On Thursday, 29 December 2022 at 19:27:44 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) is establishedIdiot.
entirely on the basis of semantic connections between expressions of
language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” cannot exist: >>
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) is established entirely on the basis of semantic connections between expressions of
language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” cannot exist:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Instead of conventional model theory the body of analytic knowledge is represented as knowledge ontology (acyclic directed graph) of
connections between expressions of language.
Nodes in this tree of knowledge represent unique individual conceptsRight, and is a proper superset of the ALL POSSIBLE analytic knowledge,
roughly equivalent to the individual sense meanings of dictionary definitions. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(computer_science)
*The Tarski Undefinability Proof*
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Because some of these semantic connections are currently unknown the set
of analytically true expressions of language is a proper superset of the
set of analytic knowledge.
If the Goldbach conjecture requires an infinite proof then it would have
an unknowable truth value, and yet still seem to be a truth bearer. https://www.britannica.com/science/Goldbach-conjecture
“Analytic” sentences, such as “Pediatricians are doctors,” have historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by
knowing those meanings. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/
On 12/29/22 12:27 PM, olcott wrote:
Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) is established
entirely on the basis of semantic connections between expressions of
language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” cannot exist: >>
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
WRONG.
Because Truth can be established by an infinite series of semantic connections, but a proof requires a finite series.
Instead of conventional model theory the body of analytic knowledge is
represented as knowledge ontology (acyclic directed graph) of
connections between expressions of language.
Which becomes infinite when we need to include the fact that a proof
does not exist.
Right, and is a proper superset of the ALL POSSIBLE analytic knowledge, because some Analytic Truths are not Finitely provable.
Nodes in this tree of knowledge represent unique individual concepts
roughly equivalent to the individual sense meanings of dictionary
definitions. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(computer_science)
*The Tarski Undefinability Proof*
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Because some of these semantic connections are currently unknown the set
of analytically true expressions of language is a proper superset of the
set of analytic knowledge.
If the Goldbach conjecture requires an infinite proof then it would have
an unknowable truth value, and yet still seem to be a truth bearer.
https://www.britannica.com/science/Goldbach-conjecture
So you admit that unknowable truths exist.
********************************************************************** * *
* This contradicts your statement above that True requires provable. * * *
**********************************************************************
“Analytic” sentences, such as “Pediatricians are doctors,” have
historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the
meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by
knowing those meanings.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/
And "Statement x is provable" is known to be an Analytic Truth Bearer,
even if we do not know if it is, or even can be, determined if it is true.
On 12/29/2022 12:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/22 12:27 PM, olcott wrote:
Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) is established
entirely on the basis of semantic connections between expressions of
language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” cannot exist: >>>
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
WRONG.
Because Truth can be established by an infinite series of semantic
connections, but a proof requires a finite series.
Instead of conventional model theory the body of analytic knowledge is
represented as knowledge ontology (acyclic directed graph) of
connections between expressions of language.
Which becomes infinite when we need to include the fact that a proof
does not exist.
Right, and is a proper superset of the ALL POSSIBLE analytic
Nodes in this tree of knowledge represent unique individual concepts
roughly equivalent to the individual sense meanings of dictionary
definitions. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(computer_science)
*The Tarski Undefinability Proof*
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Because some of these semantic connections are currently unknown the set >>> of analytically true expressions of language is a proper superset of the >>> set of analytic knowledge.
knowledge, because some Analytic Truths are not Finitely provable.
If the Goldbach conjecture requires an infinite proof then it would have >>> an unknowable truth value, and yet still seem to be a truth bearer.
https://www.britannica.com/science/Goldbach-conjecture
So you admit that unknowable truths exist.
**********************************************************************
* *
* This contradicts your statement above that True requires provable. *
* *
**********************************************************************
“Analytic” sentences, such as “Pediatricians are doctors,” have
historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the
meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by
knowing those meanings.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/
And "Statement x is provable" is known to be an Analytic Truth Bearer,
even if we do not know if it is, or even can be, determined if it is
true.
These things are all a work-in-progress as I use the process of
elimination to chop off the imperfections of my proposal.
Expressions of language that cannot be proven or refuted because they
are self-contradictory are not truth bearers.
This tosses the Tarski Undefinability theorem out on its ass because
this theorem has the (self-contradictory) Liar Paradox as its
foundational basis. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
It is more difficult to see that Tarski Undefinability forms an exact isomorphism to 1931 Gödel Incompleteness. Tarski is derived from Gödel.
Expressions of language that cannot be proven or refuted only because
they require infinite proofs are truth bearers with unknown truth
values. The Goldbach conjecture may or may not require an infinite
proof, none-the-less it seems that it must be true or false, thus a
truth bearer.
On 12/29/22 2:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/22 12:27 PM, olcott wrote:
Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) is established >>>> entirely on the basis of semantic connections between expressions of
language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” cannot exist:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
WRONG.
Because Truth can be established by an infinite series of semantic
connections, but a proof requires a finite series.
Instead of conventional model theory the body of analytic knowledge is >>>> represented as knowledge ontology (acyclic directed graph) of
connections between expressions of language.
Which becomes infinite when we need to include the fact that a proof
does not exist.
Right, and is a proper superset of the ALL POSSIBLE analytic
Nodes in this tree of knowledge represent unique individual concepts
roughly equivalent to the individual sense meanings of dictionary
definitions. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(computer_science) >>>>
*The Tarski Undefinability Proof*
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Because some of these semantic connections are currently unknown the
set
of analytically true expressions of language is a proper superset of
the
set of analytic knowledge.
knowledge, because some Analytic Truths are not Finitely provable.
If the Goldbach conjecture requires an infinite proof then it would
have
an unknowable truth value, and yet still seem to be a truth bearer.
https://www.britannica.com/science/Goldbach-conjecture
So you admit that unknowable truths exist.
**********************************************************************
* *
* This contradicts your statement above that True requires provable. *
* *
**********************************************************************
“Analytic” sentences, such as “Pediatricians are doctors,” have >>>> historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the >>>> meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by
knowing those meanings.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/
And "Statement x is provable" is known to be an Analytic Truth
Bearer, even if we do not know if it is, or even can be, determined
if it is true.
These things are all a work-in-progress as I use the process of
elimination to chop off the imperfections of my proposal.
So admit to your imperfections so you can see where you need to work.
Expressions of language that cannot be proven or refuted because they
are self-contradictory are not truth bearers.
But the statements in question are NOT "self-contradictory". You have
AGREED that statements of provability are ALWAYS truth bearers (perhaps
of unknown truth value), so can not be self-contradictory.
This tosses the Tarski Undefinability theorem out on its ass because
this theorem has the (self-contradictory) Liar Paradox as its
foundational basis. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Except that he doesn't actually use the Liar Paradox in its original
form, but the transform that no longer talks about the Truth of the statement, to the provability of the statement.
You inability to understand the differenceis your undoing here.
It is more difficult to see that Tarski Undefinability forms an exact
isomorphism to 1931 Gödel Incompleteness. Tarski is derived from Gödel.
Expressions of language that cannot be proven or refuted only because
they require infinite proofs are truth bearers with unknown truth
values. The Goldbach conjecture may or may not require an infinite
proof, none-the-less it seems that it must be true or false, thus a
truth bearer.
So you AGREE that there can be statements which are True but Unprovable, which contradicts your claim that True(x) implies Provable(x).
On 12/29/2022 2:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/22 2:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:Except that he doesn't actually use the Liar Paradox in its original
form, but the transform that no longer talks about the Truth of the
statement, to the provability of the statement.
He does use the Lair paradox in its original form:
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy
of the liar in the metalanguage, by forming in the
language itself a sentence x such that the sentence of
the metalanguage which is correlated with x asserts
that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
You inability to understand the differenceis your undoing here.
It is more difficult to see that Tarski Undefinability forms an exact
isomorphism to 1931 Gödel Incompleteness. Tarski is derived from Gödel. >>>
Expressions of language that cannot be proven or refuted only because
they require infinite proofs are truth bearers with unknown truth
values. The Goldbach conjecture may or may not require an infinite
proof, none-the-less it seems that it must be true or false, thus a
truth bearer.
So you AGREE that there can be statements which are True but
Unprovable, which contradicts your claim that True(x) implies
Provable(x).
Not quite:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨~x)
~True(x) ↔ (~⊨x)
If there are no known or unknown semantic connections that derive the
truth of The Goldbach conjecture then it is not true.
On 12/29/22 3:31 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 2:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/22 2:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:Except that he doesn't actually use the Liar Paradox in its original
form, but the transform that no longer talks about the Truth of the
statement, to the provability of the statement.
He does use the Lair paradox in its original form:
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy
of the liar in the metalanguage, by forming in the
language itself a sentence x such that the sentence of
the metalanguage which is correlated with x asserts
that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
You are missing the context, he isn't saying that we can just express
the liar's paradox, but that under this set of assumptions, we can PROVE
it true, which shows the system is inconsistent.
It isn't that the Metalanguage has an issue with not a statement not
being a Truth Bearer, but that given a definition of Truth, there will
exist a statement that both it and its antinomy can both be proven true.
You inability to understand the differenceis your undoing here.
It is more difficult to see that Tarski Undefinability forms an exact
isomorphism to 1931 Gödel Incompleteness. Tarski is derived from Gödel. >>>>
Expressions of language that cannot be proven or refuted only because
they require infinite proofs are truth bearers with unknown truth
values. The Goldbach conjecture may or may not require an infinite
proof, none-the-less it seems that it must be true or false, thus a
truth bearer.
So you AGREE that there can be statements which are True but
Unprovable, which contradicts your claim that True(x) implies
Provable(x).
Not quite:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨~x)
~True(x) ↔ (~⊨x)
So are you still saying that "x is Provable" will always be True or False?
Are you trying to equivocate and say that "x is Provable" might just be
~True but not False?
If there are no known or unknown semantic connections that derive the
truth of The Goldbach conjecture then it is not true.
But an infinite unknown series of semantic connection means a statement
is True but not Provable (since Provable means showing a finite series
of connections).
On 12/29/2022 2:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/22 3:31 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 2:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/22 2:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:Except that he doesn't actually use the Liar Paradox in its original
form, but the transform that no longer talks about the Truth of the
statement, to the provability of the statement.
He does use the Lair paradox in its original form:
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy
of the liar in the metalanguage, by forming in the
language itself a sentence x such that the sentence of
the metalanguage which is correlated with x asserts
that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
You are missing the context, he isn't saying that we can just express
the liar's paradox, but that under this set of assumptions, we can
PROVE it true, which shows the system is inconsistent.
The Liar Paradox is not true therefore his proof that it is true is
wrong. Truth bearers must have (semantic connection) truth makers.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of
itself” we can know that unification will fail because it specifies
“some kind of infinite structure.” that causes the LP expression to be rejected by unify_with_occurs_check.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
It isn't that the Metalanguage has an issue with not a statement not
being a Truth Bearer, but that given a definition of Truth, there will
exist a statement that both it and its antinomy can both be proven true. >>
Only if one does the proof incorrectly.
Prolog detects and rejects the Liar Paradox (as shown above).
You inability to understand the differenceis your undoing here.
It is more difficult to see that Tarski Undefinability forms an exact >>>>> isomorphism to 1931 Gödel Incompleteness. Tarski is derived from
Gödel.
Expressions of language that cannot be proven or refuted only because >>>>> they require infinite proofs are truth bearers with unknown truth
values. The Goldbach conjecture may or may not require an infinite
proof, none-the-less it seems that it must be true or false, thus a
truth bearer.
So you AGREE that there can be statements which are True but
Unprovable, which contradicts your claim that True(x) implies
Provable(x).
Not quite:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨~x)
~True(x) ↔ (~⊨x)
So are you still saying that "x is Provable" will always be True or
False?
Are you trying to equivocate and say that "x is Provable" might just
be ~True but not False?
Self contradictory sentences are never true or false.
That Tarski thinks they are is his mistake.
If there are no known or unknown semantic connections that derive the
truth of The Goldbach conjecture then it is not true.
But an infinite unknown series of semantic connection means a
statement is True but not Provable (since Provable means showing a
finite series of connections).
Yes and the lack of an infinite or finite sequence of semantic
connections that makes the sentence true means that it is untrue.
On 12/30/22 10:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 2:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/22 3:31 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 2:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/29/22 2:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:Except that he doesn't actually use the Liar Paradox in its
original form, but the transform that no longer talks about the
Truth of the statement, to the provability of the statement.
He does use the Lair paradox in its original form:
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy
of the liar in the metalanguage, by forming in the
language itself a sentence x such that the sentence of
the metalanguage which is correlated with x asserts
that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
You are missing the context, he isn't saying that we can just
express the liar's paradox, but that under this set of assumptions,
we can PROVE it true, which shows the system is inconsistent.
The Liar Paradox is not true therefore his proof that it is true is
wrong. Truth bearers must have (semantic connection) truth makers.
Right, so unles you can point to an actual ERROR he makes in his proof,
the fact that it proves a statement that can't be true says one of the
input hypothesis is wrong, in this case, the hypothesis that Truth has a defintion.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of
itself” we can know that unification will fail because it specifies
“some kind of infinite structure.” that causes the LP expression to be >> rejected by unify_with_occurs_check.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
You DO understand that Prolog can't handle all logic system?
You reliance on it seems to demostrate your lack of understanding of
what you are claiming.
It isn't that the Metalanguage has an issue with not a statement not
being a Truth Bearer, but that given a definition of Truth, there
will exist a statement that both it and its antinomy can both be
proven true.
Only if one does the proof incorrectly.
Prolog detects and rejects the Liar Paradox (as shown above).
Right, and since the steps of the proof ARE correct, it means one of the premises is false, namely that we can form a correct defintion of Truth.
The fact that your brain can't handle how (dis)proof by contradiction
works, shows you to be incapable of actually handling logic.
You inability to understand the differenceis your undoing here.
It is more difficult to see that Tarski Undefinability forms an exact >>>>>> isomorphism to 1931 Gödel Incompleteness. Tarski is derived from
Gödel.
Expressions of language that cannot be proven or refuted only because >>>>>> they require infinite proofs are truth bearers with unknown truth
values. The Goldbach conjecture may or may not require an infinite >>>>>> proof, none-the-less it seems that it must be true or false, thus a >>>>>> truth bearer.
So you AGREE that there can be statements which are True but
Unprovable, which contradicts your claim that True(x) implies
Provable(x).
Not quite:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨~x)
~True(x) ↔ (~⊨x)
So are you still saying that "x is Provable" will always be True or
False?
Are you trying to equivocate and say that "x is Provable" might just
be ~True but not False?
Self contradictory sentences are never true or false.
That Tarski thinks they are is his mistake.
No, that isn't what he claims. He KNOWS the Self Contradictoy sentences
are never true, so a system that can PROVE such a statement has an error.
If there are no known or unknown semantic connections that derive
the truth of The Goldbach conjecture then it is not true.
But an infinite unknown series of semantic connection means a
statement is True but not Provable (since Provable means showing a
finite series of connections).
Yes and the lack of an infinite or finite sequence of semantic
connections that makes the sentence true means that it is untrue.
But the existance of ONLY an infinite sequence of semantic connections
for a sentence make it True but Unprovable.
Thus your idea that all Truth is Provable is debunked, and you are shown
to be an idiot.
On 12/30/2022 10:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
But the existance of ONLY an infinite sequence of semantic connections
for a sentence make it True but Unprovable.
Thus your idea that all Truth is Provable is debunked, and you are
shown to be an idiot.
My prior claim that every true statement must be provable is either
qualified to allow infinite proofs or changed to refer to semantic connections that may be finite or infinite.
Thus an expression of language is never true unless it is connected to
its truth maker.
On 12/30/22 11:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 10:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
But the existance of ONLY an infinite sequence of semantic
connections for a sentence make it True but Unprovable.
Thus your idea that all Truth is Provable is debunked, and you are
shown to be an idiot.
My prior claim that every true statement must be provable is either
qualified to allow infinite proofs or changed to refer to semantic
connections that may be finite or infinite.
If you allow your "Proof" to be infinite, then you have broken the link between provable and knowable, and have left the language that everyone
else is talking.
Since some Semantic Statement DO require an infinite set of semantic connections, but knowable requries a finite set of semantic connections,
we have that there exsits some statements that are True but not
knowable, and thus not Provable by the classical definition.
Thus an expression of language is never true unless it is connected to
its truth maker.
Right, but that connection might not be knowable, because it is
infinite, and thus not provable by the classical meaning.
If you redefine your idea of "Proof" to include "infinite proofs" you
have just made you logic system incompatible with ALL standard logic
that requires it to be finite, so you need to restart at the begining.
You are going to need to define SOMETHING, to indicate actually knowable
due to having a finite proof. Knowable isn't actually a good word for
this, as we often want to include in knowable not just things proven
with a finite analytical proof, but also things knowable by direct
sensation.
Thus, if you redefine "Provable" to include an infinite sequence of
steps, it becomes just a synonym for True, and we have lost the use of
it for its normal use, and need to replace it with something more
clumbsy like Analytically Knowable.
The claim you seem to want to make is that all Analytically True
statements are Anayltically Knowable, but that is a false statement.
You try to hide the error by redefining the words and saying that all Analytical True statements are Provable, and implying that this means Analytically Knowable, but that is wrong because you are using
incompatible meanings of Provable.
You need to actually DEFINE what you mean by your terms, and any term
that doesn't mean what it means what it actually means in classical
logic can not use any of the results from classical logic.
You seem to want to change the foundation, but then expect that the
whole structure built on it will stay mostly the same. That is a false assumption. If you change the base, you need to work up from that base
and see what changes above it, but going through ALL the steps,
especially those that depend on the things you have changed, to see what actually changes.
Many of your ideas you think of as "New" are not really new, just you
have failed to see their use in the past. They might not have used your names, but they did use the same base ideas. The limitations of these
ideas have been long established.
On 12/30/2022 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 11:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 10:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
But the existance of ONLY an infinite sequence of semantic
connections for a sentence make it True but Unprovable.
Thus your idea that all Truth is Provable is debunked, and you are
shown to be an idiot.
My prior claim that every true statement must be provable is either
qualified to allow infinite proofs or changed to refer to semantic
connections that may be finite or infinite.
If you allow your "Proof" to be infinite, then you have broken the
link between provable and knowable, and have left the language that
everyone else is talking.
You and I already know that the possibility that an expression of
language can only be confirmed as true by an infinite proof then the
link between true and knowable was already broken.
Since some Semantic Statement DO require an infinite set of semantic
connections, but knowable requries a finite set of semantic
connections, we have that there exsits some statements that are True
but not knowable, and thus not Provable by the classical definition.
When infinite proofs are required to verify the truth of an expression
of language and formal systems are not allowed to have infinite proofs
then unprovable in no way means that the formal system is in any way incomplete.
Thus an expression of language is never true unless it is connected to
its truth maker.
Right, but that connection might not be knowable, because it is
infinite, and thus not provable by the classical meaning.
Yet formal systems that are not allowed to have infinite proofs cannot
be called "incomplete" because they lack an infinite proof.
If you redefine your idea of "Proof" to include "infinite proofs" you
have just made you logic system incompatible with ALL standard logic
that requires it to be finite, so you need to restart at the begining.
We can simply use my semantic version instead: True(x) ↔ (⊨x).
You are going to need to define SOMETHING, to indicate actually
knowable due to having a finite proof. Knowable isn't actually a good
word for this, as we often want to include in knowable not just things
proven with a finite analytical proof, but also things knowable by
direct sensation.
Thus, if you redefine "Provable" to include an infinite sequence of
steps, it becomes just a synonym for True, and we have lost the use of
it for its normal use, and need to replace it with something more
clumbsy like Analytically Knowable.
The claim you seem to want to make is that all Analytically True
statements are Anayltically Knowable, but that is a false statement.
You try to hide the error by redefining the words and saying that all
Analytical True statements are Provable, and implying that this means
Analytically Knowable, but that is wrong because you are using
incompatible meanings of Provable.
All analytically true statements have a semantic connection to their
truth maker.
You need to actually DEFINE what you mean by your terms, and any term
that doesn't mean what it means what it actually means in classical
logic can not use any of the results from classical logic.
Hence my new idea of semantic connections using a knowledge ontology
instead of model theory.
You seem to want to change the foundation, but then expect that the
whole structure built on it will stay mostly the same. That is a false
assumption. If you change the base, you need to work up from that base
and see what changes above it, but going through ALL the steps,
especially those that depend on the things you have changed, to see
what actually changes.
True(x) requires semantic connections to its truth maker, else we have ~True(x) or False(x). Semantically incoherent expressions of language
(such as the Liar Paradox) are neither true nor false.
Many of your ideas you think of as "New" are not really new, just you
have failed to see their use in the past. They might not have used
your names, but they did use the same base ideas. The limitations of
these ideas have been long established.
I have shown that Tarski Undefinability and Gödel Incompleteness are incorrect. Tarski "proved" that the Liar Paradox is true and we both
know that it is not true so Tarski goofed.
Because Gödel Incompleteness is an exact isomorphism to Tarski Undefinability the refutation of one is a refutation of both.
On 12/30/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 11:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 10:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
But the existance of ONLY an infinite sequence of semantic
connections for a sentence make it True but Unprovable.
Thus your idea that all Truth is Provable is debunked, and you are
shown to be an idiot.
My prior claim that every true statement must be provable is either
qualified to allow infinite proofs or changed to refer to semantic
connections that may be finite or infinite.
If you allow your "Proof" to be infinite, then you have broken the
link between provable and knowable, and have left the language that
everyone else is talking.
You and I already know that the possibility that an expression of
language can only be confirmed as true by an infinite proof then the
link between true and knowable was already broken.
Right, which means that there are some things that are True that are unknowable.
Since some Semantic Statement DO require an infinite set of semantic
connections, but knowable requries a finite set of semantic
connections, we have that there exsits some statements that are True
but not knowable, and thus not Provable by the classical definition.
When infinite proofs are required to verify the truth of an expression
of language and formal systems are not allowed to have infinite proofs
then unprovable in no way means that the formal system is in any way
incomplete.
WRONG. The DEFINITION of "Incomplete" is that there exist statements
that are True that can not be Prove, with the definition of Provable
being a Finite Proof.
In your modified terminology, Incompletenesss is DEFINED as the
existance of statements that are Analytically True but are Unknowable.
THAT IS DEFINITION.
Thus an expression of language is never true unless it is connected to >>>> its truth maker.
Right, but that connection might not be knowable, because it is
infinite, and thus not provable by the classical meaning.
Yet formal systems that are not allowed to have infinite proofs cannot
be called "incomplete" because they lack an infinite proof.
But that is the DEFINTION of the Term.
If you redefine your idea of "Proof" to include "infinite proofs" you
have just made you logic system incompatible with ALL standard logic
that requires it to be finite, so you need to restart at the begining.
We can simply use my semantic version instead: True(x) ↔ (⊨x).
So, start with your restart and see what you get. Make sure you fully document you other definitions and axioms as you go.
In particular, do you plan to redefine the implication operator?
Note currently A -> B means that for every model where A is true, B is
also true, even if that truth of B is not directly connected to the
Truth of A.
Note, PROVING a statement like A -> B, without knowing the actual truth
of A or B, will require building such a direct connection.
You are going to need to define SOMETHING, to indicate actually
knowable due to having a finite proof. Knowable isn't actually a good
word for this, as we often want to include in knowable not just
things proven with a finite analytical proof, but also things
knowable by direct sensation.
Thus, if you redefine "Provable" to include an infinite sequence of
steps, it becomes just a synonym for True, and we have lost the use
of it for its normal use, and need to replace it with something more
clumbsy like Analytically Knowable.
The claim you seem to want to make is that all Analytically True
statements are Anayltically Knowable, but that is a false statement.
You try to hide the error by redefining the words and saying that all
Analytical True statements are Provable, and implying that this means
Analytically Knowable, but that is wrong because you are using
incompatible meanings of Provable.
All analytically true statements have a semantic connection to their
truth maker.
Ok. But I don't think that actually establishs what you are trying to
make it establish.
You need to actually DEFINE what you mean by your terms, and any term
that doesn't mean what it means what it actually means in classical
logic can not use any of the results from classical logic.
Hence my new idea of semantic connections using a knowledge ontology
instead of model theory.
So DO IT. Of course, changing the base means you have to redo EVERYTHING
to see what survives.
Ultimately, my guess is you will find that with the restrictions you are talking about, you are going to find that you logic system is not able
to handle much of the current logic families, but you system is just
going to put them outside what it can show.
That, or you system is going to fall into a massive mess of
inconsistencies because you fail to guard against it, and you ego is
unable to see these problems.
You seem to want to change the foundation, but then expect that the
whole structure built on it will stay mostly the same. That is a
false assumption. If you change the base, you need to work up from
that base and see what changes above it, but going through ALL the
steps, especially those that depend on the things you have changed,
to see what actually changes.
True(x) requires semantic connections to its truth maker, else we have
~True(x) or False(x). Semantically incoherent expressions of language
(such as the Liar Paradox) are neither true nor false.
Ok, so what.
It is accept that statements like the Liar's paradox are not truth holders.
The problem is that it is absolutely TRUE that Some True Statements are Unknowable in a sufficently powerful logic system (and that sufficently powerful is a fairly low hurdle).
You can't just try to make that statems be just the same as the Liar's Paradox, because they aren't.
It is a fundamental property of Knowable/Provable for systems of any reasonable power.
Many of your ideas you think of as "New" are not really new, just you
have failed to see their use in the past. They might not have used
your names, but they did use the same base ideas. The limitations of
these ideas have been long established.
I have shown that Tarski Undefinability and Gödel Incompleteness are
incorrect. Tarski "proved" that the Liar Paradox is true and we both
know that it is not true so Tarski goofed.
No, you haven't.
You just don't understand his proof.
The fact is that Tarski PROVED (not in quotes) that the Liar's Paradox
is True
IF A DEFINITION OF TRUTH EXISTS, this is actually proof that no
such definitio of truth can exist.
Unless you find an actual ERROR in his proof, you haven't established anything but to confirm his proof.
Note, you probably need to look at the AcTUAL PROOF he gives, not just
the short summary you quote. Yes, that summary is not in itself a proof,
but references that actual proof that has been firmly established.
This seems to be a common error of yours, you don't read the actual
proof (probalby because it is too complicated for you since you admit
you have avoid formal study of the field) so you can't actually come up
with a refutatioh of the proof, so you just say it must be wrong.
In actuality YOU must certainly be wrong, since you are the one claiming something without proof that is contradicted by an actual vetted proof.
Because Gödel Incompleteness is an exact isomorphism to Tarski
Undefinability the refutation of one is a refutation of both.
Which you haven't done, because it seems you don't understand what
either one is doing, in part because it seems you don't actually
understand how logic works.
On 12/30/2022 7:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 11:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 10:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
But the existance of ONLY an infinite sequence of semantic
connections for a sentence make it True but Unprovable.
Thus your idea that all Truth is Provable is debunked, and you are >>>>>> shown to be an idiot.
My prior claim that every true statement must be provable is either
qualified to allow infinite proofs or changed to refer to semantic
connections that may be finite or infinite.
If you allow your "Proof" to be infinite, then you have broken the
link between provable and knowable, and have left the language that
everyone else is talking.
You and I already know that the possibility that an expression of
language can only be confirmed as true by an infinite proof then the
link between true and knowable was already broken.
Right, which means that there are some things that are True that are
unknowable.
Since some Semantic Statement DO require an infinite set of semantic
connections, but knowable requries a finite set of semantic
connections, we have that there exsits some statements that are True
but not knowable, and thus not Provable by the classical definition.
When infinite proofs are required to verify the truth of an expression
of language and formal systems are not allowed to have infinite proofs
then unprovable in no way means that the formal system is in any way
incomplete.
WRONG. The DEFINITION of "Incomplete" is that there exist statements
that are True that can not be Prove, with the definition of Provable
being a Finite Proof.
In your modified terminology, Incompletenesss is DEFINED as the
existance of statements that are Analytically True but are Unknowable.
THAT IS DEFINITION.
In other words you are saying that unless a formal system violates its
own definition and performs an infinite proof then the formal system is incomplete.
Thus an expression of language is never true unless it is connected to >>>>> its truth maker.
Right, but that connection might not be knowable, because it is
infinite, and thus not provable by the classical meaning.
Yet formal systems that are not allowed to have infinite proofs
cannot be called "incomplete" because they lack an infinite proof.
But that is the DEFINTION of the Term.
That definition is incoherent. It is like saying that apples are
incomplete because they are not oranges.
If you redefine your idea of "Proof" to include "infinite proofs"
you have just made you logic system incompatible with ALL standard
logic that requires it to be finite, so you need to restart at the
begining.
We can simply use my semantic version instead: True(x) ↔ (⊨x).
So, start with your restart and see what you get. Make sure you fully
document you other definitions and axioms as you go.
In particular, do you plan to redefine the implication operator?
I am only specifying the natural preexisting way that analytical truth
really works.
Note currently A -> B means that for every model where A is true, B is
also true, even if that truth of B is not directly connected to the
Truth of A.
That is an error. To say that
cows give milk implies the grass is purple
is false at the semantic level, thus not a truth preserving operation.
Note, PROVING a statement like A -> B, without knowing the actual
truth of A or B, will require building such a direct connection.
You are going to need to define SOMETHING, to indicate actually
knowable due to having a finite proof. Knowable isn't actually a
good word for this, as we often want to include in knowable not just
things proven with a finite analytical proof, but also things
knowable by direct sensation.
Thus, if you redefine "Provable" to include an infinite sequence of
steps, it becomes just a synonym for True, and we have lost the use
of it for its normal use, and need to replace it with something more
clumbsy like Analytically Knowable.
The claim you seem to want to make is that all Analytically True
statements are Anayltically Knowable, but that is a false statement.
You try to hide the error by redefining the words and saying that
all Analytical True statements are Provable, and implying that this
means Analytically Knowable, but that is wrong because you are using
incompatible meanings of Provable.
All analytically true statements have a semantic connection to their
truth maker.
Ok. But I don't think that actually establishs what you are trying to
make it establish.
It does, I spent 25 years on this and can finally say it succinctly.
You need to actually DEFINE what you mean by your terms, and any
term that doesn't mean what it means what it actually means in
classical logic can not use any of the results from classical logic.
Hence my new idea of semantic connections using a knowledge ontology
instead of model theory.
So DO IT. Of course, changing the base means you have to redo
EVERYTHING to see what survives.
I am not going to write down every element of the set of all analytic knowledge. True(x) ↔ (⊨x) has the set of all known and unknown analytic truth as its formal system.
Ultimately, my guess is you will find that with the restrictions you
are talking about, you are going to find that you logic system is not
able to handle much of the current logic families, but you system is
just going to put them outside what it can show.
The set of analytic knowledge can show everything that is analytically
known.
That, or you system is going to fall into a massive mess of
inconsistencies because you fail to guard against it, and you ego is
unable to see these problems.
Expressions of language that are not coherently linked to the set of
analytic knowledge are not members of this set.
You seem to want to change the foundation, but then expect that the
whole structure built on it will stay mostly the same. That is a
false assumption. If you change the base, you need to work up from
that base and see what changes above it, but going through ALL the
steps, especially those that depend on the things you have changed,
to see what actually changes.
True(x) requires semantic connections to its truth maker, else we have
~True(x) or False(x). Semantically incoherent expressions of language
(such as the Liar Paradox) are neither true nor false.
Ok, so what.
Tarski's undefinability theorem fails. He claimed to have proved an incoherent expression of language is true, that is ridiculous.
It is accept that statements like the Liar's paradox are not truth
holders.
Tarski claimed to have proved that it is true, what a nut.
The problem is that it is absolutely TRUE that Some True Statements
are Unknowable in a sufficently powerful logic system (and that
sufficently powerful is a fairly low hurdle).
We cannot possibly correctly say that some statements are unknowable
until we can prove that no finite proofs exist. Until then they are
simply unknown.
You can't just try to make that statems be just the same as the Liar's
Paradox, because they aren't.
Gödel himself implied that his logic sentence is isomorphic to the liar paradox.
It is a fundamental property of Knowable/Provable for systems of any
reasonable power.
Gödel said that any epistemological antinomy will do, thus he limited
his proof to be based only on self-contradictory expressions of
language.
Many of your ideas you think of as "New" are not really new, just
you have failed to see their use in the past. They might not have
used your names, but they did use the same base ideas. The
limitations of these ideas have been long established.
I have shown that Tarski Undefinability and Gödel Incompleteness are
incorrect. Tarski "proved" that the Liar Paradox is true and we both
know that it is not true so Tarski goofed.
No, you haven't.
He you already admitted that he proved that the Liar Paradox is true and
you also admitted that the Liar Paradox is not true hence you admitted
that Tarski goofed.
You just don't understand his proof.
The fact is that Tarski PROVED (not in quotes) that the Liar's Paradox
is True
Conclusively proves that Tarski did something wrong.
IF A DEFINITION OF TRUTH EXISTS, this is actually proof that no such
definitio of truth can exist.
Unless you find an actual ERROR in his proof, you haven't established
anything but to confirm his proof.
You already admitted that Tarski proved that a statement that is not
true is true, thus Tarski goofed.
Note, you probably need to look at the AcTUAL PROOF he gives, not just
the short summary you quote. Yes, that summary is not in itself a
proof, but references that actual proof that has been firmly established.
These two pages are his entire proof in his original verbatim words: https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
This seems to be a common error of yours, you don't read the actual
proof (probalby because it is too complicated for you since you admit
you have avoid formal study of the field) so you can't actually come
up with a refutatioh of the proof, so you just say it must be wrong.
In actuality YOU must certainly be wrong, since you are the one
claiming something without proof that is contradicted by an actual
vetted proof.
Because Gödel Incompleteness is an exact isomorphism to Tarski
Undefinability the refutation of one is a refutation of both.
Which you haven't done, because it seems you don't understand what
either one is doing, in part because it seems you don't actually
understand how logic works.
Gödel said this in his footnote 14
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof
In other words his proof requires self-contradictory expressions of
language or it fails and the Liar Paradox can be used for a similar undecidability proof. Tarski did that.
On 12/30/22 11:06 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 7:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 11:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 10:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
But the existance of ONLY an infinite sequence of semantic
connections for a sentence make it True but Unprovable.
Thus your idea that all Truth is Provable is debunked, and you
are shown to be an idiot.
My prior claim that every true statement must be provable is either >>>>>> qualified to allow infinite proofs or changed to refer to semantic >>>>>> connections that may be finite or infinite.
If you allow your "Proof" to be infinite, then you have broken the
link between provable and knowable, and have left the language that
everyone else is talking.
You and I already know that the possibility that an expression of
language can only be confirmed as true by an infinite proof then the
link between true and knowable was already broken.
Right, which means that there are some things that are True that are
unknowable.
Since some Semantic Statement DO require an infinite set of
semantic connections, but knowable requries a finite set of
semantic connections, we have that there exsits some statements
that are True but not knowable, and thus not Provable by the
classical definition.
When infinite proofs are required to verify the truth of an expression >>>> of language and formal systems are not allowed to have infinite proofs >>>> then unprovable in no way means that the formal system is in any way
incomplete.
WRONG. The DEFINITION of "Incomplete" is that there exist statements
that are True that can not be Prove, with the definition of Provable
being a Finite Proof.
In your modified terminology, Incompletenesss is DEFINED as the
existance of statements that are Analytically True but are Unknowable.
THAT IS DEFINITION.
In other words you are saying that unless a formal system violates its
own definition and performs an infinite proof then the formal system
is incomplete.
No, a formal system simple enough to be able to prove all true
statements in it is what is defined as "Complete".
On 12/30/2022 11:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 11:06 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 7:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 11:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 10:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
But the existance of ONLY an infinite sequence of semantic
connections for a sentence make it True but Unprovable.
Thus your idea that all Truth is Provable is debunked, and you >>>>>>>> are shown to be an idiot.
My prior claim that every true statement must be provable is either >>>>>>> qualified to allow infinite proofs or changed to refer to semantic >>>>>>> connections that may be finite or infinite.
If you allow your "Proof" to be infinite, then you have broken the >>>>>> link between provable and knowable, and have left the language
that everyone else is talking.
You and I already know that the possibility that an expression of
language can only be confirmed as true by an infinite proof then the >>>>> link between true and knowable was already broken.
Right, which means that there are some things that are True that are
unknowable.
Since some Semantic Statement DO require an infinite set of
semantic connections, but knowable requries a finite set of
semantic connections, we have that there exsits some statements
that are True but not knowable, and thus not Provable by the
classical definition.
When infinite proofs are required to verify the truth of an expression >>>>> of language and formal systems are not allowed to have infinite proofs >>>>> then unprovable in no way means that the formal system is in any way >>>>> incomplete.
WRONG. The DEFINITION of "Incomplete" is that there exist statements
that are True that can not be Prove, with the definition of Provable
being a Finite Proof.
In your modified terminology, Incompletenesss is DEFINED as the
existance of statements that are Analytically True but are Unknowable. >>>>
THAT IS DEFINITION.
In other words you are saying that unless a formal system violates
its own definition and performs an infinite proof then the formal
system is incomplete.
No, a formal system simple enough to be able to prove all true
statements in it is what is defined as "Complete".
Gödel said this in his footnote 14
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof
Every Epistemological antinomy is untrue thus when Gödel and Tarski
proved that they are true they both erred.
On 12/31/2022 9:33 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
And you still show that you do not understand that Godel didn't use
the Liar's Paradox in its Paradoxial form in his proof, but
transformed it from a statement about Truth to a statement about
Provability.
He claimed that he could have used any Epistemological antinomy such as
the Liar Paradox that Tarski used, thus the two-page Tarski proof forms
and isomorphism to his proof.
Such Transforms converts a statement that is self-contradictory into a
statement that must be a Truth Bearer,
The Liar Paradox basis of the Tarski Undefinability Theorem https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
The Tarski Undefinability Theorem
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the English.
The Chinese sentence is true, The English sentence remains neither true
nor false because it is self-contradictory.
No need for Tarski's theory and metatheory the English/Chinese serve the
same function in a way that is much easier to understand.
The only reason that the Chinese sentence is true is because
pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) has been removed. The only
reason why the English sentence is neither true nor false is because it
has pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) (it is self-contradictory).
Tarski only proved that it is true that self-contradictory sentences are
not true. This is not at all the same thing as proving that truth is undefinable.
On 12/31/22 9:19 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 11:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 11:06 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 7:09 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 11:56 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/30/22 11:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/30/2022 10:15 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
But the existance of ONLY an infinite sequence of semantic
connections for a sentence make it True but Unprovable.
Thus your idea that all Truth is Provable is debunked, and you >>>>>>>>> are shown to be an idiot.
My prior claim that every true statement must be provable is either >>>>>>>> qualified to allow infinite proofs or changed to refer to semantic >>>>>>>> connections that may be finite or infinite.
If you allow your "Proof" to be infinite, then you have broken
the link between provable and knowable, and have left the
language that everyone else is talking.
You and I already know that the possibility that an expression of
language can only be confirmed as true by an infinite proof then the >>>>>> link between true and knowable was already broken.
Right, which means that there are some things that are True that
are unknowable.
Since some Semantic Statement DO require an infinite set of
semantic connections, but knowable requries a finite set of
semantic connections, we have that there exsits some statements
that are True but not knowable, and thus not Provable by the
classical definition.
When infinite proofs are required to verify the truth of an
expression
of language and formal systems are not allowed to have infinite
proofs
then unprovable in no way means that the formal system is in any way >>>>>> incomplete.
WRONG. The DEFINITION of "Incomplete" is that there exist
statements that are True that can not be Prove, with the definition
of Provable being a Finite Proof.
In your modified terminology, Incompletenesss is DEFINED as the
existance of statements that are Analytically True but are Unknowable. >>>>>
THAT IS DEFINITION.
In other words you are saying that unless a formal system violates
its own definition and performs an infinite proof then the formal
system is incomplete.
No, a formal system simple enough to be able to prove all true
statements in it is what is defined as "Complete".
Gödel said this in his footnote 14
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof
Every Epistemological antinomy is untrue thus when Gödel and Tarski
proved that they are true they both erred.
And you still show that you do not understand that Godel didn't use the Liar's Paradox in its Paradoxial form in his proof, but transformed it
from a statement about Truth to a statement about Provability.
Such Transforms converts a statement that is self-contradictory into a statement that must be a Truth Bearer,
On 12/31/22 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 9:33 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
And you still show that you do not understand that Godel didn't use
the Liar's Paradox in its Paradoxial form in his proof, but
transformed it from a statement about Truth to a statement about
Provability.
He claimed that he could have used any Epistemological antinomy such as
the Liar Paradox that Tarski used, thus the two-page Tarski proof forms
and isomorphism to his proof.
Which shows you still don't undertand what he did.
Yes, ANY Epistemolgical antimomy can be CONVERTED from a statement about Truth, which makes it a non-truth bearer, into a similar statement about provability, which MUST be a Truth Bearer, and forces the conclusion
that the statement must be True and Unprovable, because the opposite condition, Provable but False is definitionally impossible.
Such Transforms converts a statement that is self-contradictory into
a statement that must be a Truth Bearer,
The Liar Paradox basis of the Tarski Undefinability Theorem
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
The Tarski Undefinability Theorem
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the English.
The Chinese sentence is true, The English sentence remains neither
true nor false because it is self-contradictory.
No need for Tarski's theory and metatheory the English/Chinese serve
the same function in a way that is much easier to understand.
The only reason that the Chinese sentence is true is because
pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) has been removed. The only
reason why the English sentence is neither true nor false is because it
has pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) (it is self-contradictory).
Tarski only proved that it is true that self-contradictory sentences
are not true. This is not at all the same thing as proving that truth
is undefinable.
Nope, you don't understand what he is doing.
You are just showing yourself to be incapable of understanding the logic.
On 12/31/2022 10:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 9:33 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
And you still show that you do not understand that Godel didn't use
the Liar's Paradox in its Paradoxial form in his proof, but
transformed it from a statement about Truth to a statement about
Provability.
He claimed that he could have used any Epistemological antinomy such as
the Liar Paradox that Tarski used, thus the two-page Tarski proof forms
and isomorphism to his proof.
Which shows you still don't undertand what he did.
Yes, ANY Epistemolgical antimomy can be CONVERTED from a statement
about Truth, which makes it a non-truth bearer, into a similar
statement about provability, which MUST be a Truth Bearer, and forces
the conclusion that the statement must be True and Unprovable, because
the opposite condition, Provable but False is definitionally impossible.
Such Transforms converts a statement that is self-contradictory into
a statement that must be a Truth Bearer,
The Liar Paradox basis of the Tarski Undefinability Theorem
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
The Tarski Undefinability Theorem
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the English.
The Chinese sentence is true, The English sentence remains neither
true nor false because it is self-contradictory.
No need for Tarski's theory and metatheory the English/Chinese serve
the same function in a way that is much easier to understand.
The only reason that the Chinese sentence is true is because
pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) has been removed. The only
reason why the English sentence is neither true nor false is because it
has pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) (it is self-contradictory). >>>
Tarski only proved that it is true that self-contradictory sentences
are not true. This is not at all the same thing as proving that truth
is undefinable.
Nope, you don't understand what he is doing.
You are just showing yourself to be incapable of understanding the logic.
It is not that I do not understand the logic it is that I understand it
so well that I can boil it down to its essence.
Tarski only proved that it is true that self-contradictory expressions
of language are not true.
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true."
is true because it is not self-contradictory.
Tarski did not prove that some true expressions cannot be defined.
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the system
because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my Chinese]."
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 10:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 11:26 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 9:33 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
And you still show that you do not understand that Godel didn't use
the Liar's Paradox in its Paradoxial form in his proof, but
transformed it from a statement about Truth to a statement about
Provability.
He claimed that he could have used any Epistemological antinomy such as >>>> the Liar Paradox that Tarski used, thus the two-page Tarski proof forms >>>> and isomorphism to his proof.
Which shows you still don't undertand what he did.
Yes, ANY Epistemolgical antimomy can be CONVERTED from a statement
about Truth, which makes it a non-truth bearer, into a similar
statement about provability, which MUST be a Truth Bearer, and forces
the conclusion that the statement must be True and Unprovable,
because the opposite condition, Provable but False is definitionally
impossible.
Such Transforms converts a statement that is self-contradictory
into a statement that must be a Truth Bearer,
The Liar Paradox basis of the Tarski Undefinability Theorem
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
The Tarski Undefinability Theorem
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the English. >>>> The Chinese sentence is true, The English sentence remains neither
true nor false because it is self-contradictory.
No need for Tarski's theory and metatheory the English/Chinese serve
the same function in a way that is much easier to understand.
The only reason that the Chinese sentence is true is because
pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) has been removed. The only
reason why the English sentence is neither true nor false is because it >>>> has pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) (it is
self-contradictory).
Tarski only proved that it is true that self-contradictory sentences
are not true. This is not at all the same thing as proving that
truth is undefinable.
Nope, you don't understand what he is doing.
You are just showing yourself to be incapable of understanding the
logic.
It is not that I do not understand the logic it is that I understand it
so well that I can boil it down to its essence.
But you understand it wrong. Your "Essence" isn't what it is saying,
because you just don't understand that meaning of the actual words being
used because your own vocabulary is incorrect when used in the system.
This is the flaw of the incorrect application of "First Principles"
Tarski only proved that it is true that self-contradictory expressions
of language are not true.
No, he proved that a definition of Truth can not exist in a system,
because if one did exist, then a self-contradictory expression (that
can't have a truth value) is True.
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the system
because if there was, you could show that statement True.
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the system
because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are
talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge about how
any of it works.
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the system
because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my English] >>> becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my Chinese]." >>>
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are
talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge about
how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that Tarski is saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the
system because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the
English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my
English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my Chinese]." >>>>>
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are
talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of logic. >>>>
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge about
how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed, then from that definition you could prove in the defined
Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually True.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
That is not what he is saying, try again.
Thus, since we know that can't be, there must not be an ability to
define in a system of logic, a "Definition of Truth" that allows you
to determine (i.e. Proof) every True Statement, Disprove every false
statement, and determine that every non-truthbearer was a
non-truthbearer.
What else do you think he is saying?
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory"
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the
system because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the English. >>>>
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my English] >>>> becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my Chinese]." >>>>
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are
talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge about
how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is True
or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition existed,
then from that definition you could prove in the defined Meta-Theory
that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually True.
Thus, since we know that can't be, there must not be an ability to
define in a system of logic, a "Definition of Truth" that allows you to determine (i.e. Proof) every True Statement, Disprove every false
statement, and determine that every non-truthbearer was a non-truthbearer.
What else do you think he is saying?
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the
system because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the English. >>>>
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my English] >>>> becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my Chinese]." >>>>
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are
talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge about
how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is True
or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition existed,
then from that definition you could prove in the defined Meta-Theory
that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually True.
Thus, since we know that can't be,
there must not be an ability to
define in a system of logic, a "Definition of Truth" that allows you to determine (i.e. Proof) every True Statement, Disprove every false
statement, and determine that every non-truthbearer was a non-truthbearer.
What else do you think he is saying?
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the
system because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the
English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my
English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my Chinese]." >>>>>
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are
talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of logic. >>>>
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge about
how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed, then from that definition you could prove in the defined
Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually True.
No that is incorrect. Tarski never indicated that he understood that expressions of formal language are not necessarily truth bearers.
This sentence is true:
{The following sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true."}
Thus, since we know that can't be,
Try and think of any expression of language that is true entirely on the basis of its meaning that does not have truthmaker connections to these semantic meanings.
If no such counter example exists in the universe then that proves that
I am correct about the requirement of semantic connections to truth
makers.
Self-contradictory expressions of language have no truthmaker semantic connections.
This also applies to expressions of language that have vacuous truth
objects: "This sentence is true"
True about what?
True about being true.
True about being true about what?
True about being true about being true.
Ah I see an infinitely recursive structure that never is never resolved
to a truth value, thus not a truth bearer.
there must not be an ability to define in a system of logic, a
"Definition of Truth" that allows you to determine (i.e. Proof) every
True Statement, Disprove every false statement, and determine that
every non-truthbearer was a non-truthbearer.
The possible requirement of an infinite proof requires that some
expressions of language can only have an unknown Boolean value.
We can't even tell that they definitely require an infinite proof.
The Goldbach Conjecture has a currently unknown Boolean value. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldbach%27s_conjecture
It does seem to be a truth bearer.
Analytic Knowledge is defined as expressions of language that have a
finite set of connections to their truth maker semantic meanings.
Analytic Truth is defined as expressions of language that have a finite
or infinite set of connections to their truth maker semantic meanings.
Non Truth Bearers are defined as expressions of language having no connections to any truth maker semantic meanings.
What else do you think he is saying?
On 1/1/23 10:59 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the
system because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the
English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my
English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my
Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are
talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of logic. >>>>>
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge about
how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that Tarski is >>>> saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed, then from that definition you could prove in the defined
Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually True.
No that is incorrect. Tarski never indicated that he understood that
expressions of formal language are not necessarily truth bearers.
Can yo PROVE that tement, have you read EVERYTHING he has written.
He actually seems to understand this, because he uses the fact that
"proving" the Liar's Paradox, based on an assumed Thesis, shows the
assumed Thesis must be false.
This sentence is true:
{The following sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true."}
Thus, since we know that can't be,
Try and think of any expression of language that is true entirely on the
basis of its meaning that does not have truthmaker connections to these
semantic meanings.
No one is arguing that.
If no such counter example exists in the universe then that proves that
I am correct about the requirement of semantic connections to truth
makers.
Right, but that doesn't make it PROVABLE by the definition of Provable.
Self-contradictory expressions of language have no truthmaker semantic
connections.
This also applies to expressions of language that have vacuous truth
objects: "This sentence is true"
True about what?
True about being true.
True about being true about what?
True about being true about being true.
Ah I see an infinitely recursive structure that never is never resolved
to a truth value, thus not a truth bearer.
there must not be an ability to define in a system of logic, a
"Definition of Truth" that allows you to determine (i.e. Proof) every
True Statement, Disprove every false statement, and determine that
every non-truthbearer was a non-truthbearer.
The possible requirement of an infinite proof requires that some
expressions of language can only have an unknown Boolean value.
We can't even tell that they definitely require an infinite proof.
Right, its value is unknown in that Thoery, and thus unprovable in that theory. A Meta-Theory may be able to show that it actually IS true in
that theory, and thus we have in the Theory a statment that actually is
True (but not KNOWN to be true in the Theory) that is unprovable.
The Goldbach Conjecture has a currently unknown Boolean value.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldbach%27s_conjecture
It does seem to be a truth bearer.
it MUST be a Truth Bearer, as either a number exists that breaks the
rule, or no such number exist.
Analytic Knowledge is defined as expressions of language that have a
finite set of connections to their truth maker semantic meanings.
Analytic Truth is defined as expressions of language that have a finite
or infinite set of connections to their truth maker semantic meanings.
Right, so some Truths will be not knownable, and thus not Provable.
Non Truth Bearers are defined as expressions of language having no
connections to any truth maker semantic meanings.
What else do you think he is saying?
So, your claim that All Truth is PROVABLE is refuted.
Godel incompleteness Theory is Confirm, as is Tarski theory of no "Definition" of Truth.
(Perhaps you don't undestand what he means by that)
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:He does not use the term "truth bearer". Please cite word-for-word what
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the
system because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the
English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my
English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my Chinese]." >>>>>
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are
talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of logic. >>>>
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge about
how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed,
he said and the page number of the book where he said it.
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:He does not use the term "truth bearer". Please cite word-for-word what
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the
system because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the English. >>>>
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my English] >>>> becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my Chinese]." >>>>
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are
talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge about
how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is True
or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition existed,
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 12:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 10:59 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the >>>>>>>>> system because if there was, you could show that statement True. >>>>>>>>
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the >>>>>>>> English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my >>>>>>>> English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my >>>>>>>> Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you
are talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of
logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge
about how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that
Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the >>>>>> reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed, then from that definition you could prove in the defined
Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually
True.
No that is incorrect. Tarski never indicated that he understood that
expressions of formal language are not necessarily truth bearers.
Can yo PROVE that tement, have you read EVERYTHING he has written.
You made a claim that he understood this thus it is up to you to cite
your reference.
I did.
I claim that he does not understand this otherwise he would understand
that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer and would have explicitly
stated that: "the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer".
He knows that, that is why he points out that the fact that the
assumption of the existance of a Definition of Truth with the system,
the assumption of which allows him to prove (based on that assumption)
that the liar paradox is true, shows that it is impossible for there to
be a Defiition of Truth within the logic system.
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
I claim that he does not understand this otherwise he would
understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer and would have
explicitly stated that: "the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer".
He knows that, that is why he points out that the fact that the
assumption of the existance of a Definition of Truth with the system,
the assumption of which allows him to prove (based on that assumption)
that the liar paradox is true, shows that it is impossible for there
to be a Defiition of Truth within the logic system.
He never said anything like that.
On 1/1/23 4:43 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:He does not use the term "truth bearer". Please cite word-for-word
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the
system because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the
English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my
English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my
Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are
talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of logic. >>>>>
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge about
how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that Tarski is >>>> saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed,
what he said and the page number of the book where he said it.
Sorry, I don't have his book, but am going off of the general principles
I know of what he has done.
On 1/1/23 4:44 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
I claim that he does not understand this otherwise he would
understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer and would
have explicitly stated that: "the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer".
He knows that, that is why he points out that the fact that the
assumption of the existance of a Definition of Truth with the system,
the assumption of which allows him to prove (based on that
assumption) that the liar paradox is true, shows that it is
impossible for there to be a Defiition of Truth within the logic system. >>>
He never said anything like that.
Yes, that is the whole basis of his proof.
You just don't understand it because it seems you haven't actually read
his proof, just his sketch of the proof.
OK so you did not can cannot support your claim, thus your claim is
rejected as baseless.
On 1/1/2023 12:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 10:59 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the
system because if there was, you could show that statement True. >>>>>>>
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the
English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my >>>>>>> English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my
Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are >>>>>> talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of
logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge
about how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that
Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed, then from that definition you could prove in the defined
Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually True. >>>>
No that is incorrect. Tarski never indicated that he understood that
expressions of formal language are not necessarily truth bearers.
Can yo PROVE that tement, have you read EVERYTHING he has written.
You made a claim that he understood this thus it is up to you to cite
your reference.
I claim that he does not understand this otherwise he would understand
that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer and would have explicitly
stated that: "the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer".
He actually seems to understand this, because he uses the fact that
"proving" the Liar's Paradox, based on an assumed Thesis, shows the
assumed Thesis must be false.
The way that Tarski said it: "This sentence is not true" is undecidable
in his theory and true in his meta-theory.
He never realized that what he really meant is that this sentence is not
true in his theory: "This sentence is not true"
and this sentence is true in his meta-theory:
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"}
This sentence is true:
{The following sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true."}
Thus, since we know that can't be,
Try and think of any expression of language that is true entirely on the >>> basis of its meaning that does not have truthmaker connections to these
semantic meanings.
No one is arguing that.
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been created.
Every logic system only has expressions of language that are {true,
false} or are not members of this formal system.
If no such counter example exists in the universe then that proves that
I am correct about the requirement of semantic connections to truth
makers.
Right, but that doesn't make it PROVABLE by the definition of Provable.
Every element of the set of analytic knowledge is provable and the
remaining elements of the set of analytic truth have unknown truth
values.
Self-contradictory expressions of language have no truthmaker
semantic connections.
This also applies to expressions of language that have vacuous truth
objects: "This sentence is true"
True about what?
True about being true.
True about being true about what?
True about being true about being true.
Ah I see an infinitely recursive structure that never is never resolved
to a truth value, thus not a truth bearer.
there must not be an ability to define in a system of logic, a
"Definition of Truth" that allows you to determine (i.e. Proof)
every True Statement, Disprove every false statement, and determine
that every non-truthbearer was a non-truthbearer.
The possible requirement of an infinite proof requires that some
expressions of language can only have an unknown Boolean value.
We can't even tell that they definitely require an infinite proof.
Right, its value is unknown in that Thoery, and thus unprovable in
that theory. A Meta-Theory may be able to show that it actually IS
true in that theory, and thus we have in the Theory a statment that
actually is True (but not KNOWN to be true in the Theory) that is
unprovable.
The correct "theory" of the set of analytic truth allows any order of reference from 0th order logic no N-ary logic.
As Wittgenstein said true in a formal system means has been proved in
this formal system and false in this formal system means that the
opposite has been proved in this formal system.
Expressions of language currently having unknown truth values that
require infinite proofs are by definition not part of any formal system.
The Goldbach Conjecture has a currently unknown Boolean value.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldbach%27s_conjecture
It does seem to be a truth bearer.
it MUST be a Truth Bearer, as either a number exists that breaks the
rule, or no such number exist.
Yes I agree, that is what I said.
Analytic Knowledge is defined as expressions of language that have a
finite set of connections to their truth maker semantic meanings.
Analytic Truth is defined as expressions of language that have a finite
or infinite set of connections to their truth maker semantic meanings.
Right, so some Truths will be not knownable, and thus not Provable.
And also not part of any formal system.
Non Truth Bearers are defined as expressions of language having no
connections to any truth maker semantic meanings.
What else do you think he is saying?
So, your claim that All Truth is PROVABLE is refuted.
I did not know that infinite proofs are not allowed.
What I meant was that every analytically true expression of language
must have a connection to its truth maker set of semantic meanings or it
is untrue. This connection is the proof of its truth.
Godel incompleteness Theory is Confirm, as is Tarski theory of no
"Definition" of Truth.
(Perhaps you don't undestand what he means by that)
Both of these are only anchored in "epistemological antinomies" (self- contradictory expressions) and thus both of these fail when these
expressions are rejected as not members of any formal system.
On 1/1/2023 3:58 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 4:44 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
He knows that, that is why he points out that the fact that the
I claim that he does not understand this otherwise he would
understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer and would
have explicitly stated that: "the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer". >>>>
assumption of the existance of a Definition of Truth with the
system, the assumption of which allows him to prove (based on that
assumption) that the liar paradox is true, shows that it is
impossible for there to be a Defiition of Truth within the logic
system.
He never said anything like that.
Yes, that is the whole basis of his proof.
You just don't understand it because it seems you haven't actually
read his proof, just his sketch of the proof.
Cite your sources. The proof that I cited is his entire proof in his own words not some Wikipedia summation.
His proof was added as an afterthought to a paper that he had already published.
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 12:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 10:59 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the >>>>>>>>> system because if there was, you could show that statement True. >>>>>>>>
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the >>>>>>>> English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my >>>>>>>> English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my >>>>>>>> Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you
are talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of
logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge
about how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that
Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the >>>>>> reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed, then from that definition you could prove in the defined
Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually
True.
No that is incorrect. Tarski never indicated that he understood that
expressions of formal language are not necessarily truth bearers.
Can yo PROVE that tement, have you read EVERYTHING he has written.
You made a claim that he understood this thus it is up to you to cite
your reference.
I did.
I claim that he does not understand this otherwise he would understand
that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer and would have explicitly
stated that: "the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer".
He knows that, that is why he points out that the fact that the
assumption of the existance of a Definition of Truth with the system,
the assumption of which allows him to prove (based on that assumption)
that the liar paradox is true, shows that it is impossible for there to
be a Defiition of Truth within the logic system.
What don't YOU understand about that statement?
He actually seems to understand this, because he uses the fact that
"proving" the Liar's Paradox, based on an assumed Thesis, shows the
assumed Thesis must be false.
The way that Tarski said it: "This sentence is not true" is undecidable
in his theory and true in his meta-theory.
BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THESIS A.
Thus, THESIS A can't be true.
He never realized that what he really meant is that this sentence is
not true in his theory: "This sentence is not true"
and this sentence is true in his meta-theory:
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"}
Nope, that ISN'T what he is talking about. You just are not
understanding his words.
You have shown enough misundetandings, the most like cause of any disagreement between you and a respected logictian is that you don't
actually understand what he is saying.
This is also a natural outcome of your MISAPPLICATION of the concept of "First Principles".
This sentence is true:
{The following sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true."}
Thus, since we know that can't be,
Try and think of any expression of language that is true entirely on
the
basis of its meaning that does not have truthmaker connections to these >>>> semantic meanings.
No one is arguing that.
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
Things like tertiary Logic are attempts to expand the logic system to
see if a system of logic could handle it.
You DO understand the concepts of differing systems of logic with
different ground rules, don't you?
Maybe you don't as that concept breaks you idea of an overarching
Meta-system that all logic falls under.
Every logic system only has expressions of language that are {true,
false} or are not members of this formal system.
Note members of THIS group of formal systems.
Other formal systems have other values in their logic.
If no such counter example exists in the universe then that proves that >>>> I am correct about the requirement of semantic connections to truth
makers.
Right, but that doesn't make it PROVABLE by the definition of Provable.
Every element of the set of analytic knowledge is provable and the
remaining elements of the set of analytic truth have unknown truth
values.
Yes, KNOWLEDGE is Provavle.
TRUTH is not necessarily, as it may have an infinite set of connections, which makes it outside the normal definition of Knowable.
Self-contradictory expressions of language have no truthmaker
semantic connections.
This also applies to expressions of language that have vacuous truth
objects: "This sentence is true"
True about what?
True about being true.
True about being true about what?
True about being true about being true.
Ah I see an infinitely recursive structure that never is never resolved >>>> to a truth value, thus not a truth bearer.
there must not be an ability to define in a system of logic, a
"Definition of Truth" that allows you to determine (i.e. Proof)
every True Statement, Disprove every false statement, and determine
that every non-truthbearer was a non-truthbearer.
The possible requirement of an infinite proof requires that some
expressions of language can only have an unknown Boolean value.
We can't even tell that they definitely require an infinite proof.
Right, its value is unknown in that Thoery, and thus unprovable in
that theory. A Meta-Theory may be able to show that it actually IS
true in that theory, and thus we have in the Theory a statment that
actually is True (but not KNOWN to be true in the Theory) that is
unprovable.
The correct "theory" of the set of analytic truth allows any order of
reference from 0th order logic no N-ary logic.
As Wittgenstein said true in a formal system means has been proved in
this formal system and false in this formal system means that the
opposite has been proved in this formal system.
And he is WRONG in that statement,
On 12/31/22 3:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the
system because if there was, you could show that statement True.
這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the
English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my
English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my
Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are
talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of logic. >>>>>
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge about
how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that Tarski is >>>> saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed, then from that definition you could prove in the defined
Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually True.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
That is not what he is saying, try again.
Like you just said, even an idiot can just claim something is wrong.
Note, since you aren't even showing the full chapter (which likely would
be a copyright violation) its hard to get the full context of his
statements, but thesse pages are
Thus, since we know that can't be, there must not be an ability to
define in a system of logic, a "Definition of Truth" that allows you
to determine (i.e. Proof) every True Statement, Disprove every false
statement, and determine that every non-truthbearer was a
non-truthbearer.
What else do you think he is saying?
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory"
ACCORDING TO THESIS A, this isn't neccesarily true if Thesis A isn't
True. In fact, I suspect this whole section is building up to showing
this leads to a contradiction, and thus THESIS A isn't True.
Remeber, at the end he says:
I should like to draw attention here to an analogous result. For every deductive science in "Which arithmetic is contained it is possible to
specify arithmetical notions which, so to speak, belong intuitively to
this science, but ,vhich cannot be defined on the basis of this science. 'Vith the help of methods which are, completely analogous to those used
in the copstruction of the definition of truth, it is nevertheless
possible to show that these concepts can be so defined provided the
science is enriched by the introduction of variables of higher order.
Which points out that IN THE THEORY, there are things which can not be defined, but need to be expressed in a higher order Theory (the Meta
Theory)
By extension, there will be things in the Meta-Theory which can not be defined, but need to be expressed in an even HIGHER order Theory (a Meta-Meta-Theory) and so on.
Thus in any Theory, or Meta^n Theory, there will ALWAYS be things that
can not be defined.
You don't seem to understand how proof by contradiction works, because
you mind is too simple.
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 12:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 10:59 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the >>>>>>>>> system because if there was, you could show that statement True. >>>>>>>>
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the >>>>>>>> English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my >>>>>>>> English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my >>>>>>>> Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you
are talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of
logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge
about how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that
Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the >>>>>> reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed, then from that definition you could prove in the defined
Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually
True.
No that is incorrect. Tarski never indicated that he understood that
expressions of formal language are not necessarily truth bearers.
Can yo PROVE that tement, have you read EVERYTHING he has written.
You made a claim that he understood this thus it is up to you to cite
your reference.
I did.
I claim that he does not understand this otherwise he would understand
that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer and would have explicitly
stated that: "the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer".
He knows that, that is why he points out that the fact that the
assumption of the existance of a Definition of Truth with the system,
the assumption of which allows him to prove (based on that assumption)
that the liar paradox is true, shows that it is impossible for there to
be a Defiition of Truth within the logic system.
What don't YOU understand about that statement?
He actually seems to understand this, because he uses the fact that
"proving" the Liar's Paradox, based on an assumed Thesis, shows the
assumed Thesis must be false.
The way that Tarski said it: "This sentence is not true" is undecidable
in his theory and true in his meta-theory.
BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THESIS A.
Thus, THESIS A can't be true.
He never realized that what he really meant is that this sentence is
not true in his theory: "This sentence is not true"
and this sentence is true in his meta-theory:
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"}
Nope, that ISN'T what he is talking about. You just are not
understanding his words.
You have shown enough misundetandings, the most like cause of any disagreement between you and a respected logictian is that you don't
actually understand what he is saying.
This is also a natural outcome of your MISAPPLICATION of the concept of "First Principles".
This sentence is true:
{The following sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true."}
Thus, since we know that can't be,
Try and think of any expression of language that is true entirely on
the
basis of its meaning that does not have truthmaker connections to these >>>> semantic meanings.
No one is arguing that.
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar Paracos
is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to resolve
the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic.
On 12/31/2022 3:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 3:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the
system because if there was, you could show that statement True. >>>>>>>
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the
English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my >>>>>>> English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my
Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you are >>>>>> talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of
logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge
about how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that
Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the
reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed, then from that definition you could prove in the defined
Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually True. >>>
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
That is not what he is saying, try again.
Like you just said, even an idiot can just claim something is wrong.
Note, since you aren't even showing the full chapter (which likely
would be a copyright violation) its hard to get the full context of
his statements, but thesse pages are
Thus, since we know that can't be, there must not be an ability to
define in a system of logic, a "Definition of Truth" that allows you
to determine (i.e. Proof) every True Statement, Disprove every false
statement, and determine that every non-truthbearer was a
non-truthbearer.
What else do you think he is saying?
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory"
ACCORDING TO THESIS A, this isn't neccesarily true if Thesis A isn't
True. In fact, I suspect this whole section is building up to showing
this leads to a contradiction, and thus THESIS A isn't True.
Remeber, at the end he says:
I should like to draw attention here to an analogous result. For every
deductive science in "Which arithmetic is contained it is possible to
specify arithmetical notions which, so to speak, belong intuitively to
this science, but ,vhich cannot be defined on the basis of this
science. 'Vith the help of methods which are, completely analogous to
those used in the copstruction of the definition of truth, it is
nevertheless possible to show that these concepts can be so defined
provided the science is enriched by the introduction of variables of
higher order.
Which points out that IN THE THEORY, there are things which can not be
defined, but need to be expressed in a higher order Theory (the Meta
Theory)
By extension, there will be things in the Meta-Theory which can not be
defined, but need to be expressed in an even HIGHER order Theory (a
Meta-Meta-Theory) and so on.
Or we could simply begin with 0 to N order logic and express any
analytic truth what-so-ever.
"This sentence is not true" is at one order of logic and untrue.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is at one
increment of higher order referring to the original order.
Thus in any Theory, or Meta^n Theory, there will ALWAYS be things that
can not be defined.
A finite order of logic can correctly specify any finite truth.
Most (if not all) infinite truths can be algorithmically compressed into
some finite logic.
You don't seem to understand how proof by contradiction works, because
you mind is too simple.
Right and you are one of the 16 people in the world with a six sigma IQ.
For an MIT grad I don't see the thrill in telling outrageous lies.
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% much less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
On 1/1/23 8:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 3:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 3:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the >>>>>>>>> system because if there was, you could show that statement True. >>>>>>>>
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the >>>>>>>> English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is
self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my >>>>>>>> English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my >>>>>>>> Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you
are talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of
logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge
about how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that
Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the >>>>>> reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is
True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a definition
existed, then from that definition you could prove in the defined
Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox was actually
True.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
That is not what he is saying, try again.
Like you just said, even an idiot can just claim something is wrong.
Note, since you aren't even showing the full chapter (which likely
would be a copyright violation) its hard to get the full context of
his statements, but thesse pages are
Thus, since we know that can't be, there must not be an ability to
define in a system of logic, a "Definition of Truth" that allows
you to determine (i.e. Proof) every True Statement, Disprove every
false statement, and determine that every non-truthbearer was a
non-truthbearer.
What else do you think he is saying?
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory"
ACCORDING TO THESIS A, this isn't neccesarily true if Thesis A isn't
True. In fact, I suspect this whole section is building up to showing
this leads to a contradiction, and thus THESIS A isn't True.
Remeber, at the end he says:
I should like to draw attention here to an analogous result. For
every deductive science in "Which arithmetic is contained it is
possible to specify arithmetical notions which, so to speak, belong
intuitively to this science, but ,vhich cannot be defined on the
basis of this science. 'Vith the help of methods which are,
completely analogous to those used in the copstruction of the
definition of truth, it is nevertheless possible to show that these
concepts can be so defined provided the science is enriched by the
introduction of variables of higher order.
Which points out that IN THE THEORY, there are things which can not
be defined, but need to be expressed in a higher order Theory (the
Meta Theory)
By extension, there will be things in the Meta-Theory which can not
be defined, but need to be expressed in an even HIGHER order Theory
(a Meta-Meta-Theory) and so on.
Or we could simply begin with 0 to N order logic and express any
analytic truth what-so-ever.
Until you get to an expression that needs N+1 order logic.
"This sentence is not true" is at one order of logic and untrue.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true" is at one
increment of higher order referring to the original order.
Thus in any Theory, or Meta^n Theory, there will ALWAYS be things
that can not be defined.
A finite order of logic can correctly specify any finite truth.
Most (if not all) infinite truths can be algorithmically compressed into
some finite logic.
What is a "finite Truth", one that needs only a finite number of steps
to get to it, you mean a PROBALBE truth?
Why do you say that "Most" infinite truths can be algoritmically
commpressed? What evidence do you have of that,
And if ANY of them can't, it says you have an unprovable truth.
You don't seem to understand how proof by contradiction works,
because you mind is too simple.
Right and you are one of the 16 people in the world with a six sigma IQ.
For an MIT grad I don't see the thrill in telling outrageous lies.
Actually, it more shows how little you should believe in single fixed
tests. I will admit that I probably topped out the test and it wasn't properly calibrated at the high end, but that is the result it gave.
Another test gave me a 150, and the tester admitted that that was as
high as the test would go, and I was likely much higher, but that was
more than high enough for what I was testing for.
I put little enough faith it IQ tests that I haven't bothered trying a
test really designed for top end people, because in my mind it doesn't
really matter, because intelegence isn't a one dimensional thing that
can be accurately measured.
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 12:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 10:59 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the >>>>>>>>>> system because if there was, you could show that statement True. >>>>>>>>>
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the >>>>>>>>> English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is >>>>>>>>> self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my >>>>>>>>> English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my >>>>>>>>> Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you >>>>>>>> are talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of >>>>>>>> logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge
about how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that
Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong.
**Like you are doing**
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the >>>>>>> reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to
determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory is >>>>>> True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a
definition existed, then from that definition you could prove in
the defined Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox
was actually True.
No that is incorrect. Tarski never indicated that he understood that >>>>> expressions of formal language are not necessarily truth bearers.
Can yo PROVE that tement, have you read EVERYTHING he has written.
You made a claim that he understood this thus it is up to you to cite
your reference.
I did.
I claim that he does not understand this otherwise he would
understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer and would have
explicitly stated that: "the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer".
He knows that, that is why he points out that the fact that the
assumption of the existance of a Definition of Truth with the system,
the assumption of which allows him to prove (based on that assumption)
that the liar paradox is true, shows that it is impossible for there
to be a Defiition of Truth within the logic system.
What don't YOU understand about that statement?
He actually seems to understand this, because he uses the fact that
"proving" the Liar's Paradox, based on an assumed Thesis, shows the
assumed Thesis must be false.
The way that Tarski said it: "This sentence is not true" is undecidable
in his theory and true in his meta-theory.
BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THESIS A.
Thus, THESIS A can't be true.
He never realized that what he really meant is that this sentence is
not true in his theory: "This sentence is not true"
and this sentence is true in his meta-theory:
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"}
Nope, that ISN'T what he is talking about. You just are not
understanding his words.
You have shown enough misundetandings, the most like cause of any
disagreement between you and a respected logictian is that you don't
actually understand what he is saying.
This is also a natural outcome of your MISAPPLICATION of the concept
of "First Principles".
This sentence is true:
{The following sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true."}
Thus, since we know that can't be,
Try and think of any expression of language that is true entirely
on the
basis of its meaning that does not have truthmaker connections to
these
semantic meanings.
No one is arguing that.
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar Paracos
is simply not a Truth Bearer.
Things like tertiary Logic are attempts to expand the logic system to
see if a system of logic could handle it.
You DO understand the concepts of differing systems of logic with
different ground rules, don't you?
Maybe you don't as that concept breaks you idea of an overarching
Meta-system that all logic falls under.
Every logic system only has expressions of language that are {true,
false} or are not members of this formal system.
Note members of THIS group of formal systems.
Other formal systems have other values in their logic.
If no such counter example exists in the universe then that proves
that
I am correct about the requirement of semantic connections to truth
makers.
Right, but that doesn't make it PROVABLE by the definition of Provable. >>>>
Every element of the set of analytic knowledge is provable and the
remaining elements of the set of analytic truth have unknown truth
values.
Yes, KNOWLEDGE is Provavle.
TRUTH is not necessarily, as it may have an infinite set of
connections, which makes it outside the normal definition of Knowable.
Self-contradictory expressions of language have no truthmaker
semantic connections.
This also applies to expressions of language that have vacuous
truth objects: "This sentence is true"
True about what?
True about being true.
True about being true about what?
True about being true about being true.
Ah I see an infinitely recursive structure that never is never
resolved
to a truth value, thus not a truth bearer.
there must not be an ability to define in a system of logic, a
"Definition of Truth" that allows you to determine (i.e. Proof)
every True Statement, Disprove every false statement, and
determine that every non-truthbearer was a non-truthbearer.
The possible requirement of an infinite proof requires that some
expressions of language can only have an unknown Boolean value.
We can't even tell that they definitely require an infinite proof.
Right, its value is unknown in that Thoery, and thus unprovable in
that theory. A Meta-Theory may be able to show that it actually IS
true in that theory, and thus we have in the Theory a statment that
actually is True (but not KNOWN to be true in the Theory) that is
unprovable.
The correct "theory" of the set of analytic truth allows any order of
reference from 0th order logic no N-ary logic.
As Wittgenstein said true in a formal system means has been proved in
this formal system and false in this formal system means that the
opposite has been proved in this formal system.
And he is WRONG in that statement,
All expressions of language that are analytically true require a
semantic connection to their truth maker.
Try and show how an expression of language can be true in a formal
system when that formal system cannot express any connection to the
required truth maker of this expression.
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a >>>> truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar Paracos
is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to resolve
the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic.
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox understand
Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond Binary Logic to see if
other Logical Paradigms might be able to handle that sort of thing (and actually are probably looking at things more complicated then the simple Liar's Paradox).
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who don't
understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb things, and if those
are hiting your radar, you need a better selection filter.
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of the Liar's Paradox and they leave it at that.
On 1/1/23 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 12:13 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 10:59 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 2:11 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 2:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 1:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:**Like you are doing**
On 12/31/22 1:34 PM, olcott wrote:
On 12/31/2022 12:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 12/31/22 12:10 PM, olcott wrote:這句話不是真的: "This sentence is not true."
This sentence is not true.
is not true because it is self-contradictory.
Right, and thus there can not be a Definition of Truth in the >>>>>>>>>>> system because if there was, you could show that statement True. >>>>>>>>>>
The Chinese says "This sentence is not true:" referring to the >>>>>>>>>> English.
The Chinese sentence is true because the English sentence is >>>>>>>>>> self-contradictory. This is an exact isomorphism to:
"sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory [my >>>>>>>>>> English]
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory [my >>>>>>>>>> Chinese]."
Which is a non-sequitor, showing you don't understand what you >>>>>>>>> are talking about.
You are just proving your Stupidity.
I don't think you even actually understand any of the basics of >>>>>>>>> logic.
You can parrot words, but you show an utter lack of knowledge >>>>>>>>> about how any of it works.
Try and paraphrase 100% perfectly exactly what you think that
Tarski is
saying. Any idiot (even a bot) can claim that someone is wrong. >>>>>>>
It takes actual understanding to point out the exact error and the >>>>>>>> reason that it is an error.
Why do we need to paraphrase?
He says that a "Definition" of Truth, by which he means a way to >>>>>>> determine if a given arbitrary sentence expressed in the Theory
is True or False (or not a Truth Bearer) because, if such a
definition existed, then from that definition you could prove in >>>>>>> the defined Meta-Theory that a Statement like the Liar's Paradox >>>>>>> was actually True.
No that is incorrect. Tarski never indicated that he understood that >>>>>> expressions of formal language are not necessarily truth bearers.
Can yo PROVE that tement, have you read EVERYTHING he has written.
You made a claim that he understood this thus it is up to you to cite
your reference.
I did.
I claim that he does not understand this otherwise he would
understand that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer and would
have explicitly stated that: "the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer".
He knows that, that is why he points out that the fact that the
assumption of the existance of a Definition of Truth with the system,
the assumption of which allows him to prove (based on that
assumption) that the liar paradox is true, shows that it is
impossible for there to be a Defiition of Truth within the logic system. >>>
What don't YOU understand about that statement?
He actually seems to understand this, because he uses the fact that
"proving" the Liar's Paradox, based on an assumed Thesis, shows the
assumed Thesis must be false.
The way that Tarski said it: "This sentence is not true" is undecidable >>>> in his theory and true in his meta-theory.
BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THESIS A.
Thus, THESIS A can't be true.
He never realized that what he really meant is that this sentence is
not true in his theory: "This sentence is not true"
and this sentence is true in his meta-theory:
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"}
Nope, that ISN'T what he is talking about. You just are not
understanding his words.
You have shown enough misundetandings, the most like cause of any
disagreement between you and a respected logictian is that you don't
actually understand what he is saying.
This is also a natural outcome of your MISAPPLICATION of the concept
of "First Principles".
This sentence is true:
{The following sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true."} >>>>>>
Thus, since we know that can't be,
Try and think of any expression of language that is true entirely
on the
basis of its meaning that does not have truthmaker connections to
these
semantic meanings.
No one is arguing that.
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is simply not a >>>> truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar Paracos
is simply not a Truth Bearer.
Things like tertiary Logic are attempts to expand the logic system to
see if a system of logic could handle it.
You DO understand the concepts of differing systems of logic with
different ground rules, don't you?
Maybe you don't as that concept breaks you idea of an overarching
Meta-system that all logic falls under.
Every logic system only has expressions of language that are {true,
false} or are not members of this formal system.
Note members of THIS group of formal systems.
Other formal systems have other values in their logic.
If no such counter example exists in the universe then that proves >>>>>> that
I am correct about the requirement of semantic connections to truth >>>>>> makers.
Right, but that doesn't make it PROVABLE by the definition of
Provable.
Every element of the set of analytic knowledge is provable and the
remaining elements of the set of analytic truth have unknown truth
values.
Yes, KNOWLEDGE is Provavle.
TRUTH is not necessarily, as it may have an infinite set of
connections, which makes it outside the normal definition of Knowable.
Self-contradictory expressions of language have no truthmaker
semantic connections.
This also applies to expressions of language that have vacuous
truth objects: "This sentence is true"
True about what?
True about being true.
True about being true about what?
True about being true about being true.
Ah I see an infinitely recursive structure that never is never
resolved
to a truth value, thus not a truth bearer.
there must not be an ability to define in a system of logic, a
"Definition of Truth" that allows you to determine (i.e. Proof)
every True Statement, Disprove every false statement, and
determine that every non-truthbearer was a non-truthbearer.
The possible requirement of an infinite proof requires that some
expressions of language can only have an unknown Boolean value.
We can't even tell that they definitely require an infinite proof.
Right, its value is unknown in that Thoery, and thus unprovable in
that theory. A Meta-Theory may be able to show that it actually IS
true in that theory, and thus we have in the Theory a statment that
actually is True (but not KNOWN to be true in the Theory) that is
unprovable.
The correct "theory" of the set of analytic truth allows any order
of reference from 0th order logic no N-ary logic.
As Wittgenstein said true in a formal system means has been proved in
this formal system and false in this formal system means that the
opposite has been proved in this formal system.
And he is WRONG in that statement,
All expressions of language that are analytically true require a
semantic connection to their truth maker.
Try and show how an expression of language can be true in a formal
system when that formal system cannot express any connection to the
required truth maker of this expression.
So you still don't understand the difference between having a semantic connenction (which might be infinite) to being proven (which must be
finite in the system in question).
On 1/1/23 10:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
All expressions of language that are analytically true require a
semantic connection to their truth maker.
Try and show how an expression of language can be true in a formal
system when that formal system cannot express any connection to the
required truth maker of this expression.
So you still don't understand the difference between having a
semantic connenction (which might be infinite) to being proven (which
must be finite in the system in question).
Tarski and Gödel were not referring to infinite proofs, thus infinite
proofs are irrelevant to Tarski and Gödel.
Right
When we exclude things that are irrelevant to Tarski and Gödel then
True(x) means that there is a semantic connection to a truth maker
thus providing the path for a formal proof.
So they are talking about things that are Analytic Truths because they
are connected to a known Truth Maker by an infinite series of
connections, but are not Provable, because that connection is Infinite
(and thus not a proof).
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% much less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that you don't understand what is actually Truth.
On 1/1/2023 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
All expressions of language that are analytically true require a
semantic connection to their truth maker.
Try and show how an expression of language can be true in a formal
system when that formal system cannot express any connection to the
required truth maker of this expression.
So you still don't understand the difference between having a semantic
connenction (which might be infinite) to being proven (which must be
finite in the system in question).
Tarski and Gödel were not referring to infinite proofs, thus infinite
proofs are irrelevant to Tarski and Gödel.
When we exclude things that are irrelevant to Tarski and Gödel then
True(x) means that there is a semantic connection to a truth maker thus providing the path for a formal proof.
On 1/1/2023 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is simply
not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar
Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to resolve
the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic.
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox understand
Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond Binary Logic to see if
other Logical Paradigms might be able to handle that sort of thing
(and actually are probably looking at things more complicated then the
simple Liar's Paradox).
Anyone that is trying to resolve an expression of language that is not a truth bearer to a truth value is on a fools errand.
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who don't
understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb things, and if those
are hiting your radar, you need a better selection filter.
Saul Kripke was by no means any sort of dumb https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of
understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of the Liar's
Paradox and they leave it at that.
Tarski "proved" that truth cannot be specified and used the Liar Paradox
as the foundation of this proof.
That is like proving the angel food cakes cannot be baked because the
cannot be made from house bricks.
His entire proof is on pages 275-276: http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
I was able to get Adobe Acrobat to OCR that text, it worked quite well.
This allows keyword searches.
On 1/1/23 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is simplyNo Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar
not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been created. >>>>>
Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to
resolve the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic.
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox
understand Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond Binary
Logic to see if other Logical Paradigms might be able to handle that
sort of thing (and actually are probably looking at things more
complicated then the simple Liar's Paradox).
Anyone that is trying to resolve an expression of language that is not a
truth bearer to a truth value is on a fools errand.
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who don't
understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb things, and if
those are hiting your radar, you need a better selection filter.
Saul Kripke was by no means any sort of dumb
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
And he isn't trying to say the Liar's Paradox is a Truth Beared.
At a quick glance he seems to be working on logic that handles
ill-defined statments with partial knowledge
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of
understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of the
Liar's Paradox and they leave it at that.
Tarski "proved" that truth cannot be specified and used the Liar
Paradox as the foundation of this proof.
Not quite.
He Showed that if you presume a complete specification for truth could
exist in a system, that it is neccessarily possible to prove that the
Liar's Paradox is True.
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% much less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that you
don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding of these
things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key misunderstandings of Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they barely skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too much to
carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
On 1/1/2023 10:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 10:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
All expressions of language that are analytically true require a
semantic connection to their truth maker.
Try and show how an expression of language can be true in a formal
system when that formal system cannot express any connection to the
required truth maker of this expression.
So you still don't understand the difference between having a
semantic connenction (which might be infinite) to being proven
(which must be finite in the system in question).
Tarski and Gödel were not referring to infinite proofs, thus infinite
proofs are irrelevant to Tarski and Gödel.
Right
When we exclude things that are irrelevant to Tarski and Gödel then
True(x) means that there is a semantic connection to a truth maker
thus providing the path for a formal proof.
So they are talking about things that are Analytic Truths because they
are connected to a known Truth Maker by an infinite series of
connections, but are not Provable, because that connection is Infinite
(and thus not a proof).
Not in the ballpark of anywhere nearly correct. They both anchor their
work in epistemological antinomies that are necessarily not truth
bearers. No infinite proof is required, simply reject the
epistemological antinomy as not any member of any formal system.
On 1/1/23 11:39 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 10:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 10:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:32 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:04 PM, olcott wrote:
All expressions of language that are analytically true require a
semantic connection to their truth maker.
Try and show how an expression of language can be true in a formal >>>>>> system when that formal system cannot express any connection to the >>>>>> required truth maker of this expression.
So you still don't understand the difference between having a
semantic connenction (which might be infinite) to being proven
(which must be finite in the system in question).
Tarski and Gödel were not referring to infinite proofs, thus
infinite proofs are irrelevant to Tarski and Gödel.
Right
When we exclude things that are irrelevant to Tarski and Gödel then
True(x) means that there is a semantic connection to a truth maker
thus providing the path for a formal proof.
So they are talking about things that are Analytic Truths because
they are connected to a known Truth Maker by an infinite series of
connections, but are not Provable, because that connection is
Infinite (and thus not a proof).
Not in the ballpark of anywhere nearly correct. They both anchor their
work in epistemological antinomies that are necessarily not truth
bearers. No infinite proof is required, simply reject the
epistemological antinomy as not any member of any formal system.
Nope, you just show you don't know what you are taking about.
What in the question of if a number existes with a property defined by
an always halting program is a epistemological antinomy?
Since that IS what Godel statement G is.
The epistemolgical antinomey is used help derive the nature of that
always halting program, as it is transformed from a statement about the
truth of a statement into about the proof of a statement (which is
always a Truth Beared)
Your repeating this error just shows that you haven't actually read any
good description of what Godel did.
You are just showing your total ignorance of the material you have been "studing" for decades.
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% much less >>>> than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that you
don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding of these
things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they barely skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too much to
carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I haven't
studied in great detail (but it seems I still understand some of the
point better than you, which shows your lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth Value.
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using the
standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis A" which
resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then we can prove that
the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and thus not
True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers you have
linked to and see if I can make some more detailed comments on them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be sufficent, which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable ratio considering our comparative intelegence.
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% much less >>>>> than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe the top >>>>> 5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that you
don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding of these
things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key misunderstandings of >>> Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they barely skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too much to
carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I haven't
studied in great detail (but it seems I still understand some of the
point better than you, which shows your lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth Value.
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using the
standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis A" which
resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then we can prove
that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and thus not
True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers you have
linked to and see if I can make some more detailed comments on them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be sufficent, which
compared to your decades, seems a reasonable ratio considering our
comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
On 1/1/2023 10:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is simply >>>>>>> not aNo Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been created. >>>>>>
Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to
resolve the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic.
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox
understand Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond Binary
Logic to see if other Logical Paradigms might be able to handle that
sort of thing (and actually are probably looking at things more
complicated then the simple Liar's Paradox).
Anyone that is trying to resolve an expression of language that is not a >>> truth bearer to a truth value is on a fools errand.
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who don't
understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb things, and if
those are hiting your radar, you need a better selection filter.
Saul Kripke was by no means any sort of dumb
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
And he isn't trying to say the Liar's Paradox is a Truth Beared.
At a quick glance he seems to be working on logic that handles
ill-defined statments with partial knowledge
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of
understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of the
Liar's Paradox and they leave it at that.
Tarski "proved" that truth cannot be specified and used the Liar
Paradox as the foundation of this proof.
Not quite.
He Showed that if you presume a complete specification for truth could
exist in a system, that it is neccessarily possible to prove that the
Liar's Paradox is True.
Maybe Tarski made that same mistake you are are making.
If Tarski believed that he proved this sentence is true in his
meta-theory: "This sentence is not true" then Tarski made a terrible
mistake.
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"} would be true.
"This sentence is not true" is never true.
My key skill from software engineering is to boil complex things down to their barest possible essence. Tarski already mostly did that for Gödel.
Did you verify that his proof is only two pages yet?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
On 1/1/23 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 10:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is
simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been
created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar
Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to
resolve the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic.
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox
understand Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond Binary
Logic to see if other Logical Paradigms might be able to handle
that sort of thing (and actually are probably looking at things
more complicated then the simple Liar's Paradox).
Anyone that is trying to resolve an expression of language that is
not a
truth bearer to a truth value is on a fools errand.
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who don't
understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb things, and if
those are hiting your radar, you need a better selection filter.
Saul Kripke was by no means any sort of dumb
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
And he isn't trying to say the Liar's Paradox is a Truth Beared.
At a quick glance he seems to be working on logic that handles
ill-defined statments with partial knowledge
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of
understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of the
Liar's Paradox and they leave it at that.
Tarski "proved" that truth cannot be specified and used the Liar
Paradox as the foundation of this proof.
Not quite.
He Showed that if you presume a complete specification for truth
could exist in a system, that it is neccessarily possible to prove
that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Maybe Tarski made that same mistake you are are making.
If Tarski believed that he proved this sentence is true in his
meta-theory: "This sentence is not true" then Tarski made a terrible
mistake.
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"} would be true.
"This sentence is not true" is never true.
My key skill from software engineering is to boil complex things down
to their barest possible essence. Tarski already mostly did that for
Gödel.
Did you verify that his proof is only two pages yet?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
Where in those pages do you see your summary expressed?
Note, the construction of the Meta Theory is such that any statement in
the Theory means exactly the same thing in the Meta Theory, so it isn't
the meta theory having a statement referencing the statement in the
theory, but is a proof of the actual original statement.
The proof you reference on pages 275-276 is just a simple proof that it
is possible to construct in the Theory a statement that says, in effect,
that statement x is not provable in the Theory if and only if p is True.
With p being a reference to the whole sentence (Which is sort of Godels statement in the Meta-theory),
This is NOT the "Liars Paradox", as the liar's paradox is about a
statement being TRUE, not about it being PROVABLE. (and in fact, it
looks like the top of page 275 is him showing why this statement IS a
Truth Bearer, using his words that "We can construct a sentence x of the science in question". I beleive you will find this is his terminology to describe sentneces which are what you call Truth Bearers.
Since the premise x is provable, or it is not true that x is provable
are BY DEFINITION truth bears.
Also, x being an element of the True Statements is ALSO a truth bearer,
as if x was a non-truth bearer, that statement would be false (as
non-truth beares are not true).
He then manipulates these terms and shows that neither x or not x are in
the set of provable statements, but x is in the set of True Statements
(since if x was not true, it would be provable, but provabe statements
are always true).
If you want to point out exactly which step in this proof you think he
makes an error.
I think you intend to make it about the statement x not being a truth
bearer, but he shows from the material at the begining of page 275 that
it IS, but mostly by refering to other parts of his work which he is
assuming you understand at this point.
If you want to disagree with the statement being a Truth Bearer, or as
he calls it "A Sentence of the Science", you need to show where the
things he references are wrong.
Again, it seems to be another of your errors by reading just the cliff
notes and not actually understanding what he is saying.
In partictular, I think you need to find the error in the previous proof
for the sentence:
In accordance with the first part of Th. I we can obtain the negation of
one of the sentences in condition (a) of convention T of §3 as a
consequence of the definition of the symbol 'Pr' (provided we replace
'Tr' in this convention by 'Pr').
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% much
less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe the top >>>>>> 5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that you
don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding of these
things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these mistakes. >>>> A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they barely skimmed >>>> the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too much to
carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I haven't
studied in great detail (but it seems I still understand some of the
point better than you, which shows your lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth Value.
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using the
standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis A" which
resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then we can prove
that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and thus not
True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers you
have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed comments on
them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be sufficent,
which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable ratio considering
our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic
connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
Truth is allowed to be base on a infinite set of connections.
It is True if ANY (including infinte) set of connections exist.
It is only provable if a FINITE set of connections exist.
You keep on confusing these two terms, because in your mind you have
crossed their connections and mix up Truth with Knowledge, perhaps
because you studied some theries of Knowledge, and are confusing what is known to be True with what is actually True.
You keep on makeing that sort of mistake in your words, by talking of
what we can KNOW to be true, and applying that to what is actually True.
On 1/2/2023 12:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% much >>>>>> less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe the top >>>>>> 5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that you >>>>> don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding of these >>>> things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these mistakes. >>>> A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they barely skimmed >>>> the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too much to
carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I haven't
studied in great detail (but it seems I still understand some of the
point better than you, which shows your lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth Value.
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using the
standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis A" which
resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then we can prove
that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and thus not
True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers you
have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed comments on
them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be sufficent,
which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable ratio considering
our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic
connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
Even a guy with a top 1% IQ would be able to figure out from our prior context that I must mean expressions of language that have finite
semantic connections to their truth maker.
Truth is allowed to be base on a infinite set of connections.
Off topic because we are only talking about Tarski's simplification of Gödel. The liar paradox has zero semantic connections to a truth maker, thus lacks infinite connections to a truth maker.
As I have already pointed out Prolog detects and rejects both the liar paradox and the simplified Gödel sentence on the basis that they lack connections to their truth maker.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of itself” we can know that unification will fail because it specifies “some kind of infinite structure.” that causes the LP expression to be rejected by unify_with_occurs_check.
This is not saying that the LP has an infinite proof it is saying that
the LP never reaches a truth maker.
"This sentence is not true"
It is not true about what?
It is not true about being not true.
It is not true about being not true about what?
It is not true about being not true about being not true...
It is True if ANY (including infinte) set of connections exist.
It is only provable if a FINITE set of connections exist.
You keep on confusing these two terms, because in your mind you have crossed their connections and mix up Truth with Knowledge, perhaps
because you studied some theries of Knowledge, and are confusing what is known to be True with what is actually True.
You keep on makeing that sort of mistake in your words, by talking ofIt is not that I keep confusing these terms it is that you continue to
what we can KNOW to be true, and applying that to what is actually True.
fail to understand that it can be proven in a finite number of steps
that the LP has no semantic connection to any truth maker.
Here is an example of formalizing the Liar Paradox in C++
void main()
{
bool LP = (LP != true);
}
Even the “C++” compiler recognizes the value is tested before it has been initialized.
liarparadox.cpp(3) : warning C4700: uninitialized local variable 'LP' used Microsoft (R) Incremental Linker Version 9.00.30729.01
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
On 1/2/2023 12:01 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 10:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is
simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been
created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar
Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to
resolve the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic.
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox
understand Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond Binary
Logic to see if other Logical Paradigms might be able to handle
that sort of thing (and actually are probably looking at things
more complicated then the simple Liar's Paradox).
Anyone that is trying to resolve an expression of language that is
not a
truth bearer to a truth value is on a fools errand.
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who don't
understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb things, and if
those are hiting your radar, you need a better selection filter.
Saul Kripke was by no means any sort of dumb
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
And he isn't trying to say the Liar's Paradox is a Truth Beared.
At a quick glance he seems to be working on logic that handles
ill-defined statments with partial knowledge
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of
understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of the
Liar's Paradox and they leave it at that.
Tarski "proved" that truth cannot be specified and used the Liar
Paradox as the foundation of this proof.
Not quite.
He Showed that if you presume a complete specification for truth
could exist in a system, that it is neccessarily possible to prove
that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Maybe Tarski made that same mistake you are are making.
If Tarski believed that he proved this sentence is true in his
meta-theory: "This sentence is not true" then Tarski made a terrible
mistake.
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"} would be true.
"This sentence is not true" is never true.
My key skill from software engineering is to boil complex things down
to their barest possible essence. Tarski already mostly did that for
Gödel.
Did you verify that his proof is only two pages yet?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
Where in those pages do you see your summary expressed?
Note, the construction of the Meta Theory is such that any statement
in the Theory means exactly the same thing in the Meta Theory, so it
isn't the meta theory having a statement referencing the statement in
the theory, but is a proof of the actual original statement.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
The proof you reference on pages 275-276 is just a simple proof that
it is possible to construct in the Theory a statement that says, in
effect, that statement x is not provable in the Theory if and only if
p is True. With p being a reference to the whole sentence (Which is
sort of Godels statement in the Meta-theory),
LP := "this sentence is not true" // theory
~True(LP) // meta-theory
This is NOT the "Liars Paradox", as the liar's paradox is about a
statement being TRUE, not about it being PROVABLE. (and in fact, it
Everywhere, both in the formulation of the
theorem and in its proof, we replace the symbol 'Tr' by the
symbol 'Pr' which denotes the class of all provable sentences
of the theory under consideration
*Tarski used Pr as a proxy for Tr*
(3) x ∉ Pr if and only if x ∈ Tr.
x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
~Provable(x) ↔ True(x).
x is true if and only if x is unprovable
x is true if and only if x lacks the required semantic connection to a
truth maker is false.
It is the same sort of thing as saying that one can only bake an angel
food cake when one lacks the ingredients for an angel food cake.
looks like the top of page 275 is him showing why this statement IS a
Truth Bearer, using his words that "We can construct a sentence x of
the science in question". I beleive you will find this is his
terminology to describe sentneces which are what you call Truth Bearers.
Since the premise x is provable, or it is not true that x is provable
are BY DEFINITION truth bears.
It is not a little bear that always tells the truth, it is that the expression of language has a Boolean semantic value of true or false.
On 1/2/2023 12:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% much >>>>>>> less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe the >>>>>>> top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that you >>>>>> don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding of these >>>>> things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these
mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they barely
skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too much to
carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I haven't
studied in great detail (but it seems I still understand some of the
point better than you, which shows your lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth Value.
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using the
standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis A" which
resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then we can prove
that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and thus not
True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers you
have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed comments on
them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be sufficent,
which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable ratio considering
our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic
connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
Even a guy with a top 1% IQ would be able to figure out from our prior context that I must mean expressions of language that have finite
semantic connections to their truth maker.
Truth is allowed to be base on a infinite set of connections.
Off topic because we are only talking about Tarski's simplification of Gödel. The liar paradox has zero semantic connections to a truth maker,
thus lacks infinite connections to a truth maker.
As I have already pointed out Prolog detects and rejects both the liar paradox and the simplified Gödel sentence on the basis that they lack connections to their truth maker.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of
itself” we can know that unification will fail because it specifies
“some kind of infinite structure.” that causes the LP expression to be rejected by unify_with_occurs_check.
This is not saying that the LP has an infinite proof it is saying that
the LP never reaches a truth maker.
"This sentence is not true"
It is not true about what?
It is not true about being not true.
It is not true about being not true about what?
It is not true about being not true about being not true...
It is True if ANY (including infinte) set of connections exist.
It is only provable if a FINITE set of connections exist.
You keep on confusing these two terms, because in your mind you have
crossed their connections and mix up Truth with Knowledge, perhaps
because you studied some theries of Knowledge, and are confusing what
is known to be True with what is actually True.
You keep on makeing that sort of mistake in your words, by talking of
what we can KNOW to be true, and applying that to what is actually True.
It is not that I keep confusing these terms it is that you continue to
fail to understand that it can be proven in a finite number of steps
that the LP has no semantic connection to any truth maker.
Here is an example of formalizing the Liar Paradox in C++
void main()
{
bool LP = (LP != true);
}
Even the “C++” compiler recognizes the value is tested before it has
been initialized.
liarparadox.cpp(3) : warning C4700: uninitialized local variable 'LP' used Microsoft (R) Incremental Linker Version 9.00.30729.01
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
On 1/2/23 9:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1%
much less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe
the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that
you don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding of these >>>>>> things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these
mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they barely
skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too much to >>>>>> carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I haven't
studied in great detail (but it seems I still understand some of
the point better than you, which shows your lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth Value.
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using the
standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis A"
which resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then we can
prove that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and thus
not True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers you
have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed comments on
them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be sufficent,
which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable ratio
considering our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic
connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
Even a guy with a top 1% IQ would be able to figure out from our prior
context that I must mean expressions of language that have finite
semantic connections to their truth maker.
Which means you aren't talking about ANYTHING that anyone else we have
been talking about would call "True", and thus meaningless for this conversation.
Limiting your definition of "True" to finite connections is the
equivalent of limiting it to Provable, which has been shown (though you
don't understand it) to leads either logic system that are constrained
in what they can handle, or they become inconsistent.
If that is the sort of logic system you want to talk about, ok, but make
it clear, and admit you aren't talking about fields like the properties
of the Natural Numbers.
Truth is allowed to be base on a infinite set of connections.
Off topic because we are only talking about Tarski's simplification of
Gödel. The liar paradox has zero semantic connections to a truth maker,
thus lacks infinite connections to a truth maker.
No, OM TOPIC because that is the definition of Truth used by everyone
you are talking about.
Maybe the point is that everything YOU are talking about has been OFF
TOPIC because you aren't talking about the logic systems you claim to.
As I have already pointed out Prolog detects and rejects both the liar
paradox and the simplified Gödel sentence on the basis that they lack
connections to their truth maker.
So, your "Simplified Godel Sentence" isn't actually the Godel Sentence,
and the fact you think they are equivalent shows your ignorance.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of
itself” we can know that unification will fail because it specifies
“some kind of infinite structure.” that causes the LP expression to be >> rejected by unify_with_occurs_check.
Note, Prolog, as I understand it, would be incapable of handling Godel Sentence as Prolog doesn't implement a high enough level of logic.
This is not saying that the LP has an infinite proof it is saying that
the LP never reaches a truth maker.
Who ever said the Liar Paradox has an infinite proof.
The fact you are making that claim just shows you don't understand the problems you are talking about.
Note, when Tarski "Proves" the statement that is like the Liar's
Paradox, he does so with a finite proof, but he does it by assuming a Hypothosis which shows that that Hypothosis can't be true, thus proving
it false.
That is a standard Proof by Contradiction.
"This sentence is not true"
It is not true about what?
It is not true about being not true.
It is not true about being not true about what?
It is not true about being not true about being not true...
Which isn't done in the proofs.
The fact you think it is shows you don't understand them.
It is True if ANY (including infinte) set of connections exist.
It is only provable if a FINITE set of connections exist.
You keep on confusing these two terms, because in your mind you have
crossed their connections and mix up Truth with Knowledge, perhaps
because you studied some theries of Knowledge, and are confusing what
is known to be True with what is actually True.
You keep on makeing that sort of mistake in your words, by talking of
what we can KNOW to be true, and applying that to what is actually True.
It is not that I keep confusing these terms it is that you continue to
fail to understand that it can be proven in a finite number of steps
that the LP has no semantic connection to any truth maker.
So?
No one is arguing that fact.
You do like to serve your Herring with Red Sauce.
Here is an example of formalizing the Liar Paradox in C++
void main()
{
bool LP = (LP != true);
}
Which isn't actually the Liar's Paradox, because the computation model
of C++ doesn't provide for a way to express it.
Even the “C++” compiler recognizes the value is tested before it has
been initialized.
liarparadox.cpp(3) : warning C4700: uninitialized local variable 'LP'
used
Microsoft (R) Incremental Linker Version 9.00.30729.01
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Right, so the compiler recognises that you did it wrong.
You are just proving you don't understand what you are talking about.
On 1/2/2023 8:52 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% >>>>>>>>> much less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe >>>>>>>>> the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that >>>>>>>> you don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding of
these
things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these
mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they barely
skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too much
to carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I haven't >>>>>> studied in great detail (but it seems I still understand some of
the point better than you, which shows your lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth Value. >>>>>>
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using the
standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis A"
which resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then we can >>>>>> prove that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and thus
not True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers you
have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed comments
on them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be sufficent,
which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable ratio
considering our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic
connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
Even a guy with a top 1% IQ would be able to figure out from our prior
context that I must mean expressions of language that have finite
semantic connections to their truth maker.
Which means you aren't talking about ANYTHING that anyone else we have
been talking about would call "True", and thus meaningless for this
conversation.
The subset of expressions of language that have finite semantic
connections to their truth maker is not an entirely different subject
than the set of expressions of language having semantic connections
to their truth maker.
Limiting your definition of "True" to finite connections is the
equivalent of limiting it to Provable, which has been shown (though
you don't understand it) to leads either logic system that are
constrained in what they can handle, or they become inconsistent.
Not at all. It leads to rejecting expressions of language that have no possible connection to any truth maker. Prolog can already do this.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
If that is the sort of logic system you want to talk about, ok, but
make it clear, and admit you aren't talking about fields like the
properties of the Natural Numbers.
Any expression of formal or natural language that cannot possibly have
any connection to a truth maker is not true. Epistemological antinomies cannot possibly have a semantic connection to any truth maker, thus are always untrue.
Truth is allowed to be base on a infinite set of connections.
Off topic because we are only talking about Tarski's simplification of
Gödel. The liar paradox has zero semantic connections to a truth maker, >>> thus lacks infinite connections to a truth maker.
No, OM TOPIC because that is the definition of Truth used by everyone
you are talking about.
Epistemological antinomies are proven to lack a semantic connection to
any truth maker.
Maybe the point is that everything YOU are talking about has been OFF
TOPIC because you aren't talking about the logic systems you claim to.
Everyone that I have been talking to believes that sentences can be true
and lack any semantic connection to a truth maker because formal logic
makes sure to ignore semantics as off-topic.
As I have already pointed out Prolog detects and rejects both the liar
paradox and the simplified Gödel sentence on the basis that they lack
connections to their truth maker.
So, your "Simplified Godel Sentence" isn't actually the Godel
Sentence, and the fact you think they are equivalent shows your
ignorance.
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof.
thus the Liar Paradox can be used as a proxy for the Gödel sentence.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of
itself” we can know that unification will fail because it specifies
“some kind of infinite structure.” that causes the LP expression to be >>> rejected by unify_with_occurs_check.
Note, Prolog, as I understand it, would be incapable of handling Godel
Sentence as Prolog doesn't implement a high enough level of logic.
Then you understand it incorrectly.
This is not saying that the LP has an infinite proof it is saying that
the LP never reaches a truth maker.
Who ever said the Liar Paradox has an infinite proof.
Ah so now you see that you have been off-topic with your reference to infinite connections to semantic truth makers.
The fact you are making that claim just shows you don't understand the
problems you are talking about.
Note, when Tarski "Proves" the statement that is like the Liar's
Paradox, he does so with a finite proof, but he does it by assuming a
Hypothosis which shows that that Hypothosis can't be true, thus
proving it false.
If Tarski in any way proved that the Liar Paradox is true then Tarski necessarily made a mistake because the Liar Paradox has zero finite or infinite connections to any truth maker.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
is true.
That is a standard Proof by Contradiction.
"This sentence is not true"
It is not true about what?
It is not true about being not true.
It is not true about being not true about what?
It is not true about being not true about being not true...
Which isn't done in the proofs.
That is their mistake. The LP is recognized and rejected by Prolog.
The fact you think it is shows you don't understand them.
That brand new knowledge does not conform to preexisting misconceptions
is the way that brand new knowledge is supposed to work.
It is True if ANY (including infinte) set of connections exist.
It is only provable if a FINITE set of connections exist.
You keep on confusing these two terms, because in your mind you have
crossed their connections and mix up Truth with Knowledge, perhaps
because you studied some theries of Knowledge, and are confusing
what is known to be True with what is actually True.
You keep on makeing that sort of mistake in your words, by talking
of what we can KNOW to be true, and applying that to what is
actually True.
It is not that I keep confusing these terms it is that you continue to
fail to understand that it can be proven in a finite number of steps
that the LP has no semantic connection to any truth maker.
So?
No one is arguing that fact.
You do like to serve your Herring with Red Sauce.
That Gödel and Tarski did not reject epistemological antinomies as not members of any formal system was their mistake.
Here is an example of formalizing the Liar Paradox in C++
void main()
{
bool LP = (LP != true);
}
Which isn't actually the Liar's Paradox, because the computation model
of C++ doesn't provide for a way to express it.
It *is* exactly the Liar Paradox in that it exactly assigns a vacuous
Boolean value to itself. Prolog detects this and rejects it.
Even the “C++” compiler recognizes the value is tested before it has >>> been initialized.
liarparadox.cpp(3) : warning C4700: uninitialized local variable 'LP'
used
Microsoft (R) Incremental Linker Version 9.00.30729.01
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Right, so the compiler recognises that you did it wrong.
You are just proving you don't understand what you are talking about.
The C++ compiler detects that LP is attempting to assign a Boolean value
to itself before this value has been initialized. That is *exactly* what
the Liar Paradox is doing.
pop On Monday, January 2, 2023 at 8:30:38 AM UTC-6, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:Even a guy with a top 1% IQ would be able to figure out from our prior
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% much >>>>>>>> less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe the top >>>>>>>> 5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that you >>>>>>> don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding of these >>>>>> things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these mistakes. >>>>>> A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they barely skimmed >>>>>> the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too much to >>>>>> carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I haven't
studied in great detail (but it seems I still understand some of the >>>>> point better than you, which shows your lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth Value.
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using the
standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis A" which >>>>> resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then we can prove
that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and thus not >>>>> True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers you
have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed comments on
them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be sufficent,
which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable ratio considering >>>>> our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic
connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
context that I must mean expressions of language that have finite
semantic connections to their truth maker.
Truth is allowed to be base on a infinite set of connections.Off topic because we are only talking about Tarski's simplification of
Gödel. The liar paradox has zero semantic connections to a truth maker,
thus lacks infinite connections to a truth maker.
As I have already pointed out Prolog detects and rejects both the liar
paradox and the simplified Gödel sentence on the basis that they lack
connections to their truth maker.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of
itself” we can know that unification will fail because it specifies
“some kind of infinite structure.” that causes the LP expression to be >> rejected by unify_with_occurs_check.
This is not saying that the LP has an infinite proof it is saying that
the LP never reaches a truth maker.
"This sentence is not true"
It is not true about what?
It is not true about being not true.
It is not true about being not true about what?
It is not true about being not true about being not true...
It is True if ANY (including infinte) set of connections exist.It is not that I keep confusing these terms it is that you continue to
It is only provable if a FINITE set of connections exist.
You keep on confusing these two terms, because in your mind you have
crossed their connections and mix up Truth with Knowledge, perhaps
because you studied some theries of Knowledge, and are confusing what is >>> known to be True with what is actually True.
You keep on makeing that sort of mistake in your words, by talking of
what we can KNOW to be true, and applying that to what is actually True.
fail to understand that it can be proven in a finite number of steps
that the LP has no semantic connection to any truth maker.
Here is an example of formalizing the Liar Paradox in C++
void main()
{
bool LP = (LP != true);
}
Even the “C++” compiler recognizes the value is tested before it has
been initialized.
liarparadox.cpp(3) : warning C4700: uninitialized local variable 'LP' used >> Microsoft (R) Incremental Linker Version 9.00.30729.01
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Are you related to William Tyler Olcott, the famous astronomer?
On 1/23/23 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:43 PM, Skep Dick wrote:
On Thursday, 29 December 2022 at 19:27:44 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) is established >>>> entirely on the basis of semantic connections between expressions ofIdiot.
language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” cannot exist:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Property(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Because duuuh! Any semantic property of x entails x!
Round(circle) entails a circle.
Stupid(Olcott) entails an Olcott!
By objective measures I am a genius.
Every expression of language of analytical truth necessarily has a
semantic connection to its truth maker axioms.
False(x) ↔ (⊨~x)
Then why do you say that G in F means
∃G ∈ F (G ↔ (F ⊬ G))
When that conversion from what G actually says to that isn't based on
the truth maker axioms in F?
On 1/23/2023 10:54 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:43 PM, Skep Dick wrote:
On Thursday, 29 December 2022 at 19:27:44 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) is established >>>>> entirely on the basis of semantic connections between expressions of >>>>> language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” cannot >>>>> exist:Idiot.
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Property(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Because duuuh! Any semantic property of x entails x!
Round(circle) entails a circle.
Stupid(Olcott) entails an Olcott!
By objective measures I am a genius.
Every expression of language of analytical truth necessarily has a
semantic connection to its truth maker axioms.
False(x) ↔ (⊨~x)
Then why do you say that G in F means
∃G ∈ F (G ↔ (F ⊬ G))
When that conversion from what G actually says to that isn't based on
the truth maker axioms in F?
*You don't seem to be able to get this*
Any statement that asserts that its truth value is the same as its own unprovability is self-contradictory.
If G is unprovable in F is true that makes G true in the above
expression (LHS of ↔ must have same value as RHS of ↔ ) thus proven in the above expression thus not unprovable.
On 1/23/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/23/2023 10:54 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:43 PM, Skep Dick wrote:
On Thursday, 29 December 2022 at 19:27:44 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) isIdiot.
established
entirely on the basis of semantic connections between expressions of >>>>>> language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” cannot >>>>>> exist:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Property(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Because duuuh! Any semantic property of x entails x!
Round(circle) entails a circle.
Stupid(Olcott) entails an Olcott!
By objective measures I am a genius.
Every expression of language of analytical truth necessarily has a
semantic connection to its truth maker axioms.
False(x) ↔ (⊨~x)
Then why do you say that G in F means
∃G ∈ F (G ↔ (F ⊬ G))
When that conversion from what G actually says to that isn't based on
the truth maker axioms in F?
*You don't seem to be able to get this*
Any statement that asserts that its truth value is the same as its own
unprovability is self-contradictory.
RED HERRING, since that isn't what G if F says.
If G is unprovable in F is true that makes G true in the above
expression (LHS of ↔ must have same value as RHS of ↔ ) thus proven in >> the above expression thus not unprovable.
It isn't G's unprovability in F that makes it true, it is that no number
g exists that satisfies the specified primative recursive relationship.
Since we can show in meta-F that the this is true in the math of F, then
the statement MUST be true, or your F is inconsistent.
On 1/23/2023 5:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/23/2023 10:54 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:43 PM, Skep Dick wrote:
On Thursday, 29 December 2022 at 19:27:44 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) isIdiot.
established
entirely on the basis of semantic connections between expressions of >>>>>>> language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” cannot >>>>>>> exist:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Property(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Because duuuh! Any semantic property of x entails x!
Round(circle) entails a circle.
Stupid(Olcott) entails an Olcott!
By objective measures I am a genius.
Every expression of language of analytical truth necessarily has a
semantic connection to its truth maker axioms.
False(x) ↔ (⊨~x)
Then why do you say that G in F means
∃G ∈ F (G ↔ (F ⊬ G))
When that conversion from what G actually says to that isn't based
on the truth maker axioms in F?
*You don't seem to be able to get this*
Any statement that asserts that its truth value is the same as its own
unprovability is self-contradictory.
RED HERRING, since that isn't what G if F says.
If G is unprovable in F is true that makes G true in the above
expression (LHS of ↔ must have same value as RHS of ↔ ) thus proven in >>> the above expression thus not unprovable.
It isn't G's unprovability in F that makes it true, it is that no
number g exists that satisfies the specified primative recursive
relationship.
Since we can show in meta-F that the this is true in the math of F,
then the statement MUST be true, or your F is inconsistent.
Gödel said that the Liar Paradox <is> equivalent and we can directly see that the Liar Paradox is untrue because it is self-contradictory.
When an equivalent proof is refuted, this does refute the original proof.
On 1/23/23 8:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/23/2023 5:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/23/2023 10:54 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:43 PM, Skep Dick wrote:
On Thursday, 29 December 2022 at 19:27:44 UTC+2, olcott wrote:
Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) isIdiot.
established
entirely on the basis of semantic connections between
expressions of
language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” cannot >>>>>>>> exist:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Property(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Because duuuh! Any semantic property of x entails x!
Round(circle) entails a circle.
Stupid(Olcott) entails an Olcott!
By objective measures I am a genius.
Every expression of language of analytical truth necessarily has a >>>>>> semantic connection to its truth maker axioms.
False(x) ↔ (⊨~x)
Then why do you say that G in F means
∃G ∈ F (G ↔ (F ⊬ G))
When that conversion from what G actually says to that isn't based
on the truth maker axioms in F?
*You don't seem to be able to get this*
Any statement that asserts that its truth value is the same as its own >>>> unprovability is self-contradictory.
RED HERRING, since that isn't what G if F says.
If G is unprovable in F is true that makes G true in the above
expression (LHS of ↔ must have same value as RHS of ↔ ) thus proven in >>>> the above expression thus not unprovable.
It isn't G's unprovability in F that makes it true, it is that no
number g exists that satisfies the specified primative recursive
relationship.
Since we can show in meta-F that the this is true in the math of F,
then the statement MUST be true, or your F is inconsistent.
Gödel said that the Liar Paradox <is> equivalent and we can directly see
that the Liar Paradox is untrue because it is self-contradictory.
When an equivalent proof is refuted, this does refute the original proof.
Nope, you just don't understand what he is saying, and the comment you
are misunderstanding is about in the META-THEORY, not the theory.
Look at is exact words, he never says it is "equvalent", he says he used.
All you are provi9ng is that you don't understand even the basics of his proof, and are too stupid to realize what you don't understand.
On 1/23/2023 8:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 8:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/23/2023 5:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/23/2023 10:54 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:43 PM, Skep Dick wrote:
On Thursday, 29 December 2022 at 19:27:44 UTC+2, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>> Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) is
establishedIdiot.
entirely on the basis of semantic connections between
expressions of
language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” >>>>>>>>> cannot exist:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Property(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Because duuuh! Any semantic property of x entails x!
Round(circle) entails a circle.
Stupid(Olcott) entails an Olcott!
By objective measures I am a genius.
Every expression of language of analytical truth necessarily has >>>>>>> a semantic connection to its truth maker axioms.
False(x) ↔ (⊨~x)
Then why do you say that G in F means
∃G ∈ F (G ↔ (F ⊬ G))
When that conversion from what G actually says to that isn't based >>>>>> on the truth maker axioms in F?
*You don't seem to be able to get this*
Any statement that asserts that its truth value is the same as its own >>>>> unprovability is self-contradictory.
RED HERRING, since that isn't what G if F says.
If G is unprovable in F is true that makes G true in the above
expression (LHS of ↔ must have same value as RHS of ↔ ) thus proven in
the above expression thus not unprovable.
It isn't G's unprovability in F that makes it true, it is that no
number g exists that satisfies the specified primative recursive
relationship.
Since we can show in meta-F that the this is true in the math of F,
then the statement MUST be true, or your F is inconsistent.
Gödel said that the Liar Paradox <is> equivalent and we can directly see >>> that the Liar Paradox is untrue because it is self-contradictory.
When an equivalent proof is refuted, this does refute the original
proof.
Nope, you just don't understand what he is saying, and the comment you
are misunderstanding is about in the META-THEORY, not the theory.
Tarski defines the actual Liar Paradox as his basis https://www.liarparadox.org/247_248.pdf
The Tarski determines that the Liar Paradox is true is his metatheory https://www.liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Tarski never understands that the Liar Paradox is simply not a truth
bearer in his theory because it is self-contradictory in his theory and
not self-contradictory in his metatheory.
People writing papers today are still trying to "resolve" the Liar
Paradox never realizing that this is like trying to bake an angel food
cake using house bricks as the only ingredient.
Look at is exact words, he never says it is "equvalent", he says he used.
All you are provi9ng is that you don't understand even the basics of
his proof, and are too stupid to realize what you don't understand.
On 1/23/23 11:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/23/2023 8:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 8:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/23/2023 5:01 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 5:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/23/2023 10:54 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/23/23 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 12/29/2022 12:43 PM, Skep Dick wrote:
On Thursday, 29 December 2022 at 19:27:44 UTC+2, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>> Since the entire body of analytic truth (defined below) is >>>>>>>>> established
entirely on the basis of semantic connections betweenIdiot.
expressions of
language this is the truth predicate that Tarski “proved” >>>>>>>>> cannot exist:
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
True(x) ↔ (⊨x)
False(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Property(x) ↔ (⊨x)
Because duuuh! Any semantic property of x entails x!
Round(circle) entails a circle.
Stupid(Olcott) entails an Olcott!
By objective measures I am a genius.
Every expression of language of analytical truth necessarily has >>>>>>> a semantic connection to its truth maker axioms.
False(x) ↔ (⊨~x)
Then why do you say that G in F means
∃G ∈ F (G ↔ (F ⊬ G))
When that conversion from what G actually says to that isn't based >>>>>> on the truth maker axioms in F?
*You don't seem to be able to get this*
Any statement that asserts that its truth value is the same as its own >>>>> unprovability is self-contradictory.
RED HERRING, since that isn't what G if F says.
If G is unprovable in F is true that makes G true in the above
expression (LHS of ↔ must have same value as RHS of ↔ ) thus proven in
the above expression thus not unprovable.
It isn't G's unprovability in F that makes it true, it is that no
number g exists that satisfies the specified primative recursive
relationship.
Since we can show in meta-F that the this is true in the math of F, >>>> then the statement MUST be true, or your F is inconsistent.
Gödel said that the Liar Paradox <is> equivalent and we can directly see
that the Liar Paradox is untrue because it is self-contradictory.
When an equivalent proof is refuted, this does refute the original
proof.
Nope, you just don't understand what he is saying, and the comment you
are misunderstanding is about in the META-THEORY, not the theory.
Tarski defines the actual Liar Paradox as his basis https://www.liarparadox.org/247_248.pdfWhere? and I mean in the way YOU claim where the liar is directly used
as an assumed Truth Bearing statement.
The Tarski determines that the Liar Paradox is true is his metatheory https://www.liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdfRight, given the assumption of the existance of a "Definition of Truth",
he proves that the Liar's Paradox is True, which is can't be, and thus
te existance of such a definition can not exist.
Tarski never understands that the Liar Paradox is simply not a truth bearer in his theory because it is self-contradictory in his theory and not self-contradictory in his metatheory.No, he did, becuase he used the fact that the assumption proved it
indicates that the assumption must be wrong.
You apparently can't understand the concept of Proof by Contradiction.
People writing papers today are still trying to "resolve" the LiarMaybe there are STUPID people trying to resolve it, or some smart people trying to work on alternate logic systems (knowing they are alternate)
Paradox never realizing that this is like trying to bake an angel food cake using house bricks as the only ingredient.
that can handle it.
Look at is exact words, he never says it is "equvalent", he says he used. >>
All you are provi9ng is that you don't understand even the basics of
his proof, and are too stupid to realize what you don't understand.
You didn' do this, don't mention it, so obviously you have no idea how
to show your idea except by resorting to smoke and mirrors and changing
to a new direction.
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