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foreign policy, church policy, racial policy, economic policy, social policy, everyday life in the Third Reich, about youth, culture, science, women, the NSDAP, the

Hitler Youth, the SA and the SS, and, of course, about every facet of World War II and German occupation policy. The task of the Hitler researcher, therefore, is to examine these research findings, to assess their relevance to the overall picture of the Third Reich, to weight the findings appropriately and then, if necessary, to integrate them into the mosaic of a biography. As long as research on National Socialism continues, it is inevitable that new Hitler biographies will be published at regular intervals.

In addition, the last few decades have seen a number of comprehensive scholarly works published that collect a wealth of primary sources on Hitler. When I wrote my book in 1985, Hitler researchers only had the Sämtlichen Aufzeichnungen of Hitler from the years 1905 to 1924, edited by Eberhard Jäckel and Axel Kuhn, and four volumes of Hitler's speeches and proclamations from the years 1932 to 1945, edited by Max Domarus. The rest of Hitler's speeches and essays, along with records made by his closest confidants, were only available in historical archives, which meant I had to spend a great deal of time researching and copying texts in laborious archival work. Between 1992 and 2003, however, the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich published a remarkable collection of Hitler's speeches, writings and orders in 17 volumes.164 In 2016, the Institute also published a critical scholarly edition of Hitler's Mein Kampf.165 Better access to sources is thus another reason for the regular publication of new Hitler biographies.

Ultimately, most biographers are compelled by the desire to provide their own interpretative approaches to explain the "Hitler enigma'. They want to comment on or contribute to research debates and disputes. If you read any of the more recent Hitler biographies

mentioned above, you will see the lengths authors go to as they seek to distinguish their own approaches from the interpretative schemes of other recently published works.

Ian Kershaw, who had already made a name for himself with his study on The Hitler Myth even before the publication of his Hitler biography, makes reference in his major work to the concept of "charismatic authority', which had been coined by Max Weber. This concept of charismatic authority is not primarily based on any outstanding characteristics an individual might possess. Far more, it develops from the perceptions of his or the individual's followers who, in crisis situations, project unique heroic qualities onto their chosen leader and recognize in them personal greatness, the embodiment of a "mission' to bring about "national salvation' or "national redemption'.166

Kershaw combines this concept with another explanatory approach. He attempts to show how Hitler's "presumed goals' served to develop, activate and legitimize initiatives at various levels of the regime that "worked towards the Führer'. Some acted from ideological motives and wanted to implement what they took to be Hitler's goals. Others acted out of their own interests, but they too contributed to supporting and promoting Hitler's ideological goals, claims Kershaw.167

Hitler encouraged his followers to instigate radical initiatives from below and offered such initiatives his backing, "so long as they were in line with his broadly defined goals'. This promoted ferocious competition at all levels of the regime - among rival government agencies and between individuals within those agencies. "Working towards the Führer' meant taking initiatives, creating pressures and instigating legislation

... all in ways that fell into line with what were taken to be Hitler's aims, and without the dictator necessarily having to dictate. The result was continuing radicalization of policy in a direction which brought Hitler's own ideological imperatives more plainly into view as practicable policy options.168

This is certainly an innovative interpretative approach and helps to better understand how the National Socialist system worked.

One weakness of Kershaw's Hitler biography is that, surprisingly, he hardly devotes any attention to Hitler's goals, his worldview or his system of thought. Perhaps this is because he attaches much less importance to these goals than to the diffuse perception of these goals by Hitler's followers. Kershaw writes:

In reality, Hitler's "social idea' was simplistic, diffuse, and manipulative ... Such ideas were neither new, nor original. And, ultimately, they rested not on any modern form of socialism, but on the crudest and most brutal version of nineteenth-century imperialist and social Darwinistic notions. Social welfare in the trumpeted "national community' did not exist for its own sake, but to prepare for external struggle, for conquest, "by the sword'.169

Such sentences place implicit demands on Hitler's framework of ideas that many other politicians would equally fail to fulfil. The fact that Hitler's ideas were neither "new' nor "original', but instead drew on elements from various theories, is, firstly, by no means unusual for a politician and, secondly, does not speak against the thesis that he had developed a consistent set of ideas. The argument that social welfare was not an end in itself for Hitler could also be rightly applied to many politicians. Was social welfare an end in itself for Bismarck, or did he use his social legislation as an instrument to push back the influence of social democracy?

Even before my work was first published, historians such as Peter Krüger had already demonstrated that sweeping judgments and assertions on the subject of Hitler's alleged economic ignorance, contempt for the economy and inability to think in economic terms had been shown to be unsustainable.170 In Section IV of this book, I show that Hitler took a far more intensive interest in economic issues than has been previously assumed. Kershaw ignores these findings when he writes that Hitler lacked "a grasp of even the rudiments of economic theory' and that "he was wholly ignorant of any formal understanding of the principles of economics'.171 In fact, Hitler's thinking was largely determined by economic considerations, and

even with regard to his ignorance of economic theories, this was certainly no more pronounced than was the case for many democratic politicians.

One has the impression that, in Hitler's case, excessive standards are applied - originality and novelty of ideas, social policy for its own sake, an understanding of economic theories - in order to deny in the end that he had developed a consistent body of ideas at all.

In his biography, Kershaw directly criticized the approach I adopted in my book: "The depiction of Hitler as a social-revolutionary was attempting to explain, perhaps in somewhat misconceived fashion, why he found such wide appeal in Germany in a time of social crisis.' 172 Kershaw therefore acknowledges the legitimate aim of striving to explain Hitler's and National Socialism's mass appeal, and fairly concedes that such revised interpretations are "not meant to be apologetic'. At the same time, however, he admits to concerns that my approach, just like that of Nolte, could contain, "however unwittingly, the potential for a possible rehabilitation of Hitler'.173
This misunderstanding is probably due to the fact that projects such as "erecting a welfare system'174 are, according to Kershaw's own political worldview, to be celebrated, whereas I myself would not associate such projects with positive value judgements. It seems problematic to me to declare historical findings undesirable simply because someone could possibly draw politically erroneous conclusions from them. Such arguments are not helpful in a scientific discussion; indeed, they actually tend to hinder the research discussion.

On matters of substance, Kershaw by no means denies the modern elements in Hitler's thinking that are elaborated in this book, such as his enthusiasm for the "benefits of modern technology'. 175 The only real criticism that Kershaw raises is that my book is characterized by an "overemphasis' on Hitler's "modernity'.176 At the same time, Kershaw does admit that: "Certainly, Hitler entertained notions of a prosperous German society, in which old class privileges

had disappeared, exploiting the benefits of modern technology and a higher standard of living.'177

According to Kershaw, Hitler's vision appeared excitingly modern: a break with traditional class- and status-bound hierarchies to a society where talent had its reward and there was prosperity for all - for all Germans, that is. Indeed, elements of Hitler's thinking were unquestionably modern.178

I would have certainly phrased this differently because - and I am sure Kershaw would agree - Hitler's vision of "prosperity' did not apply to "all' Germans, but only to those who satisfied Hitler's racial criteria.

Critics such as Klaus Hildebrand accused Kershaw of promoting an image of Hitler which made the dictator look "interchangeable, superfluous or at most weak'.179 In his Hitler biography, Volker Ullrich complained that Kershaw's portrayal of Hitler's personality remained "a bit anaemic'.180 Ullrich's primary aim was to refocus attention on Hitler - and to correct some of the misjudgements that have been made by earlier researchers. One such misconception, according to Ullrich, is the mistaken belief that Hitler was "basically an ordinary person with limited intellectual horizons and severely restricted social skills'.181

Ullrich refutes what had become the established image of the dictator as dull and less than intelligent. According to Ullrich, however, Hitler's "great gift was for politics alone. In his ability to instantaneously analyse and exploit situations, he was far superior not only to his rivals within the NSDAP but also to the politicians from Germany's mainstream parties.'182 Hitler's thinking and his worldview nonetheless remain remarkably colourless in Ullrich's biography and are only ever touched upon on a few pages. Much more can be learned, for example, about "Hitler and Women' and "Hitler as Human Being' - topics to which Ullrich devotes two entire chapters totalling more than 60 pages.183

Ullrich cautions against demonizing the dictator - as I also do in my own work. "It is a huge mistake,' Ullrich observes, "to assume that a criminal on the millennial scale of Hitler must have been a

monster.'184 Ullrich explains how Hitler was dangerously underestimated by "liberal and left-wing intellectuals'. Carl von Ossietzky, editor-in-chief of the influential left-wing cultural magazine Die Weltbühne, described Hitler as a "half-insane rascal', a "pathetic dunderhead', a "nowhere fool' and a "big mouth'. "But,' as Ullrich observes, "attempts to depict the NSDAP leader as ridiculous could not combat the phenomenon of Adolf Hitler.'185

In another respect, Ullrich's viewpoint - albeit only partially - contradicts the presentation of Hitler's self-conceptualization as a revolutionary put forward in my work and that of Götz Aly. Ullrich, too, emphasizes the fact that, pre-1933, Hitler's promise to overcome party and class divisions had greatly contributed to the attractiveness of Hitler and the National Socialist movement.186 Neither does Ullrich dispute the fact that "members of previously disadvantaged social classes had better chances to work their way up the social ladder', or that the "opportunity for upward mobility' accounted for much of the NSDAP's "attractiveness as a "modernizing" force'.187

'Still,' Ullrich qualifies, "none of that altered the basic structure of German society. Hitler was by no means the social revolutionary, as the odd historian has claimed. Class hurdles and barriers were lowered, but they still existed.'188 However, neither I nor any of the other researchers who have adopted a similar approach ever claimed that class barriers had been completely swept away. The statement that "none of that altered the basic structure of German society' is vague because it depends entirely on what Ullrich actually means by the term "basic structure'.

The Third Reich was both an oppressive dictatorship and a regime based on the consent of broad sections of society. While authors such as Götz Aly accentuate the importance of the Volksgemeinschaft and place a strong emphasis on popular consent, and Kershaw gives prominence to the charismatic aspects of Hitler's rule, Peter Longerich places a different emphasis in his Hitler biography: "First and foremost, Hitler's regime was in fact a dictatorship.'189

Longerich concedes that "the legitimacy of Hitler's position derived essentially from his charisma'. This charismatic relationship between the "Führer' and the "nation,' Longerich notes, was a construction that "served to legitimize the Führer state', and, in clear differentiation to Kershaw's position, "it must not be confused with the actual basis of Hitler's power'.190 Accordingly, Hitler's position was "based not on charisma ... but on the powers available within a dictatorship'.191

This interpretation is not only very different from Kershaw's, but also from Aly's, which focused on large sections of the German population's approval of Hitler and the National Socialists more than it did on the regime's repression and terror. Aly explains:

Communist East Germany would later employ 190,000 official surveillance experts and an equal number of "unofficial collaborators' to watch over a populace of 17 million, while the Gestapo in 1937 had just over 7,000 employees, including bureaucrats and secretarial staff. Together with a far smaller force of security police, they sufficed to keep tabs on more than 60 million people. Most Germans simply did not need to be subjected to surveillance or detention.192

Longerich refutes this and strongly asserts the exact opposite: "The regime's repeated claim during the first years of Hitler's rule that the "national community" was united was an illusion created by propaganda.'193 In doing so, he does not deny that the Third Reich offered "dynamic social mobility' and observes that it was by no means surprising that many, especially younger Germans, were under the impression, "that this new regime would liberate German society from outmoded class differences and rigid and anachronistic structures and herald a more mobile type of "national community" based on merit'.194

According to Longerich, the suggestion that Hitler's regime was "primarily' based on charisma and founded "above all' on the enthusiastic assent to his policies from a large majority of the German populace, is most definitely inadequate.195 Although the regime did attract approval, there was also a significant undercurrent

of discontent and reserve. The fact that Hitler's regime nevertheless functioned more or less without a hitch, Longerich observes, in explicit dissociation from other approaches, "was above all the result

... of the various means of coercion available to a dictatorship', that is, to the institutionalized repression and local surveillance of "national comrades'.196 Thus, Longerich is far more closely aligned to the traditional approaches and views that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s, which strongly emphasized the elements of terror, dictatorship and oppression as the underpinnings of Hitler's regime.

In 2015, rather than publishing a biography, Wolfgang Pyta released an analysis of Hitler as an "artist'. Pyta's approach to understanding and analysing Hitler as an artist may seem surprising at first glance - although it is no secret that Hitler described himself as an architectural painter in his youth and was a great admirer of Richard Wagner.

Pyta, with his fruitful approach, faces a similar problem to the one I faced with my study, which takes Hitler's self-conception as a revolutionary seriously. In both cases, the authors employ terms descriptively and analytically that are also used - by both non-scholars and, to some extent, by scholars - with positive connotations.

As with my book, which uses the terms "revolutionary' and "modernization' as objective descriptors without any positive value judgements, Pyta, who characterizes Hitler as an "artist' and as a "genius', emphatically states that, "[i]n this study, describing Hitler as a "genius" should in no way be understood as a positive statement about Hitler'.197 Pyta makes reference to Thomas Mann, one of Hitler's most determined opponents, who at the time also used the terms "artist' and "genius' to describe Hitler.198 According to Pyta, it is simply a prejudice that "art is inseparably connected with the true, good and beautiful and that the artist should be appreciated for his moral virtues'.199

In his 2011 book Hitlers Charisma, Ludolf Herbst described in precise detail the dilemma faced by biographers of Hitler, who feel constantly compelled

... to shine the light of value judgements on Hitler solely to protect themselves from accusations that they are evoking understanding where the public interest expects them to condemn, and where the historian - horribile dictu - should first and foremost be concerned with "understanding' in as value-free a sense as possible.200

I myself decided three decades ago to dispense with such rituals of mounting this kind of defence because I trust my readers to form their own judgements - and because anyone who wants to misunderstand the author and brand them a Hitler apologist will not be pacified by even the most strident and repeated expressions of moral repugnance.

Let us return to Pyta, whose study shows how strongly Hitler's ideas were influenced by his artistic work and the pivotal role of "presence culture' in his thinking. Presence culture refers to a specific form of aesthetic perception in which reflective distance is not a barrier.201 According to Pyta, this "primacy of the visual over the discursive'202 was already a characteristic of Hitler's understanding of art as early as his Viennese period. An essential element of Hitler's success, Pyta explains, was that he succeeded in utilizing his artistic and aesthetic inclinations in the staging of his political performances. Thus, it should not be interpreted as a disadvantage for a politician to have a background in the arts, but rather as a "starting bonus'.203

In Pyta's opinion, the content of Hitler's speeches, while not unimportant, was less of a determining factor in his rise to power than the effectiveness and the mass appeal of his public staging.204 Pyta's analysis, which in part also draws on new sources, demonstrates that original questions lead to original findings. And while Pyta's study overstates a single aspect of Hitler's persona to the exclusion of others, this is ultimately justified by the fact that this question has thus far been the subject of far too little research. There is, after all, no single, monocausal explanation for Hitler's rise to power. It is only when we combine an understanding of Hitler's worldview, as presented in my work, with the forms of artistic staging

that Pyta so convincingly presents, that we can arrive at appropriate explanations.

In 2020, Brendan Simms (professor at the Centre of International Studies at Cambridge University) published a new Hitler biography. His central thesis: It wasn't communism that Hitler hated above all else, but capitalism in general and the United States in particular. "The Anglo-American capitalist world order against which Hitler revolted structured his entire political career,' writes Simms.205 And the root of Hitler's Jew-hatred, Simms adds, was "primarily to be found in his hostility to global high finance rather than his hatred of the radical left'.206

In terms of Hitler's worldview, Simms claims that communists "were not Hitler's primary concern'.207 Hitler's anxieties were directed at the British and, above all, the Americans. "Hitler became an enemy of the British - and also of the Americans - before he became an enemy of the Jews. Indeed, he became an enemy of the Jews largely because of his hostility to the Anglo-American capitalist powers,' writes Simms.208

On the one hand, he admired the United States as an adversary because of its modernity and vast economic potential, but also because of its greater social mobility and better opportunities for workers to make a life for themselves, while on the other hand he feared that the future belonged to the "giant states' and the United States was foremost among them. Hitler hated the United States as a representative of capitalism and, above all, he feared and admired the United States because of its demographic strength. In Hitler's mind, the emigrants who had left Germany and the rest of Europe to seek a new life across the ocean were the most courageous, daring and determined people the continent had to offer. As Hitler saw it, the United States was peopled by the racially sound descendants of British emigrants, combined with the best elements of continental Europe.209 He did not see Bolshevism so much as a threat in its own right, but as an instrument of "international Jewish capitalism to undermine the working of national economies and render them ripe

for takeover by international finance capital (both Jewish and non-Jewish)'.210

That Hitler attacked the Soviet Union was, in Simms' view, primarily an economic solution to Germany's problems. Hitler wanted to conquer "new living space' to secure the raw materials and markets that Germany would need to become a world power. According to Simms, Hitler's policy of eastward expansion was not primarily motivated by ideological concerns. The driving force behind Hitler's strategy was neither hatred of the Jews nor animosity toward communism. Nor was Hitler planning to establish a reactionary agrarian utopia, as has often been claimed in the previous research. "He looked forward to a modern American-style German east, not back to a traditional rural idyll,' writes Simms.211

Simms also sees a close connection between Hitler's racism and his opposition to capitalism: "Capitalism and racism, in Hitler's book, were not compatible.'212 And: "Most importantly of all, Hitler wanted to establish what he considered racial unity in Germany by overcoming the capitalist order and working for the "construction of a new classless society".'213

The author could have better demonstrated the central role of anti-capitalism in Hitler's worldview by devoting more detailed attention to Hitler's economic thought, which unfortunately Simms chooses not to do. In fact, Hitler had developed an inherently consistent system of economic and socio-political thought, as I demonstrate in this book.

Simms is right that when he claims that Hitler was not only an ardent admirer of the United States as a modern industrial country but that he was also by no means an advocate of an anti-modern, agrarian utopia, as has so often been claimed in the past. It is also true that Hitler's strategy of conquering new living space in the east was not driven by ideological preoccupations but by economics. Simms could have provided even stronger evidence for this thesis had he expounded upon Hitler's "shrinking markets' theory and his criticism of the German economy's strong dependence on exports in more detail (for more on this, see page 346 of this book).

Simms is not correct, however, when he claims that anti-communist preoccupations did not play a key role in Hitler's thinking and that he only attacked the Soviet Union because he saw it as "weak'.214 On the contrary: Hitler viewed his National Socialism as an alternative revolutionary movement to the communist movement. In Hitler's eyes, the communists were his only serious opponents. From Hitler's point of view, they were "fanatics' - and he used this word as the highest form of praise - who would stop at nothing to achieve their aims. In sharp contrast, he regarded the bourgeoisie as cowardly and weak, and liberal capitalism as a rotten, decadent system that was doomed to fail. Hitler increasingly admired Stalin and no longer believed in his own propagandistic slogans concerning "Jewish Bolshevism'.

The same characteristics of the communist movement which are particularly worthy of criticism from a democratic-liberal point of view earned Hitler's highest admiration: the totalitarian nature of its ideology, the unrestricted will to seize and hold power and the clearly formulated goal of "fanatically' fighting and "annihilating' any and all political opponents. From Hitler's point of view, the communists and the Soviet Union posed a far greater threat than Simms would have one believe.

The merit of the biography from Simms, however, is primarily that it reveals Hitler's anxieties about demographics and the great importance he attached to emigration as an element of America's strength. No other researcher before Simms has been able to offer such a clear analysis of what was one of Hitler's major preoccupations.



National Socialism and Anti-Communism

In many respects, the book from Simms reads like an antithesis to Ernst Nolte, although Simms never explicitly addresses Nolte's theses. In Ernst Nolte's opinion, Hitler and National Socialism are primarily to be understood as reactions to the communist threat. Anti-communism, Nolte proposes, is thus the core of Hitler's

ideological aspirations.215 I will not go into his theses here as I have done so in detail elsewhere. 216 But I would like to take this opportunity to point out an older interpretation that I was not aware of when I originally wrote this book.

As early as 1944, the libertarian economist and philosopher Friedrich A. von Hayek critically scrutinized the interpretation that fascism and National Socialism were primarily responses to communism. In his book The Road to Serfdom, Hayek stressed "that the rise of fascism and naziism was not a reaction against the socialist trends of the preceding period but a necessary outcome of those tendencies'. Thus, it is that "many who think themselves infinitely superior to the aberrations of naziism, and sincerely hate all its manifestations, work at the same time for ideals whose realization would lead straight to the abhorred tyranny'.217 When I first "discovered' Hayek's work, I was astonished to find that my interpretation of Hitler and National Socialism coincided in all essential points with Hayek's view.

Hayek highlighted the similarities between National Socialism and communism, which he saw above all in their fundamental socialist convictions. It was, he observed, far from a coincidence that many of the leaders and the supporters of the National Socialist and fascist parties were frequently former socialists:

Everyone who has watched the growth of these movements in Italy or in Germany has been struck by the number of leading men, from Mussolini downward (and not excluding Laval and Quisling), who began as socialists and ended as Fascists or Nazis. And what is true of the leaders is even more true of the rank and file of the movement. The relative ease with which a young communist could be converted into a Nazi or vice versa was generally known in Germany, best of all to the propagandists of the two parties.218

Of course, Hayek addressed the frequently voiced objection that in Germany before 1933, and in Italy before 1922, communists and Nazis or fascists clashed more frequently with each other than they did with other parties. Hayek's explanation:

They competed for the support of the same type of mind and reserved for each other the hatred of the heretic. But their practice showed how closely they are related. To both, the real enemy, the man with whom they had nothing in common and whom they could not hope to convince, is the liberal of the old type.219

Anyone who reads Chapter VI.2 of this book, which focuses on how Hitler employed "The Principles of Elite Recruitment During the Movement Phase', will find clear confirmation of what Hayek had already stated in 1944:

While to the Nazi the communist, and to the communist the Nazi, and to both the socialist, are potential recruits who are made of the right timber, although they have listened to false prophets, they both know that there can be no compromise between them and those who really believe in individual freedom.220

Hitler's revolution, contrary to Ernst Nolte's claims, was not primarily an anti-revolution inspired by fears that the communists were about to seize power, but an alternative revolution whose goal was likewise the destruction of the democratic, bourgeois-capitalist social order. The combination of anti- democratic and modern elements, as well as elitist and egalitarian components, is characteristic of Hitler's imagination. The anti-democratic and modern elements, the criminal and the progressive components of his ideology, are not to be understood in the sense of irreconcilable antagonisms, but rather as dialectical opposites in a consistent ideological system.

Notes




1 I would like to thank Professors Riccardo Bavaj, Jürgen W. Falter, Alexander Gallus, Eckhard Jesse and Frank-Lothar Kroll for their critical reading of this text and literature suggestions.

2 A compilation of high-profile reviews is available at: https://historiker- zitelmann.de/hitler-selbstverstaendnis. While the reception of my book in the leading German and international journals was positive, criticism was voiced by some historians on the far-left of the political spectrum, in particular Karl Heinz Roth. He referred to the "enormous success' of my book as "astonishing' and "in need of explanation', and said that it was "conceivable (though not excusable) that some of them [those who aligned themselves with my approach] are not aware of the political consequences of a deeply anti-emancipatory and anti-democratic reinterpretation of the concept of revolution and modernization'. Roth, 11.

3 In comparison to the English edition of this work, published by London House in 1999 as Hitler: The Policies of Seduction, almost no changes have been made to the main body of the text. The fact that I am able to republish the book with minimal corrections owes much to the decision I took at the time - in line with my understanding of science - to largely refrain from making value judgements or offering personal political commentaries. I was and am of the opinion that my readers want to gain a deeper understanding of Hitler's thinking and not the author's. Despite my efforts to abstain from value judgements and political commentaries, readers may notice from a number of formulations, especially in Section IV on Hitler's economic views, that when I wrote this book 35 years ago, I was guided more by left-wing (i.e. anti- capitalist) views, which I no longer subscribe to today.
4 Brustein, xii.

5 Ibid., 58.

6 Ibid., 57-62.

7 See Falter, Hitlers Wähler, 198-230.

8 Brustein, 157.

9 Ibid., 157.

10 Ibid., 141.

11 Ibid., 181.

12 Falter, Hitlers Parteigenossen, 436.

13 Lukacs, 50.

14 Ibid., 81.

15 Ibid., 112.

16 Ibid., 82.

17 Ibid., 36.

18 Ibid., 36.

19 Ibid., 108.

20 Hehl, 65.

21 In fact, what Hehl refers to are of course only partly "preconditions', and far more the results of my work.

22 Hehl, 107.

23 Ibid., 65.

24 Bavaj, Der Nationalsozialismus, 48.

25 Kroll, Utopie als Ideologie, 16.

26 Ibid., 310-311.

27 Ibid., 73.

28 Ibid., 72.

29 Ibid., 35.

30 Ibid., 36.

31 Ibid., 41.

32 Ibid., 91-92.

33 See also Chapter V.3 of this book.

34 Zehnpfennig, Mein Kampf, 10.

35 Ibid., 11.

36 Ibid., 12.

37 Ibid., 16.

38 Ibid., 229.

39 Ibid., Interpretation, 24.

40 Ibid., 26.

41 Zehnpfennig, Mein Kampf, 241.

42 Lüdicke, 10.

43 Ibid., 77-81.

44 See Zitelmann, "Zur Begründung des Lebensraum-Motivs'.

45 Ryback, 115.

46 Ibid., 95.

47 Ibid., 95.

48 Ibid., xi.


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