• Why do theory of computation problems require pure functions? [ PSR

    From olcott@21:1/5 to All on Sun Sep 19 11:39:25 2021
    XPost: comp.theory, sci.lang, sci.logic

    On 9/19/2021 11:11 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 09:46, olcott wrote:
    On 9/19/2021 10:40 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 08:34, olcott wrote:
    On 9/18/2021 11:19 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-18 22:10, André G. Isaak wrote:

    And note that Rice is talking about properties of Turing Machines
    (or, more properly, of the language accepted by a TM), not
    computations.

    I realized immediately after hitting 'send' that the above will no
    doubt confuse you since people have been telling you that Turing
    Machines can only express computations whereas C/x86 aren't thus
    constrained.

    A computation is a Turing Machine description PLUS an input string.

    Rice's theorem is concerned with the Turing Machine's themselves.

    The Linz proof shows that you cannot construct a halting decider,
    i.e. a decider which correctly determines for any given TM + input
    string pair, whether that pair represents a halting computation.

    Rice's theorem, on the other hand, would rule out the construction
    of something like a Decider Decider, i.e. a TM which takes as its
    input a TM description and determines whether that TM qualifies as
    a decider, i.e. is guaranteed to halt on *any* possible input.

    André


    Here is where I referred to my code defining a
    a decidability decider nine days before you did:

    Where did I define or even mention a 'decidability decider'? Above I
    discussed (but did not define) a DECIDER decider, i.e. a TM which
    determines whether another TM qualifies as a decider.

    On 9/9/2021 10:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    It is the case that H(P,P)==0 is correct
    It is the case that H1((P,P)==1 is correct
    It is the case the this is inconsistent.
    It is the case that this inconsistency

    defines a decidability decider that correctly
    defines a decidability decider that correctly
    defines a decidability decider that correctly

    rejects P on the basis that P has the
    pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) error.

    So what exactly is it that the above is deciding? And how does this
    relate to Rice? If you want to claim this is somehow related to rice,
    you need to identify some semantic property that you claim to be able
    to decide.

    André


    It is deciding that either H/P or H1/P form the pathological
    self-reference error(Olcott 2004). As I said in 2004 this is the same
    error as the Liar Paradox. This means that either H/P or H1/P are not
    correctly decidable.

    The post in which I mentioned a 'decider decider' which you somehow
    misread as 'decidability decider' was intended to clarify a single
    sentence from an earlier post which you entirely ignored. Why don't you
    go back and actually read that earlier post and address the points made therein.

    Your ill-defined notion of a 'pathological self-reference error' doesn't appear to be a property of a Turing Machine, which is what Rice's
    theorem is concerned with. To the extent that it is a property at all,
    it appears to be a property of specific computations, so this has
    absolutely no relevance to Rice.

    André


    It is the property of H(P,P).

    u32 PSR_Olcott_2004(u32 P)
    {
    return H1(P,P) != H(P,P);
    }

    Decides that H(P,P) cannot correctly decide the halt status of its
    input, thus a semantic property of H relative to P.

    The Liar Paradox works this same way.
    "This sentence is not true."
    When it refers to itself it has the pathological self-reference
    error(Olcott 2004).

    This is the same as H(P,P) where the input to H refers to H.

    When we transform the Liar Paradox so that it does not refer to itself

    This sentence is not true: "2 + 3 = 7" then the pathological
    self-reference error(Olcott 2004) is eliminated.

    The same thing occurs with H1(P,P).


    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

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  • From olcott@21:1/5 to All on Sun Sep 19 12:07:25 2021
    XPost: comp.theory, sci.logic, sci.math

    On 9/19/2021 11:56 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 10:39, olcott wrote:
    On 9/19/2021 11:11 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 09:46, olcott wrote:
    On 9/19/2021 10:40 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 08:34, olcott wrote:
    On 9/18/2021 11:19 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-18 22:10, André G. Isaak wrote:

    And note that Rice is talking about properties of Turing
    Machines (or, more properly, of the language accepted by a TM), >>>>>>>> not computations.

    I realized immediately after hitting 'send' that the above will
    no doubt confuse you since people have been telling you that
    Turing Machines can only express computations whereas C/x86
    aren't thus constrained.

    A computation is a Turing Machine description PLUS an input string. >>>>>>>
    Rice's theorem is concerned with the Turing Machine's themselves. >>>>>>>
    The Linz proof shows that you cannot construct a halting decider, >>>>>>> i.e. a decider which correctly determines for any given TM +
    input string pair, whether that pair represents a halting
    computation.

    Rice's theorem, on the other hand, would rule out the
    construction of something like a Decider Decider, i.e. a TM which >>>>>>> takes as its input a TM description and determines whether that
    TM qualifies as a decider, i.e. is guaranteed to halt on *any*
    possible input.

    André


    Here is where I referred to my code defining a
    a decidability decider nine days before you did:

    Where did I define or even mention a 'decidability decider'? Above
    I discussed (but did not define) a DECIDER decider, i.e. a TM which
    determines whether another TM qualifies as a decider.

    On 9/9/2021 10:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    It is the case that H(P,P)==0 is correct
    It is the case that H1((P,P)==1 is correct
    It is the case the this is inconsistent.
    It is the case that this inconsistency

    defines a decidability decider that correctly
    defines a decidability decider that correctly
    defines a decidability decider that correctly

    rejects P on the basis that P has the
    pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) error.

    So what exactly is it that the above is deciding? And how does this
    relate to Rice? If you want to claim this is somehow related to
    rice, you need to identify some semantic property that you claim to
    be able to decide.

    André


    It is deciding that either H/P or H1/P form the pathological
    self-reference error(Olcott 2004). As I said in 2004 this is the
    same error as the Liar Paradox. This means that either H/P or H1/P
    are not correctly decidable.

    The post in which I mentioned a 'decider decider' which you somehow
    misread as 'decidability decider' was intended to clarify a single
    sentence from an earlier post which you entirely ignored. Why don't
    you go back and actually read that earlier post and address the
    points made therein.

    Your ill-defined notion of a 'pathological self-reference error'
    doesn't appear to be a property of a Turing Machine, which is what
    Rice's theorem is concerned with. To the extent that it is a property
    at all, it appears to be a property of specific computations, so this
    has absolutely no relevance to Rice.

    André


    It is the property of H(P,P).

    Right, which means this is entirely irrelevant to Rice's theorem.


    Many historical posts in comp.theory say otherwise.
    If a function can be provided that correctly decides that a specific TM
    cannot correctly decide a specific input pair (according to many
    historical posts on comp.theory) this does refute Rice's theorem.

    u32 PSR_Olcott_2004(u32 P)
    {
       return H1(P,P) != H(P,P);
    }

    Decides that H(P,P) cannot correctly decide the halt status of its input,


    No, it does not. It decides that the results of H1(P, P) doesn't match
    the results of H(P, P). It 'decides' that one of these is correct and
    the other is not but it cannot tell you which one, which means it can't decide whether H(P, P) can correctly decide the halt status of its input.


    I simply have not gotten to that part yet.

    thus a semantic property of H relative to P.

    That's not a property (semantic or otherwise) of *either* P or H.

    The Liar Paradox works this same way.

    The liar's paradox is completely irrelevant to Linz.

    André


    The pathological self-reference error (Olcott 2004) is specifically
    relevant to:
    (a) The Halting Theorem
    (b) The 1931 Incompleteness Theorem
    (c) The Tarski undefinability theorem
    (d) The Liar Paradox (upon which (c) is based).

    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

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  • From Jeff Barnett@21:1/5 to olcott on Sun Sep 19 11:36:10 2021
    XPost: comp.theory, sci.logic, sci.math

    On 9/19/2021 11:07 AM, olcott wrote:
    The pathological self-reference error (Olcott 2004) is specifically
    relevant to:
    (a) The Halting Theorem
    (b) The 1931 Incompleteness Theorem
    (c) The Tarski undefinability theorem
    (d) The Liar Paradox (upon which (c) is based).

    Nothing you have done in the past two decades seems to be relevant to
    anything. Seems? Just being polite. Actually, why bother: Nothing you
    have done in the past two decades is relevant to anything. How long has
    your illness made your brain dysfunctional? Friendly reminders: don't
    get ahead of yourself; take your meds, all of them.

    There are only two paths to long lasting fame for yourself: The first is
    to write the USENET version of "The Trisectors" by Underwood Duddley.
    The second is to collect two decades of your idiotic newsgroup threads
    and turn them into a classic entitled "How to Go Directly from Stark
    Personal Depression to Being a World Class Self-Deluded Troll Without
    Missing a Meal."

    The latter suggestion would be enhanced if you could put your
    publication in an academic series with "How To Go Directly Into Solo Law Practice Without Missing a Meal" by Gerald M. Singer (an LA lawyer).
    Fame and notoriety all based on your original works awaits you. And now
    we see how all those clever copyright annotations are going to pay off
    with big bucks.
    --
    Jeff Barnett

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  • From olcott@21:1/5 to All on Sun Sep 19 12:54:55 2021
    XPost: comp.theory, sci.logic, sci.math

    On 9/19/2021 12:25 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 11:07, olcott wrote:
    On 9/19/2021 11:56 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 10:39, olcott wrote:
    On 9/19/2021 11:11 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 09:46, olcott wrote:
    On 9/19/2021 10:40 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 08:34, olcott wrote:
    On 9/18/2021 11:19 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-18 22:10, André G. Isaak wrote:

    And note that Rice is talking about properties of Turing
    Machines (or, more properly, of the language accepted by a >>>>>>>>>> TM), not computations.

    I realized immediately after hitting 'send' that the above will >>>>>>>>> no doubt confuse you since people have been telling you that >>>>>>>>> Turing Machines can only express computations whereas C/x86
    aren't thus constrained.

    A computation is a Turing Machine description PLUS an input
    string.

    Rice's theorem is concerned with the Turing Machine's themselves. >>>>>>>>>
    The Linz proof shows that you cannot construct a halting
    decider, i.e. a decider which correctly determines for any
    given TM + input string pair, whether that pair represents a >>>>>>>>> halting computation.

    Rice's theorem, on the other hand, would rule out the
    construction of something like a Decider Decider, i.e. a TM
    which takes as its input a TM description and determines
    whether that TM qualifies as a decider, i.e. is guaranteed to >>>>>>>>> halt on *any* possible input.

    André


    Here is where I referred to my code defining a
    a decidability decider nine days before you did:

    Where did I define or even mention a 'decidability decider'?
    Above I discussed (but did not define) a DECIDER decider, i.e. a >>>>>>> TM which determines whether another TM qualifies as a decider.

    On 9/9/2021 10:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    It is the case that H(P,P)==0 is correct
    It is the case that H1((P,P)==1 is correct
    It is the case the this is inconsistent.
    It is the case that this inconsistency

    defines a decidability decider that correctly
    defines a decidability decider that correctly
    defines a decidability decider that correctly

    rejects P on the basis that P has the
    pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) error.

    So what exactly is it that the above is deciding? And how does
    this relate to Rice? If you want to claim this is somehow related >>>>>>> to rice, you need to identify some semantic property that you
    claim to be able to decide.

    André


    It is deciding that either H/P or H1/P form the pathological
    self-reference error(Olcott 2004). As I said in 2004 this is the
    same error as the Liar Paradox. This means that either H/P or H1/P >>>>>> are not correctly decidable.

    The post in which I mentioned a 'decider decider' which you somehow
    misread as 'decidability decider' was intended to clarify a single
    sentence from an earlier post which you entirely ignored. Why don't
    you go back and actually read that earlier post and address the
    points made therein.

    Your ill-defined notion of a 'pathological self-reference error'
    doesn't appear to be a property of a Turing Machine, which is what
    Rice's theorem is concerned with. To the extent that it is a
    property at all, it appears to be a property of specific
    computations, so this has absolutely no relevance to Rice.

    André


    It is the property of H(P,P).

    Right, which means this is entirely irrelevant to Rice's theorem.


    Many historical posts in comp.theory say otherwise.
    If a function can be provided that correctly decides that a specific
    TM cannot correctly decide a specific input pair (according to many
    historical posts on comp.theory) this does refute Rice's theorem.

    So what is the semantic property *of P* that you claim your
    PSR_Olcott_2004 is capable of identifying?

    You can't claim that there is anything 'erroneous' about P. There isn't.

    The fact that you run into a problem when you pass a description of P to
    some *other* TM is not an indicator that there is something wrong with
    P. That's like saying that the expression 40 + 50 is 'erroneous' because
    I can't pass it as an argument to tangent().

    u32 PSR_Olcott_2004(u32 P)
    {
       return H1(P,P) != H(P,P);
    }

    Decides that H(P,P) cannot correctly decide the halt status of its
    input,


    No, it does not. It decides that the results of H1(P, P) doesn't
    match the results of H(P, P). It 'decides' that one of these is
    correct and the other is not but it cannot tell you which one, which
    means it can't decide whether H(P, P) can correctly decide the halt
    status of its input.


    I simply have not gotten to that part yet.

    And yet you claimed to be able to 'decide' that H(P, P) cannot correctly decide the halt status of its input. Until you actually 'get to that
    part' you have no business making such a claim.


    Odd man out:
    When H1(P,P) != H(P,P) we test
    HX(P,P) != H1(P,P)
    HX(P,P) != H(P,P)

    The one that HX(P,P) agrees with is the correct one.

    thus a semantic property of H relative to P.

    That's not a property (semantic or otherwise) of *either* P or H.

    The Liar Paradox works this same way.

    The liar's paradox is completely irrelevant to Linz.

    André


    The pathological self-reference error (Olcott 2004) is specifically
    relevant to:
    (a) The Halting Theorem
    (b) The 1931 Incompleteness Theorem
    (c) The Tarski undefinability theorem
    (d) The Liar Paradox (upon which (c) is based).

    So why don't you:

    (a) provide a proper definition of "pathological self-reference error"
        That means a definition which will allow one to unambiguosly determine whether an arbitrary expression/entity has this error.

    I just provided a reference to function that correctly decide this.
    As long as my "pure function of its inputs" becomes fully validated
    I will be able to provide the actual source-code that makes this decision.

    (b) explain in what sense an "error" is a property.
    (c) demonstrate that whatever property you are referring to is a
    *semantic* property.

    André


    The pathological self reference error is when an
    (a) Input P to a halt decider // halting theorem
    has self-reference such that the Boolean value of H(P,P)
    cannot be correctly determined by H.

    (b) An expression of natural language // liar paradox
    has self-reference such that the Boolean value this expression cannot be correctly determined.

    (c) An expression of formal language // incompleteness / undefinability.
    has self-reference such that the Boolean value this expression cannot be correctly determined within the same formal system.

    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From olcott@21:1/5 to All on Sun Sep 19 13:33:41 2021
    XPost: comp.theory, sci.logic, sci.math

    On 9/19/2021 1:24 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 11:54, olcott wrote:
    On 9/19/2021 12:25 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 11:07, olcott wrote:
    On 9/19/2021 11:56 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 10:39, olcott wrote:
    On 9/19/2021 11:11 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 09:46, olcott wrote:
    On 9/19/2021 10:40 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-19 08:34, olcott wrote:
    On 9/18/2021 11:19 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
    On 2021-09-18 22:10, André G. Isaak wrote:

    And note that Rice is talking about properties of Turing >>>>>>>>>>>> Machines (or, more properly, of the language accepted by a >>>>>>>>>>>> TM), not computations.

    I realized immediately after hitting 'send' that the above >>>>>>>>>>> will no doubt confuse you since people have been telling you >>>>>>>>>>> that Turing Machines can only express computations whereas >>>>>>>>>>> C/x86 aren't thus constrained.

    A computation is a Turing Machine description PLUS an input >>>>>>>>>>> string.

    Rice's theorem is concerned with the Turing Machine's
    themselves.

    The Linz proof shows that you cannot construct a halting >>>>>>>>>>> decider, i.e. a decider which correctly determines for any >>>>>>>>>>> given TM + input string pair, whether that pair represents a >>>>>>>>>>> halting computation.

    Rice's theorem, on the other hand, would rule out the
    construction of something like a Decider Decider, i.e. a TM >>>>>>>>>>> which takes as its input a TM description and determines >>>>>>>>>>> whether that TM qualifies as a decider, i.e. is guaranteed to >>>>>>>>>>> halt on *any* possible input.

    André


    Here is where I referred to my code defining a
    a decidability decider nine days before you did:

    Where did I define or even mention a 'decidability decider'? >>>>>>>>> Above I discussed (but did not define) a DECIDER decider, i.e. >>>>>>>>> a TM which determines whether another TM qualifies as a decider. >>>>>>>>>
    On 9/9/2021 10:25 AM, olcott wrote:
    It is the case that H(P,P)==0 is correct
    It is the case that H1((P,P)==1 is correct
    It is the case the this is inconsistent.
    It is the case that this inconsistency

    defines a decidability decider that correctly
    defines a decidability decider that correctly
    defines a decidability decider that correctly

    rejects P on the basis that P has the
    pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) error.

    So what exactly is it that the above is deciding? And how does >>>>>>>>> this relate to Rice? If you want to claim this is somehow
    related to rice, you need to identify some semantic property >>>>>>>>> that you claim to be able to decide.

    André


    It is deciding that either H/P or H1/P form the pathological
    self-reference error(Olcott 2004). As I said in 2004 this is the >>>>>>>> same error as the Liar Paradox. This means that either H/P or
    H1/P are not correctly decidable.

    The post in which I mentioned a 'decider decider' which you
    somehow misread as 'decidability decider' was intended to clarify >>>>>>> a single sentence from an earlier post which you entirely
    ignored. Why don't you go back and actually read that earlier
    post and address the points made therein.

    Your ill-defined notion of a 'pathological self-reference error' >>>>>>> doesn't appear to be a property of a Turing Machine, which is
    what Rice's theorem is concerned with. To the extent that it is a >>>>>>> property at all, it appears to be a property of specific
    computations, so this has absolutely no relevance to Rice.

    André


    It is the property of H(P,P).

    Right, which means this is entirely irrelevant to Rice's theorem.


    Many historical posts in comp.theory say otherwise.
    If a function can be provided that correctly decides that a specific
    TM cannot correctly decide a specific input pair (according to many
    historical posts on comp.theory) this does refute Rice's theorem.

    So what is the semantic property *of P* that you claim your
    PSR_Olcott_2004 is capable of identifying?

    You can't claim that there is anything 'erroneous' about P. There isn't. >>>
    The fact that you run into a problem when you pass a description of P
    to some *other* TM is not an indicator that there is something wrong
    with P. That's like saying that the expression 40 + 50 is 'erroneous'
    because I can't pass it as an argument to tangent().

    u32 PSR_Olcott_2004(u32 P)
    {
       return H1(P,P) != H(P,P);
    }

    Decides that H(P,P) cannot correctly decide the halt status of its >>>>>> input,


    No, it does not. It decides that the results of H1(P, P) doesn't
    match the results of H(P, P). It 'decides' that one of these is
    correct and the other is not but it cannot tell you which one,
    which means it can't decide whether H(P, P) can correctly decide
    the halt status of its input.


    I simply have not gotten to that part yet.

    And yet you claimed to be able to 'decide' that H(P, P) cannot
    correctly decide the halt status of its input. Until you actually
    'get to that part' you have no business making such a claim.


    Odd man out:
    When H1(P,P) != H(P,P) we test
       HX(P,P) != H1(P,P)
       HX(P,P) != H(P,P)

    The one that HX(P,P) agrees with is the correct one.

    There are a potentially infinite number of Hns. Your 'decider' only
    qualifies as a decider if it works for *every* one of them. Your 'odd
    man out strategy' only works if the case you are testing happens to be
    among the three which are included in your test function.


    The halting theorem is based on an artificially contrived example that
    would never actually occur in actual practice. In actual practice we
    would only actually need H.

    The odd-man-out system does correctly decide an input that was
    artificially contrived to specifically have the pathological
    self-reference error (Olcott 2004) for either H or H1. All of the rest
    of the cases are simply correctly decided by either H or H1.

    thus a semantic property of H relative to P.

    That's not a property (semantic or otherwise) of *either* P or H.

    The Liar Paradox works this same way.

    The liar's paradox is completely irrelevant to Linz.

    André


    The pathological self-reference error (Olcott 2004) is specifically
    relevant to:
    (a) The Halting Theorem
    (b) The 1931 Incompleteness Theorem
    (c) The Tarski undefinability theorem
    (d) The Liar Paradox (upon which (c) is based).

    So why don't you:

    (a) provide a proper definition of "pathological self-reference error"
         That means a definition which will allow one to unambiguosly
    determine whether an arbitrary expression/entity has this error.

    I just provided a reference to function that correctly decide this.

    No. You provided an ad hoc function which decides it for a *single*
    case. That's not the same thing as a function which correctly decides it.


    This will come later when my "pure function of its inputs" has been
    totally validated.

    It is a well-established fact that you cannot trisect an arbitrary angle using only a compass and straightedge. I can show you how to trisect a
    90° angle using a compass and straightedge, but this doesn't refute the claim. Only a solution which works for *any* angle would refute the claim.

    As long as my "pure function of its inputs" becomes fully validated
    I will be able to provide the actual source-code that makes this
    decision.

    (b) explain in what sense an "error" is a property.
    (c) demonstrate that whatever property you are referring to is a
    *semantic* property.

    André


    The pathological self reference error is when an
    (a) Input P to a halt decider   // halting theorem
    has self-reference such that the Boolean value of H(P,P)
    cannot be correctly determined by H.
    (b) An expression of natural language // liar paradox
    has self-reference such that the Boolean value this expression cannot
    be correctly determined.

    (c) An expression of formal language // incompleteness / undefinability.
    has self-reference such that the Boolean value this expression cannot
    be correctly determined within the same formal system.

    None of those constitute definitions. Nor do they identify properties.
    And if you want to claim that PSR is an actual thing, you need a single definition. And, as has been pointed out to you numerous times, neither
    the halting problem proofs nor the incompleteness theorem involve self-reference at all. This is just your imaginary bugaboo.

    André



    --
    Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott

    "Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
    minds." Einstein

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)