On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm can do
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is concerned, so >>>>>>> you
better find another topic you don't know about.
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct halt status >>>>>> for
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior that this
input actually specifies.
what the
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such that D(X,Y) is >>>>> true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I know... I >>>>> don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden logical
incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden gaps in their
reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of truth itself is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent with the
system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you need to
strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century behind in
the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works.
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm can do
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is concerned, >>>>>>>> so you
better find another topic you don't know about.
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct halt
status for
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior that this >>>>>>> input actually specifies.
what the
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such that
D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I know... I >>>>>> don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden logical
incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden gaps in their
reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of truth itself is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent with the
system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you need to
strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century behind in
the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth understanding of
all of the subtle nuances of computer science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how logic systems systems sometimes diverge from correct reasoning when examined at the
very high level abstraction of the philosophical foundation of the
notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of any of the
key philosophical underpinnings of these things, simply taking for
granted that they are all these underpinnings are infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally invisible
to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician.
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm can do
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is concerned, >>>>>>>>> so you
better find another topic you don't know about.
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct halt
status for
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior that this >>>>>>>> input actually specifies.
what the
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such that
D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I know... I >>>>>>> don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you know that >>>>> would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden logical
incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden gaps in their
reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of truth itself is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent with the
system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you need to
strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century behind
in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth understanding
of all of the subtle nuances of computer science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how logic
systems systems sometimes diverge from correct reasoning when examined
at the very high level abstraction of the philosophical foundation of
the notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of any of
the key philosophical underpinnings of these things, simply taking for
granted that they are all these underpinnings are infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally invisible
to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that century
ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand mathematics (and thought
it not valuable)
You aseem to be refering to writings published post-humously about a his comments on a paper he hadn't yet actually read, and that he never
repeated after actually reading the paper.
Yes, that is very good basis for claiming your idea have to be right.
You have shown ZERO understanding for the rules of logic, and that your opinions are basically worthless.
If you want to try to ACTUAL PROVE something, based on REAL ESTABLISHED
rules of logic, go ahead and give a try.
Note, this means NOT just falling back to "the meaning of the words"
except when you are actually QUOTING the accepted meaning of those words
in the field and showing how they apply.
I don't know if I have ever seen you put together a string of logic more
that one or two steps before you go off on a "this must be true" side
track, and never actually use any of the fundamental definitions. (You
may quotes some of them, but then never actually use that definition in
your nest step of the proof).
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm can do >>>>>>>> what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is concerned, >>>>>>>>>> so you
better find another topic you don't know about.
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct halt
status for
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior that this >>>>>>>>> input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such that
D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I know... I >>>>>>>> don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you know that >>>>>> would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden logical
incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden gaps in their
reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of truth itself is broken. >>>>>
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent with the
system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you need to
strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century behind
in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth understanding
of all of the subtle nuances of computer science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how logic
systems systems sometimes diverge from correct reasoning when
examined at the very high level abstraction of the philosophical
foundation of the notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of any of
the key philosophical underpinnings of these things, simply taking
for granted that they are all these underpinnings are infallibly
correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally
invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that century
ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand mathematics (and
thought it not valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over everyone's
head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic rather than most
elegant bare essence.
You aseem to be refering to writings published post-humously about a
his comments on a paper he hadn't yet actually read, and that he never
repeated after actually reading the paper.
Yes, that is very good basis for claiming your idea have to be right.
You have shown ZERO understanding for the rules of logic, and that
your opinions are basically worthless.
If you want to try to ACTUAL PROVE something, based on REAL
ESTABLISHED rules of logic, go ahead and give a try.
Note, this means NOT just falling back to "the meaning of the words"
except when you are actually QUOTING the accepted meaning of those
words in the field and showing how they apply.
I don't know if I have ever seen you put together a string of logic
more that one or two steps before you go off on a "this must be true"
side track, and never actually use any of the fundamental definitions.
(You may quotes some of them, but then never actually use that
definition in your nest step of the proof).
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm can do >>>>>>>>> what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is
concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about.
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct halt >>>>>>>>>> status for
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior that this >>>>>>>>>> input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such that >>>>>>>>> D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I
know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you know that >>>>>>> would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden logical
incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden gaps in their
reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of truth itself is broken. >>>>>>
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent with
the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you need to
strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century behind
in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth
understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how logic
systems systems sometimes diverge from correct reasoning when
examined at the very high level abstraction of the philosophical
foundation of the notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of any of
the key philosophical underpinnings of these things, simply taking
for granted that they are all these underpinnings are infallibly
correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally
invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that century
ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand mathematics (and
thought it not valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over everyone's
head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic rather than most
elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes that were
published after his death. If he really believed in this statement as
was sure of it, it would seem natural that he actually would of
published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there was an error
in his logic that he worked on and either never resolved or he found his logic error and thus stopped believing in that statement.
This make the "appeal" to him as an authority to rebut Godel incorrect,
as he never stood as an authority to make such a claim, he just
investigated it in private notes.
Perhaps he realized that his argument to try to prove that Truth can be proven rested on the assumption of a definition that Truth was Provable
and thus is just a circular argument.
As I have put to you, PROVE that Truth must be Provable, or by your own
logic the statement isn't true. We KNOW (if we have any intelligence)
that there are Truths that we do not know about, so it is established
that some truths are at least unknown for now. What is the basis for
saying that there can't be an aspect that happens to be true even though
we can not prove it?
You aseem to be refering to writings published post-humously about a
his comments on a paper he hadn't yet actually read, and that he
never repeated after actually reading the paper.
Yes, that is very good basis for claiming your idea have to be right.
You have shown ZERO understanding for the rules of logic, and that
your opinions are basically worthless.
If you want to try to ACTUAL PROVE something, based on REAL
ESTABLISHED rules of logic, go ahead and give a try.
Note, this means NOT just falling back to "the meaning of the words"
except when you are actually QUOTING the accepted meaning of those
words in the field and showing how they apply.
I don't know if I have ever seen you put together a string of logic
more that one or two steps before you go off on a "this must be true"
side track, and never actually use any of the fundamental
definitions. (You may quotes some of them, but then never actually
use that definition in your nest step of the proof).
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm can >>>>>>>>>> do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is
concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about.
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct halt >>>>>>>>>>> status for
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior that >>>>>>>>>>> this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such that >>>>>>>>>> D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I
know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you know >>>>>>>> that
would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden logical
incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden gaps in their >>>>>>> reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of truth itself is
broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent with
the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you need
to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century
behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth
understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how logic
systems systems sometimes diverge from correct reasoning when
examined at the very high level abstraction of the philosophical
foundation of the notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of any of
the key philosophical underpinnings of these things, simply taking
for granted that they are all these underpinnings are infallibly
correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally
invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that
century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand mathematics
(and thought it not valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over everyone's
head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic rather than most
elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not understanding
what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have
intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes that
were published after his death. If he really believed in this
statement as was sure of it, it would seem natural that he actually
would of published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there was an
error in his logic that he worked on and either never resolved or he
found his logic error and thus stopped believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly before I
ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct knowledge that his reasoning is correct.
His full quote is on page 6 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes Wittgenstein have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved
in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system'
means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.-
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
There are only two possible ways that any analytical expression of
language can possibly be true:
(1) It is stipulated to be true. // like an axiom
(2) It is derived by applying only truth preserving operations to (1) or
the consequences of (2). // like sound deduction
Analytic truth includes every expression of language that can be
completely verified as totally true entirely on the basis of its meaning without requiring any sense data from the sense organs.
Empirical expressions of language also require sense data from the sense organs to verify their truth.
This means that if there are no connected set of semantics meanings
(sound deduction) that make an analytical expression of language true
then then it cannot possibly be true unless it was stipulated as true.
The conclusion of Wittgenstein's analysis and mind is that if G is
unprovable in F then G is simply untrue in F.
Incomplete(T) ↔ ∃φ ((T ⊬ φ) ∧ (T ⊬ ¬φ)).
Even though F does meet the erroneous mathematical definition of Incomplete(F) that F was ever construed as incomplete is simply
incorrect because it does not screen out expressions of language that
are simply not truth bearers.
Tarski made this same mistake with a much simply yet comparable proof to
the Gödel 1931 incompleteness theorem:
Tarski undefinability theorem 1936
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
"the sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory."
It is not that Tarski's metatheory is smarter than his theory.
It is that Tarski's x (the liar paradox) is not provable or true in his theory because it is not a truth bearer in his theory in the same way
that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer in F.
This make the "appeal" to him as an authority to rebut Godel
incorrect, as he never stood as an authority to make such a claim, he
just investigated it in private notes.
Perhaps he realized that his argument to try to prove that Truth can
be proven rested on the assumption of a definition that Truth was
Provable and thus is just a circular argument.
As I have put to you, PROVE that Truth must be Provable, or by your
own logic the statement isn't true. We KNOW (if we have any
intelligence) that there are Truths that we do not know about, so it
is established that some truths are at least unknown for now. What is
the basis for saying that there can't be an aspect that happens to be
true even though we can not prove it?
You aseem to be refering to writings published post-humously about a
his comments on a paper he hadn't yet actually read, and that he
never repeated after actually reading the paper.
Yes, that is very good basis for claiming your idea have to be right.
You have shown ZERO understanding for the rules of logic, and that
your opinions are basically worthless.
If you want to try to ACTUAL PROVE something, based on REAL
ESTABLISHED rules of logic, go ahead and give a try.
Note, this means NOT just falling back to "the meaning of the words"
except when you are actually QUOTING the accepted meaning of those
words in the field and showing how they apply.
I don't know if I have ever seen you put together a string of logic
more that one or two steps before you go off on a "this must be
true" side track, and never actually use any of the fundamental
definitions. (You may quotes some of them, but then never actually
use that definition in your nest step of the proof).
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm can >>>>>>>>>>> do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is >>>>>>>>>>>>> concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about.
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct halt >>>>>>>>>>>> status for
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior that >>>>>>>>>>>> this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such that >>>>>>>>>>> D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I >>>>>>>>>>> know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you know >>>>>>>>> that
would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden logical
incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden gaps in
their reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of truth itself >>>>>>>> is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent with >>>>>>> the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you need >>>>>>> to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century
behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth
understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how logic
systems systems sometimes diverge from correct reasoning when
examined at the very high level abstraction of the philosophical
foundation of the notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of any
of the key philosophical underpinnings of these things, simply
taking for granted that they are all these underpinnings are
infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally
invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you right. >>>>>
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that
century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand mathematics
(and thought it not valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over
everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic rather
than most elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not understanding
what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have
intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes that
were published after his death. If he really believed in this
statement as was sure of it, it would seem natural that he actually
would of published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there was an
error in his logic that he worked on and either never resolved or he
found his logic error and thus stopped believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly before I
ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct knowledge that his
reasoning is correct.
No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it,
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes Wittgenstein have
the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved
in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system'
means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.-
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to be proved
to be true.
If needs to be taken as an assumption, it is not something that IS unconditionally true.
There are only two possible ways that any ANALYTICALLY expression of
language can possibly be true:
(1) It is stipulated to be true. // like an axiom
(2) It is derived by applying only truth preserving operations to (1)
or the consequences of (2). // like sound deduction
WRONG.
There are only two possible ways that they can be ANALYTICALLY true.
Analytic truth includes every expression of language that can be
completely verified as totally true entirely on the basis of its
meaning without requiring any sense data from the sense organs.
And there are other truths besides Analytic Truth. That is implied by
the need of the adjective.
Empirical expressions of language also require sense data from the
sense organs to verify their truth.
Nope, things can be empirically true even without the sense data.
Without the sense data they are not KNOWN to be true, but might be.
This means that if there are no connected set of semantics meanings
(sound deduction) that make an analytical expression of language true
then then it cannot possibly be true unless it was stipulated as true.
WRONG. You are again confalating KNOWLEDGE with TRUTH.
The conclusion of Wittgenstein's analysis and mind is that if G is
unprovable in F then G is simply untrue in F.
Incomplete(T) ↔ ∃φ ((T ⊬ φ) ∧ (T ⊬ ¬φ)).
WRONG.
Makes the erroneous assumption that Truth requires proof, and becomes a circular argument.
Even though F does meet the erroneous mathematical definition of
Incomplete(F) that F was ever construed as incomplete is simply
incorrect because it does not screen out expressions of language that
are simply not truth bearers.
Except that the expression of language WAS a Truth Bearer, as a given statement MUST be either Provable or not. This comes because you of
course can't prove an statement that can't be true, like a non-sense sentence.
Unless you are willing to define that Provability isn't a Truth Bearer,
which since you are then defining Truth as Provable, the Truth of a
statement isn't a Truth Bearer, you have a problem. You whole logic
system collapses as it can no longer talk about itself.
Tarski made this same mistake with a much simply yet comparable proof
to the Gödel 1931 incompleteness theorem:
Tarski undefinability theorem 1936
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
"the sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory."
It is not that Tarski's metatheory is smarter than his theory.
It is that Tarski's x (the liar paradox) is not provable or true in
his theory because it is not a truth bearer in his theory in the same
way that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer in F.
This make the "appeal" to him as an authority to rebut Godel
incorrect, as he never stood as an authority to make such a claim, he
just investigated it in private notes.
Perhaps he realized that his argument to try to prove that Truth can
be proven rested on the assumption of a definition that Truth was
Provable and thus is just a circular argument.
As I have put to you, PROVE that Truth must be Provable, or by your
own logic the statement isn't true. We KNOW (if we have any
intelligence) that there are Truths that we do not know about, so it
is established that some truths are at least unknown for now. What is
the basis for saying that there can't be an aspect that happens to be
true even though we can not prove it?
You aseem to be refering to writings published post-humously about
a his comments on a paper he hadn't yet actually read, and that he
never repeated after actually reading the paper.
Yes, that is very good basis for claiming your idea have to be right. >>>>>
You have shown ZERO understanding for the rules of logic, and that
your opinions are basically worthless.
If you want to try to ACTUAL PROVE something, based on REAL
ESTABLISHED rules of logic, go ahead and give a try.
Note, this means NOT just falling back to "the meaning of the
words" except when you are actually QUOTING the accepted meaning of
those words in the field and showing how they apply.
I don't know if I have ever seen you put together a string of logic
more that one or two steps before you go off on a "this must be
true" side track, and never actually use any of the fundamental
definitions. (You may quotes some of them, but then never actually
use that definition in your nest step of the proof).
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm can >>>>>>>>>>>> do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about.
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct halt >>>>>>>>>>>>> status for
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior >>>>>>>>>>>>> that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such that >>>>>>>>>>>> D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise. >>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I >>>>>>>>>>>> know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you >>>>>>>>>> know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden logical >>>>>>>>> incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden gaps in
their reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of truth
itself is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent with >>>>>>>> the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you need >>>>>>>> to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century
behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth
understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how logic
systems systems sometimes diverge from correct reasoning when
examined at the very high level abstraction of the philosophical >>>>>>> foundation of the notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of any >>>>>>> of the key philosophical underpinnings of these things, simply
taking for granted that they are all these underpinnings are
infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally
invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you right. >>>>>>
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that
century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand
mathematics (and thought it not valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over
everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic
rather than most elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not understanding
what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have
intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes that
were published after his death. If he really believed in this
statement as was sure of it, it would seem natural that he actually
would of published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there was an
error in his logic that he worked on and either never resolved or he
found his logic error and thus stopped believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly before
I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct knowledge that
his reasoning is correct.
No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it,
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw his reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes Wittgenstein have
the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved
in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system'
means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.-
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to be proved
to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof that it is true. There are no categories of expressions of language that are both
true and neither stipulated as true or proven to be true (sound
deduction) on the basis of semantic connections to other true
expressions of language.
If needs to be taken as an assumption, it is not something that IS
unconditionally true.
There are only two possible ways that any ANALYTICALLY expression of
language can possibly be true:
(1) It is stipulated to be true. // like an axiom
(2) It is derived by applying only truth preserving operations to (1)
or the consequences of (2). // like sound deduction
WRONG.
There are only two possible ways that they can be ANALYTICALLY true.
Should I capitalize my use of ANALYTICALLY too so that you can see that
I already specified this? (I capitalized it, above)
Analytic truth includes every expression of language that can be
completely verified as totally true entirely on the basis of its
meaning without requiring any sense data from the sense organs.
And there are other truths besides Analytic Truth. That is implied by
the need of the adjective.
All of math and logic is exclusively ANALYTICAL.
Empirical expressions of language also require sense data from the
sense organs to verify their truth.
Nope, things can be empirically true even without the sense data.
Without the sense data they are not KNOWN to be true, but might be.
to verify their truth.
to verify their truth.
to verify their truth.
This means that if there are no connected set of semantics meanings
(sound deduction) that make an analytical expression of language true
then then it cannot possibly be true unless it was stipulated as true.
WRONG. You are again confalating KNOWLEDGE with TRUTH.
Counter-examples are categorically impossible because ALL ANALYTIC expressions of language ONLY derive their truth value from semantic connections to other ANALYTIC expressions of language that are known to
be true, AKA sound deduction.
The conclusion of Wittgenstein's analysis and mind is that if G is
unprovable in F then G is simply untrue in F.
Incomplete(T) ↔ ∃φ ((T ⊬ φ) ∧ (T ⊬ ¬φ)).
WRONG.
Makes the erroneous assumption that Truth requires proof, and becomes
a circular argument.
It is not a circle it is a tree of sound deduction.
The conclusion is linked backwards (sound deduction in reverse) to every expression of language that derives it.
Even though F does meet the erroneous mathematical definition of
Incomplete(F) that F was ever construed as incomplete is simply
incorrect because it does not screen out expressions of language that
are simply not truth bearers.
Except that the expression of language WAS a Truth Bearer, as a given
statement MUST be either Provable or not. This comes because you of
course can't prove an statement that can't be true, like a non-sense
sentence.
As recently as 1974, people were still clueless about the issue of the
liar paradox.It is the simplest of all self-reference paradoxes so I
bought the domain name liarparadox.org for my work.
Tarski based his whole proof on the liar paradox and proved in his
metatheory that it is not provable in his theory, same result as Godel.
Unless you are willing to define that Provability isn't a Truth
Bearer, which since you are then defining Truth as Provable, the Truth
of a statement isn't a Truth Bearer, you have a problem. You whole
logic system collapses as it can no longer talk about itself.
True(F, x) is implemented as Provable(F, x) through sound deduction on
the basis of premises known to be true. In a reverse sound deduction
(same thing as Prolog back-chaining inference) know truths (AKA Prolog
facts) are sought on the basis of Prolog rules.
https://www.google.com/search?q=prolog+back+chainikng&rlz=1C1GCEJ_enUS813US813&oq=prolog+back+chainikng&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i10i160.4658j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
Tarski made this same mistake with a much simply yet comparable proof
to the Gödel 1931 incompleteness theorem:
Tarski undefinability theorem 1936
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
"the sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory."
It is not that Tarski's metatheory is smarter than his theory.
It is that Tarski's x (the liar paradox) is not provable or true in
his theory because it is not a truth bearer in his theory in the same
way that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer in F.
This make the "appeal" to him as an authority to rebut Godel
incorrect, as he never stood as an authority to make such a claim,
he just investigated it in private notes.
Perhaps he realized that his argument to try to prove that Truth can
be proven rested on the assumption of a definition that Truth was
Provable and thus is just a circular argument.
As I have put to you, PROVE that Truth must be Provable, or by your
own logic the statement isn't true. We KNOW (if we have any
intelligence) that there are Truths that we do not know about, so it
is established that some truths are at least unknown for now. What
is the basis for saying that there can't be an aspect that happens
to be true even though we can not prove it?
You aseem to be refering to writings published post-humously about >>>>>> a his comments on a paper he hadn't yet actually read, and that he >>>>>> never repeated after actually reading the paper.
Yes, that is very good basis for claiming your idea have to be right. >>>>>>
You have shown ZERO understanding for the rules of logic, and that >>>>>> your opinions are basically worthless.
If you want to try to ACTUAL PROVE something, based on REAL
ESTABLISHED rules of logic, go ahead and give a try.
Note, this means NOT just falling back to "the meaning of the
words" except when you are actually QUOTING the accepted meaning
of those words in the field and showing how they apply.
I don't know if I have ever seen you put together a string of
logic more that one or two steps before you go off on a "this must >>>>>> be true" side track, and never actually use any of the fundamental >>>>>> definitions. (You may quotes some of them, but then never actually >>>>>> use that definition in your nest step of the proof).
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>> can do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about.
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt status for
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such >>>>>>>>>>>>> that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I >>>>>>>>>>>>> know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you >>>>>>>>>>> know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden logical >>>>>>>>>> incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden gaps in >>>>>>>>>> their reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of truth
itself is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent
with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you
need to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system. >>>>>>>>>
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century >>>>>>>>> behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works. >>>>>>>>
understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer science. >>>>>>>>
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how logic >>>>>>>> systems systems sometimes diverge from correct reasoning when
examined at the very high level abstraction of the philosophical >>>>>>>> foundation of the notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of any >>>>>>>> of the key philosophical underpinnings of these things, simply >>>>>>>> taking for granted that they are all these underpinnings are
infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally
invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you right. >>>>>>>
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that
century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand
mathematics (and thought it not valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over
everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic
rather than most elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not understanding
what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have
intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes that
were published after his death. If he really believed in this
statement as was sure of it, it would seem natural that he actually
would of published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there was an
error in his logic that he worked on and either never resolved or
he found his logic error and thus stopped believing in that statement. >>>>>
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly before
I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct knowledge that
his reasoning is correct.
No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it,
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw his
reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes Wittgenstein have
the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved
in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system'
means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.-
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to be
proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof that it
is true. There are no categories of expressions of language that are
both true and neither stipulated as true or proven to be true (sound
deduction) on the basis of semantic connections to other true
expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the
sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.
Thus either the statement "Collatz is True", or "Collatz is False", must
be true, and there is no known proof or refutation for either, While
this doesn't prove that no proof exists, it does point out a flaw with
your statement, until you have actually proved or refuted a statement,
you don't even know if it could be a truth bearer.
Thus we have a, at least possible, counter-example when you claim none
exist. You can only refute this as a possible counter-example by actualy proving that a proof or refutation actually exists.
If needs to be taken as an assumption, it is not something that IS
unconditionally true.
WRONG.
There are only two possible ways that any ANALYTICALLY expression of
language can possibly be true:
(1) It is stipulated to be true. // like an axiom
(2) It is derived by applying only truth preserving operations to
(1) or the consequences of (2). // like sound deduction >>>
There are only two possible ways that they can be ANALYTICALLY true.
Should I capitalize my use of ANALYTICALLY too so that you can see
that I already specified this? (I capitalized it, above)
Except then it points out that you erroeous omit it in your other
statements.
Analytic truth includes every expression of language that can be
completely verified as totally true entirely on the basis of its
meaning without requiring any sense data from the sense organs.
And there are other truths besides Analytic Truth. That is implied by
the need of the adjective.
All of math and logic is exclusively ANALYTICAL.
That is part of your error. Math and Logic use analytical methods to
prove its ideas, but not all Truth in math and logic is Analytical.
Empirical expressions of language also require sense data from the
sense organs to verify their truth.
Nope, things can be empirically true even without the sense data.
Without the sense data they are not KNOWN to be true, but might be.
to verify their truth.
to verify their truth.
to verify their truth.
Truth doesn't need to be "Verified" to be True. It only needs to be
verified before its Truth can be used to create other Truths in a Proof.
This means that if there are no connected set of semantics meanings
(sound deduction) that make an analytical expression of language
true then then it cannot possibly be true unless it was stipulated
as true.
WRONG. You are again confalating KNOWLEDGE with TRUTH.
Counter-examples are categorically impossible because ALL ANALYTIC
expressions of language ONLY derive their truth value from semantic
connections to other ANALYTIC expressions of language that are known
to be true, AKA sound deduction.
Thus, the circular definition.
You only show that ANALYTIC Truth must be proven, not Truth.
Analytics accept that not all Truth is Analytically proven. You make a category error assuming all Truth must be Analytically True.
Note, An Analytical Statement might be True but not Analytically ture.
The conclusion of Wittgenstein's analysis and mind is that if G is
unprovable in F then G is simply untrue in F.
Incomplete(T) ↔ ∃φ ((T ⊬ φ) ∧ (T ⊬ ¬φ)).
WRONG.
Makes the erroneous assumption that Truth requires proof, and becomes
a circular argument.
It is not a circle it is a tree of sound deduction.
The conclusion is linked backwards (sound deduction in reverse) to
every expression of language that derives it.
Nope. Give the NON-CIRCULAR proof.
Your failure to show what you claim is evidence that you don't actually
have a real proof.
Your statement that "Something is True only if it is Provable" is itself
a contradiction unless you can ACTUALLY prove it, and until you do, you
can not use it.
Without such a proof, the statement says it can not be true, so you can
not use it.
Even though F does meet the erroneous mathematical definition of
Incomplete(F) that F was ever construed as incomplete is simply
incorrect because it does not screen out expressions of language
that are simply not truth bearers.
Except that the expression of language WAS a Truth Bearer, as a given
statement MUST be either Provable or not. This comes because you of
course can't prove an statement that can't be true, like a non-sense
sentence.
As recently as 1974, people were still clueless about the issue of the
liar paradox.It is the simplest of all self-reference paradoxes so I
bought the domain name liarparadox.org for my work.
Tarski based his whole proof on the liar paradox and proved in his
metatheory that it is not provable in his theory, same result as Godel.
Unless you are willing to define that Provability isn't a Truth
Bearer, which since you are then defining Truth as Provable, the
Truth of a statement isn't a Truth Bearer, you have a problem. You
whole logic system collapses as it can no longer talk about itself.
True(F, x) is implemented as Provable(F, x) through sound deduction on
the basis of premises known to be true. In a reverse sound deduction
(same thing as Prolog back-chaining inference) know truths (AKA Prolog
facts) are sought on the basis of Prolog rules.
https://www.google.com/search?q=prolog+back+chainikng&rlz=1C1GCEJ_enUS813US813&oq=prolog+back+chainikng&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i10i160.4658j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
And Prolog doesn't define logic, but is just a programming languge to
handle simple rule sets.
Note, Prolog doesn't provide a well implemented "Not" operator, in part BECAUSE it defines a statement that is unprovable as false.
If you want to limit your logic to what Prolog can handle, be my guess,
but then stay out of things beyond its capability, like Compuation Theory.
I don't think you are smart enough to understand the limitation of
Prolog (or even simple logic) and thus make enormous errors not
understanding the limited domain of your tools.
You just don't see that you logic system has become horribly
inconsistent because you close your eyes to those errors and say that
logic must be wrong, but you can't actually define WHAT is wrong with
the logic, because it actually does follow the rules you propose.
Tarski made this same mistake with a much simply yet comparable
proof to the Gödel 1931 incompleteness theorem:
Tarski undefinability theorem 1936
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
"the sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory
becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory."
It is not that Tarski's metatheory is smarter than his theory.
It is that Tarski's x (the liar paradox) is not provable or true in
his theory because it is not a truth bearer in his theory in the
same way that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer in F.
This make the "appeal" to him as an authority to rebut Godel
incorrect, as he never stood as an authority to make such a claim,
he just investigated it in private notes.
Perhaps he realized that his argument to try to prove that Truth
can be proven rested on the assumption of a definition that Truth
was Provable and thus is just a circular argument.
As I have put to you, PROVE that Truth must be Provable, or by your
own logic the statement isn't true. We KNOW (if we have any
intelligence) that there are Truths that we do not know about, so
it is established that some truths are at least unknown for now.
What is the basis for saying that there can't be an aspect that
happens to be true even though we can not prove it?
You aseem to be refering to writings published post-humously
about a his comments on a paper he hadn't yet actually read, and >>>>>>> that he never repeated after actually reading the paper.
Yes, that is very good basis for claiming your idea have to be
right.
You have shown ZERO understanding for the rules of logic, and
that your opinions are basically worthless.
If you want to try to ACTUAL PROVE something, based on REAL
ESTABLISHED rules of logic, go ahead and give a try.
Note, this means NOT just falling back to "the meaning of the
words" except when you are actually QUOTING the accepted meaning >>>>>>> of those words in the field and showing how they apply.
I don't know if I have ever seen you put together a string of
logic more that one or two steps before you go off on a "this
must be true" side track, and never actually use any of the
fundamental definitions. (You may quotes some of them, but then
never actually use that definition in your nest step of the proof). >>>>>>
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt status for
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you >>>>>>>>>>>>> know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden
logical incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden >>>>>>>>>>>> gaps in their reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of >>>>>>>>>>>> truth itself is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent >>>>>>>>>>> with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you >>>>>>>>>>> need to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system. >>>>>>>>>>>
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century >>>>>>>>>>> behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works. >>>>>>>>>>
understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer science. >>>>>>>>>>
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how
logic systems systems sometimes diverge from correct reasoning >>>>>>>>>> when examined at the very high level abstraction of the
philosophical foundation of the notion of (analytic) truth >>>>>>>>>> itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of >>>>>>>>>> any of the key philosophical underpinnings of these things, >>>>>>>>>> simply taking for granted that they are all these
underpinnings are infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally >>>>>>>>>> invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician. >>>>>>>>>>
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you >>>>>>>>> right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that >>>>>>>>> century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand
mathematics (and thought it not valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over
everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic
rather than most elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not
understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read
the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have
intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes
that were published after his death. If he really believed in
this statement as was sure of it, it would seem natural that he
actually would of published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there was
an error in his logic that he worked on and either never resolved >>>>>>> or he found his logic error and thus stopped believing in that
statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly
before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct
knowledge that his reasoning is correct.
No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it,
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw his
reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of
understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes Wittgenstein
have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved
in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system'
means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.-
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to be
proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof that
it is true. There are no categories of expressions of language that
are both true and neither stipulated as true or proven to be true
(sound deduction) on the basis of semantic connections to other true
expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I ever
talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not talking about that.
Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true.
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, because you
can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can show via a meta-logical proof in a higher system that it actually is True.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it.
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least in the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be "Analytically True", but
it is still True, and the conjure has ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.
The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically True, or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement isn't a Truth Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither Analytically True
or Emperically True. Those are distinctions made in fields of KNOWLEDGE,
and only relate to catagorizing KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE.
Epistemology, as you seem to like describing what you are talking about
ISN'T about studying Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of the field understands the difference, but you don't seem to be able to do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is "Known". A
Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things that are True that
are outside knowledge.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the
sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even doesn't
eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is no
possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot be
derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected set of
semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they cannot be
found in finite time.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at least
by the normal definitions of a proof.
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>> can do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt status for
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you >>>>>>>>>>>> know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden logical >>>>>>>>>>> incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden gaps in >>>>>>>>>>> their reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of truth >>>>>>>>>>> itself is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent >>>>>>>>>> with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you >>>>>>>>>> need to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system. >>>>>>>>>>
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century >>>>>>>>>> behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works. >>>>>>>>>
understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer science. >>>>>>>>>
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how logic >>>>>>>>> systems systems sometimes diverge from correct reasoning when >>>>>>>>> examined at the very high level abstraction of the
philosophical foundation of the notion of (analytic) truth itself. >>>>>>>>>
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of >>>>>>>>> any of the key philosophical underpinnings of these things,
simply taking for granted that they are all these underpinnings >>>>>>>>> are infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally >>>>>>>>> invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician. >>>>>>>>>
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you
right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that
century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand
mathematics (and thought it not valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over
everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic
rather than most elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not
understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read the >>>>>> paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have
intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes
that were published after his death. If he really believed in this >>>>>> statement as was sure of it, it would seem natural that he
actually would of published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there was an >>>>>> error in his logic that he worked on and either never resolved or
he found his logic error and thus stopped believing in that
statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly
before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct
knowledge that his reasoning is correct.
No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it,
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw his
reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of understanding. >>>>
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes Wittgenstein
have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved
in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system'
means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.-
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to be
proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof that it
is true. There are no categories of expressions of language that are
both true and neither stipulated as true or proven to be true (sound
deduction) on the basis of semantic connections to other true
expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I ever talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not talking about that.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the
sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even doesn't
eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is no possible
"non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot be
derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected set of semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they cannot be
found in finite time.
On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt status for
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden >>>>>>>>>>>>> logical incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden >>>>>>>>>>>>> gaps in their reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of >>>>>>>>>>>>> truth itself is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent >>>>>>>>>>>> with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you >>>>>>>>>>>> need to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system. >>>>>>>>>>>>
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century >>>>>>>>>>>> behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works. >>>>>>>>>>>
understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer science. >>>>>>>>>>>
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how >>>>>>>>>>> logic systems systems sometimes diverge from correct
reasoning when examined at the very high level abstraction of >>>>>>>>>>> the philosophical foundation of the notion of (analytic) >>>>>>>>>>> truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>> learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of >>>>>>>>>>> any of the key philosophical underpinnings of these things, >>>>>>>>>>> simply taking for granted that they are all these
underpinnings are infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally >>>>>>>>>>> invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician. >>>>>>>>>>>
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you >>>>>>>>>> right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that >>>>>>>>>> century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand
mathematics (and thought it not valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over
everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic >>>>>>>>> rather than most elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not
understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read >>>>>>>> the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have >>>>>>>> intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes >>>>>>>> that were published after his death. If he really believed in
this statement as was sure of it, it would seem natural that he >>>>>>>> actually would of published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there was >>>>>>>> an error in his logic that he worked on and either never
resolved or he found his logic error and thus stopped believing >>>>>>>> in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly
before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct
knowledge that his reasoning is correct.
No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it,
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw his
reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of
understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes Wittgenstein
have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved
in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system'
means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.- >>>>>>>
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to be
proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof that
it is true. There are no categories of expressions of language that
are both true and neither stipulated as true or proven to be true
(sound deduction) on the basis of semantic connections to other
true expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I ever
talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not talking about that.
Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true.
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, because you
can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can show via a
meta-logical proof in a higher system that it actually is True.
OK great this is a key agreement between us.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it.
Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except that is excludes expressions of language dealing with sense data from the sense organs.
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least in
the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be "Analytically True",
but it is still True, and the conjure has ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.
If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic meanings
proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set can be
found, thus is still would exists even if it took an infinite search to
find.
The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically True,
or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement isn't a Truth
Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither Analytically
True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions made in fields of
KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE.
Epistemology, as you seem to like describing what you are talking
about ISN'T about studying Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of
the field understands the difference, but you don't seem to be able to
do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is "Known". A
Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things that are True
that are outside knowledge.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the
sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even
doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is
no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot be
derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected set of
semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they cannot be
found in finite time.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at
least by the normal definitions of a proof.
I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from logic.
On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true.
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt status for
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behavior that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting.
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden >>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical incoherence, false assumptions, or very well >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden gaps in their reasoning otherwise the fundamental >>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature of truth itself is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent >>>>>>>>>>>>> with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you >>>>>>>>>>>>> need to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a >>>>>>>>>>>>> century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic >>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth >>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer science. >>>>>>>>>>>>
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how >>>>>>>>>>>> logic systems systems sometimes diverge from correct
reasoning when examined at the very high level abstraction >>>>>>>>>>>> of the philosophical foundation of the notion of (analytic) >>>>>>>>>>>> truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>> learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of >>>>>>>>>>>> any of the key philosophical underpinnings of these things, >>>>>>>>>>>> simply taking for granted that they are all these
underpinnings are infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally >>>>>>>>>>>> invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician. >>>>>>>>>>>>
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you >>>>>>>>>>> right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that >>>>>>>>>>> century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand
mathematics (and thought it not valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over >>>>>>>>>> everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic >>>>>>>>>> rather than most elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not
understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read >>>>>>>>> the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have >>>>>>>>> intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes >>>>>>>>> that were published after his death. If he really believed in >>>>>>>>> this statement as was sure of it, it would seem natural that he >>>>>>>>> actually would of published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there was >>>>>>>>> an error in his logic that he worked on and either never
resolved or he found his logic error and thus stopped believing >>>>>>>>> in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly
before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct
knowledge that his reasoning is correct.
No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it, >>>>>>>
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw his
reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of
understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes Wittgenstein >>>>>>>> have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved
in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system'
means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.- >>>>>>>>
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to be
proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof that >>>>>> it is true. There are no categories of expressions of language
that are both true and neither stipulated as true or proven to be
true (sound deduction) on the basis of semantic connections to
other true expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I ever
talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not talking about that. >>>
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, because you
can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can show via a
meta-logical proof in a higher system that it actually is True.
OK great this is a key agreement between us.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it.
Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except that
is excludes expressions of language dealing with sense data from the
sense organs.
FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If it is)
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least in
the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be "Analytically
True", but it is still True, and the conjure has ALWAYS been a Truth
Bearer.
If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic meanings
proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set can be
found, thus is still would exists even if it took an infinite search
to find.
Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, you don't
have a Proof.
The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically True,
or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement isn't a Truth
Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither Analytically
True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions made in fields of
KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing KNOWN Truths, or
KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as you seem to like describing what you are
talking about ISN'T about studying Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper
student of the field understands the difference, but you don't seem
to be able to do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is "Known". A
Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things that are True
that are outside knowledge.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the
sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even
doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is
no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot be
derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected set
of semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they cannot
be found in finite time.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at
least by the normal definitions of a proof.
I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from logic.
Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?
Formal Logic STARTS with its definition of what is correct reasoning in
that Formal System.
You can not change that definition without needing to restart at the
begining of that Formal System.
I have pointed this out many times.
If you want to change the ground rules of logic, you need to start at
the other end, and begin with a NEW Formal Logic with your new rules.
People HAVE looked at this idea of inserting the conditon that something
is only True if it can be proven, and it greatly limits the power of the logic system, in particular, it can't handle much math.
I get the feeling that you haven't really looked at that area, because
it seems too much "learn by rote", and says you can't get to where you
want to get to.
In short, your ignorance of the past has doomed you to repeat the great mistakes of the past.
On 5/14/2022 4:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct halt status for
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behavior that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code
that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I know, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical incoherence, false assumptions, or very well >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden gaps in their reasoning otherwise the fundamental >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature of truth itself is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be
inconsistent with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic >>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth >>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer >>>>>>>>>>>>> science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how >>>>>>>>>>>>> logic systems systems sometimes diverge from correct >>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning when examined at the very high level abstraction >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the philosophical foundation of the notion of (analytic) >>>>>>>>>>>>> truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>>> learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling >>>>>>>>>>>>> of any of the key philosophical underpinnings of these >>>>>>>>>>>>> things, simply taking for granted that they are all these >>>>>>>>>>>>> underpinnings are infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is >>>>>>>>>>>>> totally invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book >>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make >>>>>>>>>>>> you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly >>>>>>>>>>>> that century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand >>>>>>>>>>>> mathematics (and thought it not valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over >>>>>>>>>>> everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic >>>>>>>>>>> rather than most elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not
understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read >>>>>>>>>> the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have >>>>>>>>>> intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes >>>>>>>>>> that were published after his death. If he really believed in >>>>>>>>>> this statement as was sure of it, it would seem natural that >>>>>>>>>> he actually would of published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there >>>>>>>>>> was an error in his logic that he worked on and either never >>>>>>>>>> resolved or he found his logic error and thus stopped
believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly >>>>>>>>> before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct >>>>>>>>> knowledge that his reasoning is correct.
No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it, >>>>>>>>
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw his >>>>>>> reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of
understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes Wittgenstein >>>>>>>>> have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved >>>>>>>>> in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' >>>>>>>>> means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.- >>>>>>>>>
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to be >>>>>>>> proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof
that it is true. There are no categories of expressions of
language that are both true and neither stipulated as true or
proven to be true (sound deduction) on the basis of semantic
connections to other true expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I ever
talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not talking about
that.
Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true.
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, because you
can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can show via a
meta-logical proof in a higher system that it actually is True.
OK great this is a key agreement between us.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it.
Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except that
is excludes expressions of language dealing with sense data from the
sense organs.
FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If it is)
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least in
the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be "Analytically
True", but it is still True, and the conjure has ALWAYS been a Truth
Bearer.
If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic meanings
proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set can
be found, thus is still would exists even if it took an infinite
search to find.
Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, you
don't have a Proof.
So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on terminology.
When I refer to a set of connected semantic meanings this seems not
exactly the same thing as a proof. If this set does not exist, then the expression is not true. If the set exists yet is impossible to find then
it is still true.
The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically
True, or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement isn't
a Truth Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither Analytically
True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions made in fields of
KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing KNOWN Truths, or
KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as you seem to like describing what you are
talking about ISN'T about studying Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper
student of the field understands the difference, but you don't seem
to be able to do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is "Known". A
Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things that are True
that are outside knowledge.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the >>>>>> sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even
doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is >>>>>> no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot
be derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected
set of semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they
cannot be found in finite time.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at
least by the normal definitions of a proof.
I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from logic.
Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?
So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes (incoherence and inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms of the art.
Formal Logic STARTS with its definition of what is correct reasoning
in that Formal System.
You can not change that definition without needing to restart at the
begining of that Formal System.
I have pointed this out many times.
If you want to change the ground rules of logic, you need to start at
the other end, and begin with a NEW Formal Logic with your new rules.
Same idea as logic, created to correct the errors of logic.
People HAVE looked at this idea of inserting the conditon that
something is only True if it can be proven, and it greatly limits the
power of the logic system, in particular, it can't handle much math.
I get the feeling that you haven't really looked at that area, because
it seems too much "learn by rote", and says you can't get to where you
want to get to.
Logic has mistakes (incoherence and inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms of the art. When we contrast logic with correct reasoning then we might see that these are mistakes.
In short, your ignorance of the past has doomed you to repeat the
great mistakes of the past.
On 5/14/22 5:48 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 4:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct halt status for
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behavior that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know, I know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical incoherence, false assumptions, or very well >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden gaps in their reasoning otherwise the fundamental >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature of truth itself is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be
inconsistent with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer >>>>>>>>>>>>>> science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic systems systems sometimes diverge from correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning when examined at the very high level abstraction >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the philosophical foundation of the notion of
(analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>>>> learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of any of the key philosophical underpinnings of these >>>>>>>>>>>>>> things, simply taking for granted that they are all these >>>>>>>>>>>>>> underpinnings are infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make >>>>>>>>>>>>> you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly >>>>>>>>>>>>> that century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't
understand mathematics (and thought it not valuable) >>>>>>>>>>>>>
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over >>>>>>>>>>>> everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for
simplistic rather than most elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not
understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't >>>>>>>>>>> read the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I >>>>>>>>>>> have intensly studied), this statement is solely from private >>>>>>>>>>> notes that were published after his death. If he really
believed in this statement as was sure of it, it would seem >>>>>>>>>>> natural that he actually would of published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there >>>>>>>>>>> was an error in his logic that he worked on and either never >>>>>>>>>>> resolved or he found his logic error and thus stopped
believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly >>>>>>>>>> before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct >>>>>>>>>> knowledge that his reasoning is correct.
No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it, >>>>>>>>>
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw his >>>>>>>> reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of
understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes
Wittgenstein have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved >>>>>>>>>> in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' >>>>>>>>>> means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.- >>>>>>>>>>
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to be >>>>>>>>> proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof
that it is true. There are no categories of expressions of
language that are both true and neither stipulated as true or
proven to be true (sound deduction) on the basis of semantic
connections to other true expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I
ever talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not talking
about that.
Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true.
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, because
you can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can show via a
meta-logical proof in a higher system that it actually is True.
OK great this is a key agreement between us.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it.
Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except that
is excludes expressions of language dealing with sense data from the
sense organs.
FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If it is)
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least in
the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be "Analytically
True", but it is still True, and the conjure has ALWAYS been a
Truth Bearer.
If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic
meanings proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set can
be found, thus is still would exists even if it took an infinite
search to find.
Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, you
don't have a Proof.
So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on terminology.
When I refer to a set of connected semantic meanings this seems not
exactly the same thing as a proof. If this set does not exist, then
the expression is not true. If the set exists yet is impossible to
find then it is still true.
So something can be "Provable" yet no "Proof" actually be findable or expressable?
That means you might not know if you have Proven Something.
The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically
True, or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement isn't
a Truth Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither Analytically
True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions made in fields of
KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing KNOWN Truths, or
KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as you seem to like describing what you
are talking about ISN'T about studying Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A
proper student of the field understands the difference, but you
don't seem to be able to do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is "Known".
A Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things that are
True that are outside knowledge.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that
the sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even >>>>>>> doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There
is no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things. >>>>>>>
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot
be derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected
set of semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they
cannot be found in finite time.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at
least by the normal definitions of a proof.
I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from logic.
Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?
So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes (incoherence and
inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms of the art.
So, again, your are at the wrong end. If you want to change the
fundamental definitions, you need to be talking about the Core Logic
rules that you think need to be changed, not try to change them in a
derived logic system, when such a change is NOT allowed.
Formal Logic STARTS with its definition of what is correct reasoning
in that Formal System.
You can not change that definition without needing to restart at the
begining of that Formal System.
I have pointed this out many times.
If you want to change the ground rules of logic, you need to start at
the other end, and begin with a NEW Formal Logic with your new rules.
Same idea as logic, created to correct the errors of logic.
So start with your new logic system and see what you can get to in your limited time left, Sounds like you have wasted decades of time by
working at the wrong end of the stick.
People HAVE looked at this idea of inserting the conditon that
something is only True if it can be proven, and it greatly limits the
power of the logic system, in particular, it can't handle much math.
I get the feeling that you haven't really looked at that area,
because it seems too much "learn by rote", and says you can't get to
where you want to get to.
Logic has mistakes (incoherence and inconsistency) baked right into
the definitions of its terms of the art. When we contrast logic with
correct reasoning then we might see that these are mistakes.
So YOU say. Then start at the base and see how far you can get based on
your new idea.
Probably only a few decades of work for someone who knows what they are doing.
Starting at the wrong end is like trying to stop a mile long freight
train by dragging a bucket out the back of the caboose.
In short, your ignorance of the past has doomed you to repeat the
great mistakes of the past.
On 5/14/2022 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:48 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 4:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct halt status for
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behavior that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know, I know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical incoherence, false assumptions, or very well >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden gaps in their reasoning otherwise the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental nature of truth itself is broken. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconsistent with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to strictly limit the capabilities of your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic systems systems sometimes diverge from correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning when examined at the very high level
abstraction of the philosophical foundation of the notion >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of any of the key philosophical underpinnings of these >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things, simply taking for granted that they are all these >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> underpinnings are infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't
understand mathematics (and thought it not valuable) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over >>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for
simplistic rather than most elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not
understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't >>>>>>>>>>>> read the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I >>>>>>>>>>>> have intensly studied), this statement is solely from
private notes that were published after his death. If he >>>>>>>>>>>> really believed in this statement as was sure of it, it >>>>>>>>>>>> would seem natural that he actually would of published it. >>>>>>>>>>>>
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there >>>>>>>>>>>> was an error in his logic that he worked on and either never >>>>>>>>>>>> resolved or he found his logic error and thus stopped
believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly >>>>>>>>>>> before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct >>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that his reasoning is correct.
No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it, >>>>>>>>>>
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw >>>>>>>>> his reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of
understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes
Wittgenstein have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved >>>>>>>>>>> in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' >>>>>>>>>>> means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.- >>>>>>>>>>>
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to >>>>>>>>>> be proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof >>>>>>>>> that it is true. There are no categories of expressions of
language that are both true and neither stipulated as true or >>>>>>>>> proven to be true (sound deduction) on the basis of semantic >>>>>>>>> connections to other true expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I
ever talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not talking >>>>>>> about that.
Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true.
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, because
you can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can show via a
meta-logical proof in a higher system that it actually is True.
OK great this is a key agreement between us.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it.
Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except
that is excludes expressions of language dealing with sense data
from the sense organs.
FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If it is)
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least
in the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be "Analytically >>>>>> True", but it is still True, and the conjure has ALWAYS been a
Truth Bearer.
If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic
meanings proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set can
be found, thus is still would exists even if it took an infinite
search to find.
Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, you
don't have a Proof.
So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on terminology.
When I refer to a set of connected semantic meanings this seems not
exactly the same thing as a proof. If this set does not exist, then
the expression is not true. If the set exists yet is impossible to
find then it is still true.
So something can be "Provable" yet no "Proof" actually be findable or
expressable?
That means you might not know if you have Proven Something.
The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically
True, or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement
isn't a Truth Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither Analytically >>>>>> True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions made in fields of >>>>>> KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing KNOWN Truths, or
KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as you seem to like describing what you
are talking about ISN'T about studying Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A
proper student of the field understands the difference, but you
don't seem to be able to do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is "Known". >>>>>> A Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things that are
True that are outside knowledge.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that >>>>>>>> the sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N
even doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. >>>>>>>> There is no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for
such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot >>>>>>> be derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected >>>>>>> set of semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they >>>>>>> cannot be found in finite time.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at
least by the normal definitions of a proof.
I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from logic. >>>>>
Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?
So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes (incoherence and
inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms of the art.
So, again, your are at the wrong end. If you want to change the
fundamental definitions, you need to be talking about the Core Logic
rules that you think need to be changed, not try to change them in a
derived logic system, when such a change is NOT allowed.
We cannot correctly label any analytical expression of language as true unless and until:
(1) It has been stipulated to be true.
(2) a connected set of semantic meanings back-chain to expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true.
This is the same system that Prolog uses.
The reason that I keep referring to the Tarski proof is it essentially
the exact same proof Gödel after Gödel has been simplified 100,000-fold. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Tarski simply uses the liar paradox which
Gödel says:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof
Thus making Tarski's simpler proof equivalent to Gödel's, even though Tarski's whole proof is only two pages long.
Formal Logic STARTS with its definition of what is correct reasoning
in that Formal System.
You can not change that definition without needing to restart at the
begining of that Formal System.
I have pointed this out many times.
If you want to change the ground rules of logic, you need to start
at the other end, and begin with a NEW Formal Logic with your new
rules.
Same idea as logic, created to correct the errors of logic.
So start with your new logic system and see what you can get to in
your limited time left, Sounds like you have wasted decades of time by
working at the wrong end of the stick.
People HAVE looked at this idea of inserting the conditon that
something is only True if it can be proven, and it greatly limits
the power of the logic system, in particular, it can't handle much
math.
I get the feeling that you haven't really looked at that area,
because it seems too much "learn by rote", and says you can't get to
where you want to get to.
Logic has mistakes (incoherence and inconsistency) baked right into
the definitions of its terms of the art. When we contrast logic with
correct reasoning then we might see that these are mistakes.
So YOU say. Then start at the base and see how far you can get based
on your new idea.
I started this "new idea" in 1997.
Probably only a few decades of work for someone who knows what they
are doing.
Starting at the wrong end is like trying to stop a mile long freight
train by dragging a bucket out the back of the caboose.
In short, your ignorance of the past has doomed you to repeat the
great mistakes of the past.
On 5/14/22 7:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:48 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 4:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with >>>>>>>>>>> it,
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:It is now dead obvious that you accept that no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct halt status for
*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behavior that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know, I know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because you know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical incoherence, false assumptions, or very well >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden gaps in their reasoning otherwise the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental nature of truth itself is broken. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconsistent with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you need to strictly limit the capabilities of your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how logic systems systems sometimes diverge from correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning when examined at the very high level >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction of the philosophical foundation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with
mathematicians learned-by-rote by-the-book without the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> slightest inkling of any of the key philosophical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> underpinnings of these things, simply taking for granted >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that they are all these underpinnings are infallibly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand mathematics (and thought it not valuable) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over >>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for >>>>>>>>>>>>>> simplistic rather than most elegant bare essence.
Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not >>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't >>>>>>>>>>>>> read the paper).
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I >>>>>>>>>>>>> have intensly studied), this statement is solely from >>>>>>>>>>>>> private notes that were published after his death. If he >>>>>>>>>>>>> really believed in this statement as was sure of it, it >>>>>>>>>>>>> would seem natural that he actually would of published it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there >>>>>>>>>>>>> was an error in his logic that he worked on and either >>>>>>>>>>>>> never resolved or he found his logic error and thus stopped >>>>>>>>>>>>> believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself
shortly before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have
first-hand direct knowledge that his reasoning is correct. >>>>>>>>>>>
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw >>>>>>>>>> his reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of >>>>>>>>>>> understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes
Wittgenstein have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved >>>>>>>>>>>> in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' >>>>>>>>>>>> means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.- >>>>>>>>>>>>
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to >>>>>>>>>>> be proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof >>>>>>>>>> that it is true. There are no categories of expressions of >>>>>>>>>> language that are both true and neither stipulated as true or >>>>>>>>>> proven to be true (sound deduction) on the basis of semantic >>>>>>>>>> connections to other true expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I >>>>>>>> ever talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not talking >>>>>>>> about that.
Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true.
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, because >>>>>>> you can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can show via a
meta-logical proof in a higher system that it actually is True.
OK great this is a key agreement between us.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it. >>>>>>>
Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except
that is excludes expressions of language dealing with sense data
from the sense organs.
FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If it is) >>>>>
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least >>>>>>> in the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be
"Analytically True", but it is still True, and the conjure has
ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.
If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic
meanings proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set
can be found, thus is still would exists even if it took an
infinite search to find.
Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, you
don't have a Proof.
So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on terminology.
When I refer to a set of connected semantic meanings this seems not
exactly the same thing as a proof. If this set does not exist, then
the expression is not true. If the set exists yet is impossible to
find then it is still true.
So something can be "Provable" yet no "Proof" actually be findable or
expressable?
That means you might not know if you have Proven Something.
The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically
True, or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement
isn't a Truth Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither
Analytically True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions
made in fields of KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing
KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as you seem to like
describing what you are talking about ISN'T about studying Truth, >>>>>>> but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of the field understands the
difference, but you don't seem to be able to do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is
"Known". A Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things
that are True that are outside knowledge.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that >>>>>>>>> the sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N >>>>>>>>> even doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. >>>>>>>>> There is no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for >>>>>>>>> such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer
cannot be derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a >>>>>>>> connected set of semantic meanings that make it true or false
even if they cannot be found in finite time.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at >>>>>>> least by the normal definitions of a proof.
I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from logic. >>>>>>
Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?
So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes (incoherence and
inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms of the
art.
So, again, your are at the wrong end. If you want to change the
fundamental definitions, you need to be talking about the Core Logic
rules that you think need to be changed, not try to change them in a
derived logic system, when such a change is NOT allowed.
We cannot correctly label any analytical expression of language as
true unless and until:
(1) It has been stipulated to be true.
(2) a connected set of semantic meanings back-chain to expressions of
language that have been stipulated to be true.
This is the same system that Prolog uses.
Source for this "Claim". It can not be labeld "Analytically True", yes,
but nothing says it can not be True. (If we can't prove it True we can
not use it to actually directly prove something else, but it can be True).
You seem to be saying that the Collatz conjecture can not have a Truth
Value, because it has not been proven, even though it can be proven that
it must be either True of False?
On 5/14/2022 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 7:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:48 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 4:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree >>>>>>>>>>>> with it,
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> read the paper).
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is now dead obvious that you accept that no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct halt status for*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is concerned, so you
better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behavior that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know, I know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because you know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
All undecidable problems always have very well hidden >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical incoherence, false assumptions, or very well >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden gaps in their reasoning otherwise the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental nature of truth itself is broken. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconsistent with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then you need to strictly limit the capabilities of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how logic systems systems sometimes diverge from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct reasoning when examined at the very high level >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction of the philosophical foundation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with
mathematicians learned-by-rote by-the-book without the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> slightest inkling of any of the key philosophical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> underpinnings of these things, simply taking for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> granted that they are all these underpinnings are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand mathematics (and thought it not valuable) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> over everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simplistic rather than most elegant bare essence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> have intensly studied), this statement is solely from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> private notes that were published after his death. If he >>>>>>>>>>>>>> really believed in this statement as was sure of it, it >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would seem natural that he actually would of published it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> there was an error in his logic that he worked on and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> either never resolved or he found his logic error and thus >>>>>>>>>>>>>> stopped believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself >>>>>>>>>>>>> shortly before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have
first-hand direct knowledge that his reasoning is correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw >>>>>>>>>>> his reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of >>>>>>>>>>>> understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes
Wittgenstein have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved >>>>>>>>>>>>> in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' >>>>>>>>>>>>> means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.- >>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to >>>>>>>>>>>> be proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof >>>>>>>>>>> that it is true. There are no categories of expressions of >>>>>>>>>>> language that are both true and neither stipulated as true or >>>>>>>>>>> proven to be true (sound deduction) on the basis of semantic >>>>>>>>>>> connections to other true expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I >>>>>>>>> ever talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not
talking about that.
Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true.
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, because >>>>>>>> you can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can show via a >>>>>>>> meta-logical proof in a higher system that it actually is True. >>>>>>>>
OK great this is a key agreement between us.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it. >>>>>>>>
Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except
that is excludes expressions of language dealing with sense data >>>>>>> from the sense organs.
FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If it is) >>>>>>
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least >>>>>>>> in the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be
"Analytically True", but it is still True, and the conjure has >>>>>>>> ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.
If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic
meanings proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set
can be found, thus is still would exists even if it took an
infinite search to find.
Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, you >>>>>> don't have a Proof.
So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on
terminology. When I refer to a set of connected semantic meanings
this seems not exactly the same thing as a proof. If this set does
not exist, then the expression is not true. If the set exists yet
is impossible to find then it is still true.
So something can be "Provable" yet no "Proof" actually be findable
or expressable?
That means you might not know if you have Proven Something.
The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically >>>>>>>> True, or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement
isn't a Truth Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither
Analytically True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions
made in fields of KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing
KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as you seem to like
describing what you are talking about ISN'T about studying
Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of the field understands >>>>>>>> the difference, but you don't seem to be able to do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is
"Known". A Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things >>>>>>>> that are True that are outside knowledge.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that >>>>>>>>>> the sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N >>>>>>>>>> even doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. >>>>>>>>>> There is no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for >>>>>>>>>> such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer
cannot be derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a >>>>>>>>> connected set of semantic meanings that make it true or false >>>>>>>>> even if they cannot be found in finite time.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, >>>>>>>> at least by the normal definitions of a proof.
I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from
logic.
Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?
So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes (incoherence
and inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms of
the art.
So, again, your are at the wrong end. If you want to change the
fundamental definitions, you need to be talking about the Core Logic
rules that you think need to be changed, not try to change them in a
derived logic system, when such a change is NOT allowed.
We cannot correctly label any analytical expression of language as
true unless and until:
(1) It has been stipulated to be true.
(2) a connected set of semantic meanings back-chain to expressions of
language that have been stipulated to be true.
This is the same system that Prolog uses.
Source for this "Claim". It can not be labeld "Analytically True",
yes, but nothing says it can not be True. (If we can't prove it True
we can not use it to actually directly prove something else, but it
can be True).
You seem to be saying that the Collatz conjecture can not have a Truth
Value, because it has not been proven, even though it can be proven
that it must be either True of False?
It can only be declared as having an unknown truth value.
On 5/15/22 12:07 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 7:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:48 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 4:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree >>>>>>>>>>>>> with it,
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding what Godel actually said (because he hadn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read the paper).
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes:
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is now dead obvious that you accept that no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct halt status for*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting is concerned, so you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behavior that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake...
<snip distractions>
That is, in the context of C-like code >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you are more comfortable with, no D can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist such that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know, I know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because you know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
All undecidable problems always have very well >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden logical incoherence, false assumptions, or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well hidden gaps in their reasoning otherwise >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the fundamental nature of truth itself is broken. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconsistent with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then you need to strictly limit the capabilities of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Logic actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depth understanding of all of the subtle nuances of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computer science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how logic systems systems sometimes diverge from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct reasoning when examined at the very high level >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction of the philosophical foundation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematicians learned-by-rote by-the-book without the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> slightest inkling of any of the key philosophical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> underpinnings of these things, simply taking for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> granted that they are all these underpinnings are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nearly that century ago, to a man who admitted he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> didn't understand mathematics (and thought it not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> over everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simplistic rather than most elegant bare essence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have intensly studied), this statement is solely from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private notes that were published after his death. If he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really believed in this statement as was sure of it, it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would seem natural that he actually would of published it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there was an error in his logic that he worked on and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> either never resolved or he found his logic error and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thus stopped believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself >>>>>>>>>>>>>> shortly before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have >>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-hand direct knowledge that his reasoning is correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw >>>>>>>>>>>> his reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of >>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wittgenstein have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' >>>>>>>>>>>>>> means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.-
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete >>>>>>>>>>>> proof that it is true. There are no categories of
expressions of language that are both true and neither >>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated as true or proven to be true (sound deduction) on >>>>>>>>>>>> the basis of semantic connections to other true expressions >>>>>>>>>>>> of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I >>>>>>>>>> ever talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not
talking about that.
Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true. >>>>>>>>>
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F,
because you can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can >>>>>>>>> show via a meta-logical proof in a higher system that it
actually is True.
OK great this is a key agreement between us.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be >>>>>>>>> Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it. >>>>>>>>>
Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except >>>>>>>> that is excludes expressions of language dealing with sense data >>>>>>>> from the sense organs.
FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If it >>>>>>> is)
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at
least in the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be
"Analytically True", but it is still True, and the conjure has >>>>>>>>> ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.
If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic
meanings proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set >>>>>>>> can be found, thus is still would exists even if it took an
infinite search to find.
Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result,
you don't have a Proof.
So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on
terminology. When I refer to a set of connected semantic meanings
this seems not exactly the same thing as a proof. If this set does >>>>>> not exist, then the expression is not true. If the set exists yet
is impossible to find then it is still true.
So something can be "Provable" yet no "Proof" actually be findable
or expressable?
That means you might not know if you have Proven Something.
The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically >>>>>>>>> True, or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement >>>>>>>>> isn't a Truth Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither
Analytically True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions >>>>>>>>> made in fields of KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing >>>>>>>>> KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as you seem to like >>>>>>>>> describing what you are talking about ISN'T about studying
Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of the field understands >>>>>>>>> the difference, but you don't seem to be able to do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is
"Known". A Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things >>>>>>>>> that are True that are outside knowledge.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such >>>>>>>>>>> that the sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 >>>>>>>>>>> for N even doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of >>>>>>>>>>> False. There is no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't >>>>>>>>>>> allow for such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer >>>>>>>>>> cannot be derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a >>>>>>>>>> connected set of semantic meanings that make it true or false >>>>>>>>>> even if they cannot be found in finite time.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, >>>>>>>>> at least by the normal definitions of a proof.
I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from >>>>>>>> logic.
Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?
So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes (incoherence
and inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms
of the art.
So, again, your are at the wrong end. If you want to change the
fundamental definitions, you need to be talking about the Core
Logic rules that you think need to be changed, not try to change
them in a derived logic system, when such a change is NOT allowed.
We cannot correctly label any analytical expression of language as
true unless and until:
(1) It has been stipulated to be true.
(2) a connected set of semantic meanings back-chain to expressions
of language that have been stipulated to be true.
This is the same system that Prolog uses.
Source for this "Claim". It can not be labeld "Analytically True",
yes, but nothing says it can not be True. (If we can't prove it True
we can not use it to actually directly prove something else, but it
can be True).
You seem to be saying that the Collatz conjecture can not have a
Truth Value, because it has not been proven, even though it can be
proven that it must be either True of False?
It can only be declared as having an unknown truth value.
Which means it HAS a truth value of True or False but we don't know which.
That is VERY difffernt then it having neither, which is what you have
been claimiing (or at least what your words meant).
This shows your confusion between Truth and Knowledge.
Truth is about what actually IS
Knowledge is about what we know about what is.
On 5/15/2022 6:16 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/15/22 12:07 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 7:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:48 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 4:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with it,
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding what Godel actually said (because he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hadn't read the paper).
On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><snip distractions>
On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is now dead obvious that you accept that no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct halt status for*Validity and Soundness*Good plan. You've run aground as far as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting is concerned, so you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behavior that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting".
Tarski makes a similar mistake... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That is, in the context of C-like code >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you are more comfortable with, no D can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist such that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? (I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know, I know... I
don't really expect an answer.)
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because you know that
would be the end of you bragging about halting. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
All undecidable problems always have very well >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden logical incoherence, false assumptions, or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well hidden gaps in their reasoning otherwise >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the fundamental nature of truth itself is broken. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconsistent with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then you need to strictly limit the capabilities of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Logic actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depth understanding of all of the subtle nuances of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computer science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how logic systems systems sometimes diverge from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct reasoning when examined at the very high >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> level abstraction of the philosophical foundation of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the notion of (analytic) truth itself.
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematicians learned-by-rote by-the-book without >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the slightest inkling of any of the key philosophical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> underpinnings of these things, simply taking for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> granted that they are all these underpinnings are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally invisible to every learned-by-rote >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by-the-book mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nearly that century ago, to a man who admitted he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> didn't understand mathematics (and thought it not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> over everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simplistic rather than most elegant bare essence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have intensly studied), this statement is solely from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private notes that were published after his death. If he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really believed in this statement as was sure of it, it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would seem natural that he actually would of published it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there was an error in his logic that he worked on and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> either never resolved or he found his logic error and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thus stopped believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> shortly before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-hand direct knowledge that his reasoning is correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever >>>>>>>>>>>>> saw his reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wittgenstein have the exact same view as mine:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.-
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be proved to be true.
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete >>>>>>>>>>>>> proof that it is true. There are no categories of
expressions of language that are both true and neither >>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated as true or proven to be true (sound deduction) >>>>>>>>>>>>> on the basis of semantic connections to other true
expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time >>>>>>>>>>> I ever talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not >>>>>>>>>>> talking about that.
Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true. >>>>>>>>>>
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F,
because you can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can >>>>>>>>>> show via a meta-logical proof in a higher system that it
actually is True.
OK great this is a key agreement between us.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be >>>>>>>>>> Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it. >>>>>>>>>>
Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except >>>>>>>>> that is excludes expressions of language dealing with sense
data from the sense organs.
FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If >>>>>>>> it is)
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at >>>>>>>>>> least in the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be >>>>>>>>>> "Analytically True", but it is still True, and the conjure has >>>>>>>>>> ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.
If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic >>>>>>>>> meanings proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set >>>>>>>>> can be found, thus is still would exists even if it took an
infinite search to find.
Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, >>>>>>>> you don't have a Proof.
So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on
terminology. When I refer to a set of connected semantic meanings >>>>>>> this seems not exactly the same thing as a proof. If this set
does not exist, then the expression is not true. If the set
exists yet is impossible to find then it is still true.
So something can be "Provable" yet no "Proof" actually be findable >>>>>> or expressable?
That means you might not know if you have Proven Something.
The key point is that just because something isn't
Analytically True, or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that >>>>>>>>>> the statement isn't a Truth Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither
Analytically True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions >>>>>>>>>> made in fields of KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing >>>>>>>>>> KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as you seem to like >>>>>>>>>> describing what you are talking about ISN'T about studying >>>>>>>>>> Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of the field
understands the difference, but you don't seem to be able to >>>>>>>>>> do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is
"Known". A Proper Epistemolist understand that there are
things that are True that are outside knowledge.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such >>>>>>>>>>>> that the sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 >>>>>>>>>>>> for N even doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True >>>>>>>>>>>> of False. There is no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>> allow for such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer >>>>>>>>>>> cannot be derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists >>>>>>>>>>> a connected set of semantic meanings that make it true or >>>>>>>>>>> false even if they cannot be found in finite time.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, >>>>>>>>>> at least by the normal definitions of a proof.
I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from >>>>>>>>> logic.
Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?
So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes (incoherence >>>>>>> and inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms >>>>>>> of the art.
So, again, your are at the wrong end. If you want to change the
fundamental definitions, you need to be talking about the Core
Logic rules that you think need to be changed, not try to change
them in a derived logic system, when such a change is NOT allowed.
We cannot correctly label any analytical expression of language as
true unless and until:
(1) It has been stipulated to be true.
(2) a connected set of semantic meanings back-chain to expressions
of language that have been stipulated to be true.
This is the same system that Prolog uses.
Source for this "Claim". It can not be labeld "Analytically True",
yes, but nothing says it can not be True. (If we can't prove it True
we can not use it to actually directly prove something else, but it
can be True).
You seem to be saying that the Collatz conjecture can not have a
Truth Value, because it has not been proven, even though it can be
proven that it must be either True of False?
It can only be declared as having an unknown truth value.
Which means it HAS a truth value of True or False but we don't know
which.
That is VERY difffernt then it having neither, which is what you have
been claimiing (or at least what your words meant).
Unless and Until a (possibly unknown) connection exists between an
expression of language back-chained by sound deductive inference steps
to known truth, the expression is not true.
This shows your confusion between Truth and Knowledge.
Truth is about what actually IS
Knowledge is about what we know about what is.
None-the-less the sequence of inference steps must exist, analytical
truth is parasitic.
On 5/17/22 11:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/15/2022 6:16 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/15/22 12:07 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 7:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:48 PM, olcott wrote:We cannot correctly label any analytical expression of language as >>>>>> true unless and until:
On 5/14/2022 4:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with it,
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding what Godel actually said (because he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hadn't read the paper).
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><snip distractions>
Tarski makes a similar mistake... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is now dead obvious that you accept that no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct halt status for*Validity and Soundness* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Good plan. You've run aground as far as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting is concerned, so you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behavior that this
input actually specifies.
world calls "decide halting". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because you know thatThat is, in the context of C-like code >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you are more comfortable with, no D can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist such that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (I know, I know... I
don't really expect an answer.) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
would be the end of you bragging about halting. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
All undecidable problems always have very well >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden logical incoherence, false assumptions, or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well hidden gaps in their reasoning otherwise >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the fundamental nature of truth itself is broken. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconsistent with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then you need to strictly limit the capabilities of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Logic actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depth understanding of all of the subtle nuances of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computer science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of how logic systems systems sometimes diverge from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct reasoning when examined at the very high >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> level abstraction of the philosophical foundation of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the notion of (analytic) truth itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematicians learned-by-rote by-the-book without >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the slightest inkling of any of the key >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophical underpinnings of these things, simply >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> taking for granted that they are all these >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> underpinnings are infallibly correct.
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally invisible to every learned-by-rote >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by-the-book mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nearly that century ago, to a man who admitted he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> didn't understand mathematics (and thought it not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> over everyone's head that they mistook his analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for simplistic rather than most elegant bare essence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have intensly studied), this statement is solely from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private notes that were published after his death. If >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he really believed in this statement as was sure of it, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would seem natural that he actually would of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there was an error in his logic that he worked on and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> either never resolved or he found his logic error and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thus stopped believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> shortly before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-hand direct knowledge that his reasoning is correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever >>>>>>>>>>>>>> saw his reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding.
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be proved to be true.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wittgenstein have the exact same view as mine: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.-
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete >>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof that it is true. There are no categories of
expressions of language that are both true and neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated as true or proven to be true (sound deduction) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on the basis of semantic connections to other true >>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time >>>>>>>>>>>> I ever talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not >>>>>>>>>>>> talking about that.
Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true. >>>>>>>>>>>
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, >>>>>>>>>>> because you can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can >>>>>>>>>>> show via a meta-logical proof in a higher system that it >>>>>>>>>>> actually is True.
OK great this is a key agreement between us.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be >>>>>>>>>>> Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it. >>>>>>>>>>>
Analytically True or False is the same as True or False,
except that is excludes expressions of language dealing with >>>>>>>>>> sense data from the sense organs.
FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If >>>>>>>>> it is)
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at >>>>>>>>>>> least in the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be >>>>>>>>>>> "Analytically True", but it is still True, and the conjure >>>>>>>>>>> has ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.
If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic >>>>>>>>>> meanings proving that it is true otherwise it is not true. >>>>>>>>>>
I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected >>>>>>>>>> set can be found, thus is still would exists even if it took >>>>>>>>>> an infinite search to find.
Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, >>>>>>>>> you don't have a Proof.
So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on
terminology. When I refer to a set of connected semantic
meanings this seems not exactly the same thing as a proof. If
this set does not exist, then the expression is not true. If the >>>>>>>> set exists yet is impossible to find then it is still true.
So something can be "Provable" yet no "Proof" actually be
findable or expressable?
That means you might not know if you have Proven Something.
The key point is that just because something isn't
Analytically True, or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that >>>>>>>>>>> the statement isn't a Truth Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither
Analytically True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions >>>>>>>>>>> made in fields of KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing >>>>>>>>>>> KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as you seem to like >>>>>>>>>>> describing what you are talking about ISN'T about studying >>>>>>>>>>> Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of the field
understands the difference, but you don't seem to be able to >>>>>>>>>>> do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is >>>>>>>>>>> "Known". A Proper Epistemolist understand that there are >>>>>>>>>>> things that are True that are outside knowledge.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such >>>>>>>>>>>>> that the sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 >>>>>>>>>>>>> for N even doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True >>>>>>>>>>>>> of False. There is no possible "non-answer", as math >>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't allow for such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer >>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists >>>>>>>>>>>> a connected set of semantic meanings that make it true or >>>>>>>>>>>> false even if they cannot be found in finite time.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a
proof, at least by the normal definitions of a proof.
I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from >>>>>>>>>> logic.
Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?
So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes (incoherence >>>>>>>> and inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms >>>>>>>> of the art.
So, again, your are at the wrong end. If you want to change the
fundamental definitions, you need to be talking about the Core
Logic rules that you think need to be changed, not try to change >>>>>>> them in a derived logic system, when such a change is NOT allowed. >>>>>>
(1) It has been stipulated to be true.
(2) a connected set of semantic meanings back-chain to expressions >>>>>> of language that have been stipulated to be true.
This is the same system that Prolog uses.
Source for this "Claim". It can not be labeld "Analytically True",
yes, but nothing says it can not be True. (If we can't prove it
True we can not use it to actually directly prove something else,
but it can be True).
You seem to be saying that the Collatz conjecture can not have a
Truth Value, because it has not been proven, even though it can be
proven that it must be either True of False?
It can only be declared as having an unknown truth value.
Which means it HAS a truth value of True or False but we don't know
which.
That is VERY difffernt then it having neither, which is what you have
been claimiing (or at least what your words meant).
Unless and Until a (possibly unknown) connection exists between an
expression of language back-chained by sound deductive inference steps
to known truth, the expression is not true.
This shows your confusion between Truth and Knowledge.
Truth is about what actually IS
Knowledge is about what we know about what is.
None-the-less the sequence of inference steps must exist, analytical
truth is parasitic.
Absolutely NOT. There does NOT need to be proof that something is true.
IF you want to claim that, by YOUR definition, you need to actually
PROVE it.
And, you can't do that by assuming it, you need to actually PROVE it
from the accepted axioms.
Since you can't, that just shows your statement isn't TRUE.
It is a fact, that it HAS been proved that if you include such a rule in
your axioms, that you can get an inconsistent system once you allow
certain logical operations to be used, that are needed to support mathemeatics.
So, your arguement fails.
On 5/18/2022 6:28 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/17/22 11:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/15/2022 6:16 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/15/22 12:07 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 7:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 5:48 PM, olcott wrote:We cannot correctly label any analytical expression of language
On 5/14/2022 4:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote:So something can be "Provable" yet no "Proof" actually be
On 5/14/22 5:02 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 3:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 1:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 11:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 11:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with it,
On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding what Godel actually said (because he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hadn't read the paper).
On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><snip distractions>
Tarski makes a similar mistake... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> writes: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>world calls "decide halting". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the correct halt status for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actual behavior that this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input actually specifies. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is now dead obvious that you accept that no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm can do what the*Validity and Soundness* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Good plan. You've run aground as far as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting is concerned, so you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> better find another topic you don't know about. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
As expected, no answer. You can't answer this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because you know thatThat is, in the context of C-like code >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you are more comfortable with, no D can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist such that D(X,Y) is
true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise.
Do you now accept that this is not possible? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (I know, I know... I
don't really expect an answer.) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
would be the end of you bragging about halting. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
All undecidable problems always have very well >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hidden logical incoherence, false assumptions, or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well hidden gaps in their reasoning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise the fundamental nature of truth itself >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is broken.
No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inconsistent with the system.
If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then you need to strictly limit the capabilities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of your logic system.
Your failure to understand this just shows you are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a century behind in the knowledge of how Truth and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Logic actually works.
The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depth understanding of all of the subtle nuances of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computer science.
The key thing here is my much deeper understanding >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of how logic systems systems sometimes diverge from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct reasoning when examined at the very high >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> level abstraction of the philosophical foundation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the notion of (analytic) truth itself. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mathematicians learned-by-rote by-the-book without >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the slightest inkling of any of the key >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophical underpinnings of these things, simply >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> taking for granted that they are all these >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> underpinnings are infallibly correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
When these underpinnings are incorrect this error >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is totally invisible to every learned-by-rote >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by-the-book mathematician.
That other people have made the same errors, doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make you right.
Note also, you are refering to a person who lived >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nearly that century ago, to a man who admitted he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> didn't understand mathematics (and thought it not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valuable)
He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> over everyone's head that they mistook his analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for simplistic rather than most elegant bare essence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> field I have intensly studied), this statement is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> solely from private notes that were published after >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his death. If he really believed in this statement as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was sure of it, it would seem natural that he actually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would of published it.
It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there was an error in his logic that he worked on and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> either never resolved or he found his logic error and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thus stopped believing in that statement.
Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> shortly before I ever heard of Wittgenstein I have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-hand direct knowledge that his reasoning is correct. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> saw his reasoning.
That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding.
Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> needs to be proved to be true.
His full quote is on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
This is the key source of our agreement that makes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Wittgenstein have the exact same view as mine: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.-
True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof that it is true. There are no categories of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions of language that are both true and neither >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulated as true or proven to be true (sound deduction) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on the basis of semantic connections to other true >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions of language.
WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only >>>>>>>>>>>>> time I ever talk about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am >>>>>>>>>>>>> not talking about that.
Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true. >>>>>>>>>>>>
For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, >>>>>>>>>>>> because you can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can >>>>>>>>>>>> show via a meta-logical proof in a higher system that it >>>>>>>>>>>> actually is True.
OK great this is a key agreement between us.
Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not >>>>>>>>>>>> be Analytically True or False until someone can prove or >>>>>>>>>>>> refute it.
Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, >>>>>>>>>>> except that is excludes expressions of language dealing with >>>>>>>>>>> sense data from the sense organs.
FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If >>>>>>>>>> it is)
It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at >>>>>>>>>>>> least in the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be >>>>>>>>>>>> "Analytically True", but it is still True, and the conjure >>>>>>>>>>>> has ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.
If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic >>>>>>>>>>> meanings proving that it is true otherwise it is not true. >>>>>>>>>>>
I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected >>>>>>>>>>> set can be found, thus is still would exists even if it took >>>>>>>>>>> an infinite search to find.
Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, >>>>>>>>>> you don't have a Proof.
So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on
terminology. When I refer to a set of connected semantic
meanings this seems not exactly the same thing as a proof. If >>>>>>>>> this set does not exist, then the expression is not true. If >>>>>>>>> the set exists yet is impossible to find then it is still true. >>>>>>>>
findable or expressable?
That means you might not know if you have Proven Something.
The key point is that just because something isn't
Analytically True, or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that >>>>>>>>>>>> the statement isn't a Truth Bearer.
Note also, There are true statements that are neither
Analytically True or Emperically True. Those are
distinctions made in fields of KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to >>>>>>>>>>>> catagorizing KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE. Epistemology, as >>>>>>>>>>>> you seem to like describing what you are talking about ISN'T >>>>>>>>>>>> about studying Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of the >>>>>>>>>>>> field understands the difference, but you don't seem to be >>>>>>>>>>>> able to do that.
Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is >>>>>>>>>>>> "Known". A Proper Epistemolist understand that there are >>>>>>>>>>>> things that are True that are outside knowledge.
But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a >>>>>>>>>>>> proof, at least by the normal definitions of a proof.
The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> N/2 for N even doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either >>>>>>>>>>>>>> True of False. There is no possible "non-answer", as math >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't allow for such things.
If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer >>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot be derived in finite time. None-the-less there >>>>>>>>>>>>> exists a connected set of semantic meanings that make it >>>>>>>>>>>>> true or false even if they cannot be found in finite time. >>>>>>>>>>>>
I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat >>>>>>>>>>> from logic.
Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?
So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes
(incoherence and inconsistency) baked right into the
definitions of its terms of the art.
So, again, your are at the wrong end. If you want to change the >>>>>>>> fundamental definitions, you need to be talking about the Core >>>>>>>> Logic rules that you think need to be changed, not try to change >>>>>>>> them in a derived logic system, when such a change is NOT allowed. >>>>>>>
as true unless and until:
(1) It has been stipulated to be true.
(2) a connected set of semantic meanings back-chain to
expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true.
This is the same system that Prolog uses.
Source for this "Claim". It can not be labeld "Analytically True", >>>>>> yes, but nothing says it can not be True. (If we can't prove it
True we can not use it to actually directly prove something else,
but it can be True).
You seem to be saying that the Collatz conjecture can not have a
Truth Value, because it has not been proven, even though it can be >>>>>> proven that it must be either True of False?
It can only be declared as having an unknown truth value.
Which means it HAS a truth value of True or False but we don't know
which.
That is VERY difffernt then it having neither, which is what you
have been claimiing (or at least what your words meant).
Unless and Until a (possibly unknown) connection exists between an
expression of language back-chained by sound deductive inference
steps to known truth, the expression is not true.
This shows your confusion between Truth and Knowledge.
Truth is about what actually IS
Knowledge is about what we know about what is.
None-the-less the sequence of inference steps must exist, analytical
truth is parasitic.
Absolutely NOT. There does NOT need to be proof that something is true.
IF you want to claim that, by YOUR definition, you need to actually
PROVE it.
“Analytic” sentences, such as “Pediatricians are doctors,” have historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by
knowing those meanings. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/
Every analytic expression of language (including math and logic) must be connected to it meaning showing that it is true OR IT IS NOT TRUE.
Expressions of language that are not connected to their meaning are meaningless thus neither true nor false.
And, you can't do that by assuming it, you need to actually PROVE it
from the accepted axioms.
Since you can't, that just shows your statement isn't TRUE.
It is a fact, that it HAS been proved that if you include such a rule
in your axioms, that you can get an inconsistent system once you allow
certain logical operations to be used, that are needed to support
mathemeatics.
So, your arguement fails.
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