• New vulnerability in Apple's positioning service allows troop movements

    From Mickey D@21:1/5 to All on Thu May 30 17:30:36 2024
    XPost: misc.phone.mobile.iphone, comp.sys.mac.system, alt.comp.networking.routers

    https://www.plantalibre.mx/en/8jfkdjaa116979Pdfac1d42/
    Vulnerability of Apple Location Services - troop movements can be tracked

    A key component of Apple Location Services contains a so-called
    high-severity privacy vulnerability that could allow troop movements to be tracked.

    The issue could also allow an attacker to track the location of anyone
    using a mobile Wi-Fi router, such as those in RVs and travel routers
    sometimes used by business travelers.

    Both Apple and Google maintain their own WPS databases and the method they
    use is essentially the same. Detect nearby BSSIDs, measure the strength of
    each signal, then compare this data to the WPS database to find out where
    the mobile device is located.

    However, there is one crucial difference between the way Apple and Google devices perform this task - and that's where the privacy problem arises.

    Researchers at the University of Maryland found that Apple devices take a different approach than every other location service does by using
    on-device location tracking.

    On-device processing is one of Apple's trademarks and sounds more secure
    only when advertised in slick ads, but this is where the problem arises.

    The researchers said that by geofencing regions indexed by Apple's location API, they could track how Wi-Fi access points moved over time. Why could
    that be a big problem? They found that by geofencing active conflict areas
    in Ukraine, they could determine the location and movement of Starlink
    devices used by both Ukrainian and Russian military forces.

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  • From =?UTF-8?Q?J=C3=B6rg_Lorenz?=@21:1/5 to Mickey D on Thu May 30 23:36:13 2024
    XPost: misc.phone.mobile.iphone, comp.sys.mac.system, alt.comp.networking.routers

    On 30.05.24 23:30, Mickey D wrote:
    https://www.plantalibre.mx/en/8jfkdjaa116979Pdfac1d42/
    Vulnerability of Apple Location Services - troop movements can be tracked.

    Very old news.

    --
    "Alea iacta est." (Julius Caesar)

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  • From Jolly Roger@21:1/5 to Mickey D on Thu May 30 21:40:20 2024
    XPost: misc.phone.mobile.iphone, comp.sys.mac.system, alt.comp.networking.routers

    On 2024-05-30, Mickey D <mickeydavis078XX@ptd.net> wrote:

    [a bunch of pearl-clutching nonsense from someone who doesn't
    understand that all WiFi access points broadcast their SSIDs and
    BSSIDs to the world]

    Poor, little ignorant Arlen thinks he's latched onto a huge "gotcha",
    when it's really just a big nothing burger yet again. *YAWN*

    --
    E-mail sent to this address may be devoured by my ravenous SPAM filter.
    I often ignore posts from Google. Use a real news client instead.

    JR

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  • From Andrew@21:1/5 to Alan Browne on Fri May 31 17:37:35 2024
    XPost: misc.phone.mobile.iphone, comp.sys.mac.system, alt.comp.networking.routers

    Alan Browne wrote on Thu, 30 May 2024 19:18:55 -0400 :

    The "general" case is that it is absolutely not an Apple issue.
    SSID/BSSID's are OPENLY AND LOUDLY BROADCAST WORLDIWDE IN THE BILLIONS.

    The fact is you're defending Apple's holes, to the death, no matter what.

    Every desperate excuse you make for the flaws in Apple's implementation
    show you not understand what only Apple does that's different here.

    Worse, you were not aware the outward facing MAC address cannot be cloned
    (in almost all routers and particularly in the tested travel routers).

    And you were not aware that the SSID is meaningless for this exploit, other than the workaround that Apple suggested (of appending _nomac to the SSID).

    Furthermore, you're still not aware that a "hidden broadcast" has been a feature of nearly every router since the dawn of Wi-Fi, where the mere act
    of clicking that checkbox prevents the BSSID from being *uploaded* to the Google and Apple and Mozilla and Wigle databases, by default. (See notes in
    the sig, given the Apple religious zealots don't understand this issue).

    While you're frantically desperate to fabricate excuses for Apple's vulnerabilities, you don't ever show any understanding of them.

    Notes in the sig given Apple religious zealots don't understand anything.
    --
    Note 1: The hidden broadcast won't hide the BSSID from a seasoned attacker (such as a Google or Apple transit vehicle - depending on how its code is written); but the mere act of hiding the SSID broadcast packet has been
    proven to prevent the normal users' device (i.e., mobile phones) from
    uploading your BSSID using the typical software that we are speaking about

    Note 2: Since the Apple religious zealots act only out of franctic
    desperation to make excuses for all Apple's vulnerabilities, it should be
    noted that an intelligent person knows the difference between the upload of
    the BSSID (which is a first-order issue) vs the deletion of the BSSID from
    the Internet databases (which requires second-order software processing).

    Note 3: There's no way the Apple religious zealots will understand the two notes above, but for the intelligent people reading this thread, it should
    be noted that if you do hide your broadcast packets, then you often might
    want to set your client (such as a phone) to "remember" and "reconnect";
    but this has other issues - where the Apple zealots won't understand but
    you might understand that the "remember" is fine (unless you're worried
    about your phone being stolen) but the "automatic reconnect" should be
    turned off because that setting causes the phone to seek out the named AP.

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  • From Oscar Mayer@21:1/5 to All on Fri May 31 14:57:15 2024
    XPost: misc.phone.mobile.iphone, comp.sys.mac.system, alt.comp.networking.routers

    TheRegister reports Apple is throwing UK residents' privacy under the bus. https://www.theregister.com/2024/05/23/apple_wifi_positioning_system/

    "The threat applies even to users that do not own devices for which the WPSes are designed - individuals who own no Apple products, for instance,
    can have their AP in Apple's WPS merely by having Apple devices come within Wi-Fi transmission range."

    Here's the paper. https://www.cs.umd.edu/~dml/papers/wifi-surveillance-sp24.pdf

    Here's more information about Apple's privacy flaw which affects everyone.

    [https://9to5mac.com/2024/05/24/apple-location-services-vulnerability/]
    "There is one crucial difference between the way in which
    Apple and Google devices carry out this task
    and that's exactly where the privacy issue arises."

    [https://www.macworld.com/article/2343297/apple-wi-fi-network-wps-vulnerability-location-services-leak.html]
    "Researchers have discovered a crucial vulnerability in the way
    only Apple's location services work"

    [https://www.govinfosecurity.com/surveillance-risk-apples-wifi-based-positioning-system-a-25330]
    "The attack risk stems from Apple's WiFi-based Positioning System, or WPS"

    [https://9to5mac.com/2024/05/24/apple-location-services-vulnerability/]
    "We need to understand Apple devices figure out locations differently"

    [https://securityboulevard.com/2024/05/apple-wi-fi-location-privacy-richixbw/]
    "An unrestricted Apple API endpoint allows for easy tracking."


    [https://cybernews.com/privacy/apple-beams-wifi-location-data-privacy-risk/]
    "Anyone can exploit Apple's flawed WiFi-based positioning system (WPS)*

    [https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.14975]
    "In this work, we show that Apple's flawed WPS can too easily be abused"

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