgenstein understood this.

    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

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