On 04-14-23 17:09, Mike Powell <=-
spoke to All about Documents in the garage <=-
In all seriousness, why would a National Guardsman have access to such information to leak to begin with?
In all seriousness, why would a National Guardsman have access to such information to leak to begin with?
Perhaps because of sloppy access controls by the Air National Guard?
Mike Powell wrote to DALE SHIPP <=-
I would think sloppy access controls higher than that. Some of the
stuff reported to have been leaked is stuff that makes me question why anyone outside of the Pentagon and above would have any reason to know about.
In all seriousness, why would a National Guardsman have access to such
information to leak to begin with?
Perhaps because of sloppy access controls by the Air National Guard?
On 04-15-23 08:41, Mike Powell <=-
spoke to Dale Shipp about Re: Documents in the gar <=-
In all seriousness, why would a National Guardsman have access to such information to leak to begin with?
Perhaps because of sloppy access controls by the Air National Guard?
I would think sloppy access controls higher than that. Some of the
stuff reported to have been leaked is stuff that makes me question why anyone outside of the Pentagon and above would have any reason to know about.
On 04-15-23 16:04, Ron L. <=-
spoke to Mike Powell about Re: Documents in the gar <=-
Mike Powell wrote to DALE SHIPP <=-
I would think sloppy access controls higher than that. Some of the
stuff reported to have been leaked is stuff that makes me question why anyone outside of the Pentagon and above would have any reason to know about.
Which makes me think that the National Guard person was just the one
who was chosen to take the blame - not the one who did the actual retrieval of data.
I would think sloppy access controls higher than that. Some of the stuff reported to have been leaked is stuff that makes me question why anyone outside of the Pentagon and above would have any reason to know about.
It was on the news tonight that because he was in IT Admin, he had some
sort of access to many documents -- not that he was supposed to read
their contents. I call that sloppy. I do not know, but some of the documents might not have come from the Pentagon, but from elsewhere in
the Intelligence community.
On 04-16-23 07:20, Mike Powell <=-
spoke to Dale Shipp about Re: Documents in the gar <=-
It was on the news tonight that because he was in IT Admin, he had some
sort of access to many documents -- not that he was supposed to read
their contents. I call that sloppy. I do not know, but some of the documents might not have come from the Pentagon, but from elsewhere in
the Intelligence community.
Well, that he was an IT Admin is something I had not yet heard. They
do sometimes wind up with access to things they should not have
otherwise. Security Admins do also and, you are right, they are trusted not to read the contents.
It is sloppy and it is best to find a way to prevent that, if
possible.
Which makes me think that the National Guard person was just the one
who was chosen to take the blame - not the one who did the actual
retrieval of data.
You have no evidence for that claim. The evidence is contrary to your statement.
I would suggest end to end encryption (and I have heard that mentioned
on at least one news channel by a talking head). It might well be
difficult to implement in such a way as to give the multiple intended recipients ability to read, while at the same time denying read ability
to transitory points.
On 04-17-23 15:17, Mike Powell <=-
spoke to Dale Shipp about Re: Documents in the gar <=-
I would suggest end to end encryption (and I have heard that mentioned
on at least one news channel by a talking head). It might well be
difficult to implement in such a way as to give the multiple intended recipients ability to read, while at the same time denying read ability
to transitory points.
That would help prevent persons from decrypting them in transit, but
if the offender is on the sending or receiving end it would only do so
if they did not have clearance.
Since IT and security admins often have clearance (or the keys), it
might not have helped in this case.
Several, several years ago now, there was a high-ranking (but not
elected) state official whose computer was originally not locked down
with a password. Once forced to use one, he had someone else log him
on each morning because, in his mind, the computer should boot right up and be ready without such nonsense.
Not true. Clearance does not automatically grant access. It only
enables access if one has "need to know". The IT personnel may well have
the clearance, but could be prevented from decrypting by not having the appropriate keys.
Such ignorance and lack of concern is one of the things that makes
security difficult.
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