On 10/17/2021 10:23 AM, olcott wrote:
Here is my addition to this field:
Knowledge is a fully justified true belief
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
|
| Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier,
| Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases")
| challenge the long-held justified true belief (JTB)
| account of knowledge.
| In a 1966 scenario known as "The sheep in the field", Roderick
| Chisholm asks us to imagine that someone, X, is standing outside
| a field looking at something that looks like a sheep (although
| in fact, it is a dog disguised as a sheep). X believes there is
| a sheep in the field, and in fact, X is right because there is a
| sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field. Hence, X has a
| justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field. But is
| that belief knowledge?
such that the truth of the belief is a necessary consequence of
its justification.
We have evidence (sometimes).
The evidence justifies a belief (sometimes).
The justified belief is also true (sometimes).
We might not have evidence of some true circumstance.
If we have evidence of it, it might not be enough or
we might not understand the consequences of the evidence.
( A good example of this:
( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sum_and_Product_Puzzle
( |
( | The Sum and Product Puzzle, also known as the Impossible
( | Puzzle because it seems to lack sufficient information
( | for a solution, is a logic puzzle.
Anyway, for various reason, our beliefs might not reflect
the evidence we have.
We might think we have evidence for a certain belief,
and we would be correct to believe it on that basis, but
the evidence is not what it seems to be. Coincidentally,
what we have been tricked into believing is actually true.
Justified belief that is also true. Is it knowledge?
Here is my addition to this field:
Knowledge is a fully justified true belief
such that the truth of the belief is a necessary consequence of
its justification.
On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
I will put it in simpler terms.
The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete logical
certainty that an expression of language is true is when its truth
can be totally verified entirely on the basis of its meaning.
This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable (in some
fields).
Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are simply
excluded from the body of knowledge.
But may still be true.
And it is also a fact that you might not know if
something can be in the body of knowledge.
Math is built on logical definitions that allow for statements to
exist that we know must be either True of False, but that we are
unable to actually 'prove' by analytical proof which it is.
Any expression of language that cannot be proven true is necessarily
untrue, yet possibly also not false. Some expressions of language are
simply not bearers of truth values.
WRONG. That statement was disproved a century ago.
There are statements
which it is provable that they must be either True or False, but it is impossible to actually prove if they are True or False.
One interesting problem with your position, is it turns out that if you
won't accept that a statement is a Truth Bearer unless it is provable,
then there exist statements that you can't tell if they ARE Truth
Bearers or not, as you can't prove if they are provable. And this
continues to infinity.
THis means that you really can't make a statement to be decided on until
you prove that it IS decidable, and you can't really ask if it is
decidable until your prove that its decidability is decidable, and so on.
This severely limits the power of a system of logic that refuses to acknowledge the existance of truth values for statements that are not provable.
You seem to be a century behind in the theories of knowledge, probably because you refuse to study some of what has been done because you don't 'believe' they can be right. You have basically condemned yourself to
repeat the errors of the past, and don't have the excusses that they did
back then.
Yes, There ARE realms where you can use that sort of logic, but there
are also realms where it does not work. You just don't understand where
that line is and it bashes you in the head and makes you stupid.
On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
I will put it in simpler terms.
The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
of its meaning.
This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
(in some fields).
Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
simply excluded from the body of knowledge.
But may still be true.
That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
knowledge until after they have been proven true.
On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
I will put it in simpler terms.
The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
of its meaning.
This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
(in some fields).
Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
simply excluded from the body of knowledge.
But may still be true.
That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
knowledge until after they have been proven true.
A modest proposal:
Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
need not be about only reality).
'4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
|
| Betty had four apples.
| Then she gave two of them to Bill.
| How many does she have now?
I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
"analytic symbol grab-bags".
But what is reality?
|
| Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
| doesn't go away.
|
― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon
It seems to me that welding truth to knowledge misses the
point of truth, which is that, if we play our cards right,
we can expand knowledge further into truth. You suggest that
there is no "there" there to expand into.
On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
I will put it in simpler terms.
The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
of its meaning.
This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
(in some fields).
Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
simply excluded from the body of knowledge.
But may still be true.
That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
knowledge until after they have been proven true.
A modest proposal:
Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
need not be about only reality).
'4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
|
| Betty had four apples.
| Then she gave two of them to Bill.
| How many does she have now?
I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
"analytic symbol grab-bags".
But what is reality?
|
| Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
| doesn't go away.
|
― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon
It seems to me that welding truth to knowledge misses the
point of truth, which is that, if we play our cards right,
we can expand knowledge further into truth. You suggest that
there is no "there" there to expand into.
On 10/18/2021 11:12 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
I will put it in simpler terms.
The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
of its meaning.
This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
(in some fields).
Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
simply excluded from the body of knowledge.
But may still be true.
That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
knowledge until after they have been proven true.
A modest proposal:
Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
need not be about only reality).
'4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
|
| Betty had four apples.
| Then she gave two of them to Bill.
| How many does she have now?
I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
"analytic symbol grab-bags".
But what is reality?
|
| Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
| doesn't go away.
|
― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon
Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
a vat thought experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
decision problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
they are simply not truth bearers.
On 10/18/2021 12:32 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/18/2021 11:12 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
On 10/18/2021 10:55 AM, olcott wrote:
On 10/17/2021 4:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 10/17/21 4:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/17/2021 3:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 10/17/21 3:06 PM, olcott wrote:
I will put it in simpler terms.
The only way that we can know with 100% perfectly complete
logical certainty that an expression of language is true is
when its truth can be totally verified entirely on the basis
of its meaning.
This does provide the foundation of all analytical truth.
But the flaw is that not all analytical truths are knowable
(in some fields).
Expressions of language that have unknown truth values are
simply excluded from the body of knowledge.
But may still be true.
That does not matter they do not count as truth or as
knowledge until after they have been proven true.
A modest proposal:
Analytic truths _constrain_ reality (though it's true they
need not be about only reality).
'4 - 2 = 2' is an analytic truth.
It _constrains_ what the real answer can be to
|
| Betty had four apples.
| Then she gave two of them to Bill.
| How many does she have now?
I think that this is why we call them "truths" instead of
"analytic symbol grab-bags".
But what is reality?
|
| Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it,
| doesn't go away.
|
― Philip K. Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon
Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
a vat thought experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
| Synsepalum dulcificum is a plant in the Sapotaceae family known for
| its berry that, when eaten, causes sour foods (such as lemons and
| limes) subsequently consumed to taste sweet. This effect is due to
| miraculin. Common names for this species and its berry include
| miracle fruit, miracle berry, miraculous berry, sweet berry, and
| in West Africa, where the species originates, agbayun, taami, asaa,
| and ledidi.
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synsepalum_dulcificum
There is a reality of sugar being in the thing you're eating or a
reality of sugar not being in it.
There is a _sensation_ (sweetness) of sugar being in the thing
you're eating or a reality of sugar not being in it.
The reality and the sensation agree, for the most part. That's
why we associate sweetness with sugar. They do not always agree.
That's why they're not the same.
The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
decision problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
they are simply not truth bearers.
You haven't explained anything. When we look inside your
definitions, we see that you're saying undecidable decision
problems are not decidable decision problems.
You seem to want to contradict Philip K Dick:
You want to stop believing in undecidable decision problems,
after which they should go away. I disagree that _reality_
is like that.
On 10/18/2021 12:58 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
On 10/18/2021 12:32 PM, olcott wrote:
Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
a vat thought experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
| Synsepalum dulcificum is a plant in the Sapotaceae family known for
| its berry that, when eaten, causes sour foods (such as lemons and
| limes) subsequently consumed to taste sweet. This effect is due to
| miraculin. Common names for this species and its berry include
| miracle fruit, miracle berry, miraculous berry, sweet berry, and
| in West Africa, where the species originates, agbayun, taami, asaa,
| and ledidi.
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synsepalum_dulcificum
There is a reality of sugar being in the thing you're eating or a
reality of sugar not being in it.
There is an empirical truth of sugar being contained in
some foods.
There is a _sensation_ (sweetness) of sugar being in the thing
you're eating or a reality of sugar not being in it.
It has been empirically validated that what appears to be
the physical sensation of sweetness is associated with
the presence of sugar.
Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
a vat thought experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
The reality and the sensation agree, for the most part. That's
why we associate sweetness with sugar. They do not always agree.
That's why they're not the same.
The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
decision problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
they are simply not truth bearers.
You haven't explained anything. When we look inside your
definitions, we see that you're saying undecidable decision
problems are not decidable decision problems.
The only reason that we cannot "decide" whether or not
an undecidable proposition is true or false is that this
"undecidable proposition" is not a truth bearer,
thus a semantically incorrect proposition.
You seem to want to contradict Philip K Dick:
You want to stop believing in undecidable decision problems,
after which they should go away. I disagree that _reality_
is like that.
They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
accurately construed as semantically incorrect rather than
undecidable.
On 10/18/2021 6:04 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
On 10/18/2021 2:15 PM, olcott wrote:
They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
accurately construed as semantically incorrect rather than
undecidable.
Consider this fragment of set theory:
I. If sets x and y have the same elements, then x = y.
II. An empty set exists.
III. If sets x and y exist, then set x ∪ {y} exists.
Perhaps
no domain of sets exists which satisfies I,II,III.
On the other hand,
*IF* there is a domain D of sets which satisfies I,II,III, *THEN*
for each claim about the sets in D, there is a corresponding
set in D.
For each finite sequence of claims about the sets in D, there is
a corresponding set in D.
For each proof from I,II,III (proof == finite sequence of claims)
_about_ D, there is a corresponding set _in_ D.
There are a lot of details supporting my claims which I've
left out, but they're fairly straightforward.
None of that looks semantically incorrect to me.
For here, it's a hop, skip, and a jump to claims which are
true-but-not-provable from I,II,III about the sets in D.
The claim is not actually true but unprovable,
the claim is true in F yet unprovable in F.
True and unprovable would be analogous to black and
totally colorless.
On 10/18/2021 2:15 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/18/2021 12:58 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
On 10/18/2021 12:32 PM, olcott wrote:
Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
a vat thought experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
| Synsepalum dulcificum is a plant in the Sapotaceae family known for
| its berry that, when eaten, causes sour foods (such as lemons and
| limes) subsequently consumed to taste sweet. This effect is due to
| miraculin. Common names for this species and its berry include
| miracle fruit, miracle berry, miraculous berry, sweet berry, and
| in West Africa, where the species originates, agbayun, taami, asaa,
| and ledidi.
|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synsepalum_dulcificum
There is a reality of sugar being in the thing you're eating or a
reality of sugar not being in it.
There is an empirical truth of sugar being contained in
some foods.
There is a _sensation_ (sweetness) of sugar being in the thing
you're eating or a reality of sugar not being in it.
It has been empirically validated that what appears to be
the physical sensation of sweetness is associated with
the presence of sugar.
Reality is (what at least appears to be) a continuous stream of
physical sensations. This remains true even in the brain in
a vat thought experiment. https://iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
Reality and sensations are not the same.
Consider what happens when one chews Synsepalum dulcificum.
The reality and the sensation agree, for the most part. That's
why we associate sweetness with sugar. They do not always agree.
That's why they're not the same.
The scope of analytical knowledge encompasses "undecidable"
decision problems that are actually only "undecidable" because
they are simply not truth bearers.
You haven't explained anything. When we look inside your
definitions, we see that you're saying undecidable decision
problems are not decidable decision problems.
The only reason that we cannot "decide" whether or not
an undecidable proposition is true or false is that this
"undecidable proposition" is not a truth bearer,
You previously defined "truth bearer" as "decidable proposition".
Am I mistaken about that?
The following is not useful:
_truth bearer_ -- See "decidable proposition"
_decidable proposition_ -- See "truth bearer"
thus a semantically incorrect proposition.
You seem to want to contradict Philip K Dick:
You want to stop believing in undecidable decision problems,
after which they should go away. I disagree that _reality_
is like that.
They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
accurately construed as semantically incorrect rather than
undecidable.
Consider this fragment of set theory:
I. If sets x and y have the same elements, then x = y.
II. An empty set exists.
III. If sets x and y exist, then set x ∪ {y} exists.
Perhaps
no domain of sets exists which satisfies I,II,III.
On the other hand,
*IF* there is a domain D of sets which satisfies I,II,III, *THEN*
for each claim about the sets in D, there is a corresponding
set in D.
For each finite sequence of claims about the sets in D, there is
a corresponding set in D.
For each proof from I,II,III (proof == finite sequence of claims)
_about_ D, there is a corresponding set _in_ D.
There are a lot of details supporting my claims which I've
left out, but they're fairly straightforward.
None of that looks semantically incorrect to me.
For here, it's a hop, skip, and a jump to claims which are true-but-not-provable from I,II,III about the sets in D.
On 10/18/2021 7:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 10/18/2021 6:04 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
On 10/18/2021 2:15 PM, olcott wrote:
They are simply misclassified, they still exist yet are
accurately construed as semantically incorrect rather than
undecidable.
Consider this fragment of set theory:
I. If sets x and y have the same elements, then x = y.
II. An empty set exists.
III. If sets x and y exist, then set x ∪ {y} exists.
Perhaps
no domain of sets exists which satisfies I,II,III.
On the other hand,
*IF* there is a domain D of sets which satisfies I,II,III, *THEN*
for each claim about the sets in D, there is a corresponding
set in D.
For each finite sequence of claims about the sets in D, there is
a corresponding set in D.
For each proof from I,II,III (proof == finite sequence of claims)
_about_ D, there is a corresponding set _in_ D.
There are a lot of details supporting my claims which I've
left out, but they're fairly straightforward.
None of that looks semantically incorrect to me.
Does any of that look semantically incorrect to you?
For here, it's a hop, skip, and a jump to claims which are
true-but-not-provable from I,II,III about the sets in D.
The claim is not actually true but unprovable,
the claim is true in F yet unprovable in F.
"Unprovable in F" looks a lot like "not-provable from I,II,III"
Are you agreeing or disagreeing with me?
True and unprovable would be analogous to black and
totally colorless.
True without saying true _of what_ and provable without saying
provable _from what_ would be more analogous to
| 'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
| Did gyre and gimble in the wabe.
Luckily for me, I haven't done either of those things.
See above for what's what.
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